Essay
Immanuel Kant: Reason and Freedom
Immanuel Kant argues that being purely objective or purely rational and being independently free are two peas in a pod. As Kant argued in his widely known book Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, all human beings possess what he refers to as 'the idea of freedom' (Pasternack, 2002, 12). He builds his concept of categorical imperatives-- in the absence of which responsibility and morality would cease to exist-- upon the speculated idea that freedom is an omnipresent concept. Kant claims that it is clearly not possible for people to envision themselves as 'un-free' (Kant, 2013). They should see themselves as capable of suppressing every empirical cause (motivation), even if they decide indeed to pursue their desire or what they want. This claim is somewhat indirect or merely suggestive-- Kant does not clearly argue that people absolutely are free. However, the idea that people cannot prevent conceiving themselves as free is sufficient to confirm the assumption that the moral law in fact brings people together. This paper analyzes the Kantian model of reason and freedom, and compares it with the Marxist theory of rationality and freedom.
Some scholars argue that Kant presents a transcendental criticism of empirical determinism grounded on such a straightforward theory of freedom. Simply put, freedom demands transcendental limitations on metaphysics. Several metaphysical ideas are at odds with the notion of agency-- refers to the ability of an individual to function in a particular environment-- and cannot consequently be conceivable ideas for a free-thinking agent (Pasternack, 2002). Another argument often mentioned against the Kantian theory of reason and freedom states that Kant puts forth two ideas of freedom, which could be called the 'neutral' and 'rational' models. The neutral model pertains to people's ability to choose between right and wrong; specifically, having knowledge of the law people decide whether to abide by it or to freely disobey it (Indaimo, 2015). In the absence of this model of freedom it becomes unreasonable or unlikely to hold agents responsible for their wrongdoings. On the other hand, the rational model explains that freedom requires obeying the moral law. The argument explains that it is only when people obey the moral law that they are truly free of the influence of their volition by inherent desires (Kant, 2013). Therefore, rational freedom is seemingly needed so as to shed light on people's capability to choose moral acts.
Kant applies the concept of 'speculative reason' to describe the inclination of humans to reflect on things that are completely hypothetical in nature, things that seem to exist outside a person's actual sense experience, also called 'supersensible' (Kant, 2016, 574-5). Kant elaborates on the importance of a control or regulation of the speculative limitation of rationality in his original Critique (Kant, 2016, 575):
There is no need of a critique of reason in its empirical employment, because in this field its principles are always subject to the test of experience But where reason is being considered in its transcendental employment, in accordance with mere concepts, it stands so greatly in need of a discipline, to restrain its tendency towards extension beyond the narrow limits of possible experience and to guard it against extravagance and error, that the whole philosophy of pure reason has no other than this strictly negative utility.
Once a person uses his/her reasoning capability to the actual world, reflecting on things discernible through the senses, his/her experience necessarily will impose control or discipline upon his/her thinking; for instance, a person may realize that putting additional lubricant to his generator could lead to enhanced performance. Kant explains that this reasoning can be verified through experience.
Yet when a person exercises his/her reason in a completely speculative manner, reflecting on things, like eternal souls, which subsist outside the borders of his/her sense experience, there will be no experiential testing which can confirm his reasoning and “guard it against extravagance and error” (Kant, 2016, 575). Therefore Kant believes that speculative reason is in significant need of control or discipline, in such a way that the entire Critique has a single purpose, that is, putting in check the human inclination to stretch reasoning incorrectly “beyond the narrow limits of possible experience” (Kant, 2016, 575). He argues that “speculative restriction and practical extension of pure reason bring pure reason into that relation of balance wherein reason as such can be suitably used” (Kant, 1985, 147). Within such “relation of balance” (Kant, 1985, 147), the purpose of speculative reason is not, as explained by Kant, that of “assuming a new object beyond experience but only of approaching perfection in its employment within experience” (Olson, 1993, 26). Hence, in connection to freedom, one can formulate these following assumptions (Olson, 1993):
(1) So as to be conscious of one's freedom s/he should be capable of reasoning, without conflict, of him/herself as free;
(2) So as to conceive him/herself without conflict as free, s/he should exercise a discipline of the speculative limitation of his/her rationality, by which s/he thinks of him/herself in concert as a 'thing in itself' (unknowable) and an object of experience (knowable);
(3) Hence, so as to be conscious of his/her freedom, s/he should exercise a discipline of the speculative limitation of reasoning.
In other words, the path of reason unavoidably approaches the concept of freedom. In his final effort to provide an explanation of his arguments, Kant build on his landmark argument in the second Critique, which asserts that reason is a repository whose foundation is freedom. The Critique explains it clearly: “The concept of freedom, in so far as its reality is proved by an apodictic [absolute] law of practical reason, is the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason” (Dorrien, 2015, 541). Fundamentally, ideas acquire strength and objectivity only by associating themselves with the notion of freedom. In fact, as argued by Kant, even the paramount ideas of immortality and a Supreme Being become true simply through “the fact that there really is freedom, for this idea is revealed by the moral law” (Dorrien, 2015, 541). Kant explained that if the foundation is not placed at the repository of reason the repository will crumble. If the foundation of freedom is built, the repository becomes self-sustaining. Freedom is independence or self-determination, the self-supporting of law-- an unconditional, supreme law that is exactly the law of freedom with no excess or remnant.
Kant argues that freedom is a part of reason because freedom imposes supreme instructions that a person behave in a particular way and it demands the entirety of a person's will. Furthermore, freedom is pragmatic, transcending theoretical reasoning. Freedom is a form of causation, as asserted by Kant; it establishes laws for the knowable world and it induces responses or acts with visible, discernible consequences for the actual world (Kant, 1985). Basically, the philosophy of Kant was a model about the relationship between the tenets of the practical world and the rational world through sensible reason and the submission of all things to freedom.
This theory of freedom as the connection between the sensible and rational world and the totality of the self was the response from his ontological paradigm to the rules of his framework, although Kant did not explain it this way (Pasternack, 2002). As clarified by Henrich: “We need understanding in order to get to totality; we need totality in order to get to freedom: and we need freedom in order to get to the significance of the total system” (Henrich, 2008, 59). The concept of freedom allowed the system of Kant to be transformed into an entirety, although one cannot begin with this concept. Because the nothingness of freedom cannot be validated, one is privileged to believe in it if it seems to be a fundamental, paramount belief. However, the Kantian theory of freedom does not depend only on whether a person wishes to believe in it. It involved the castigating reality that if a person does not believe in his/her freedom, s/he cannot trust everything that his/her reasoning presents to him/her (Henrich, 2008). Kantian idealism was fixated on the indispensable value of freedom for reason, the absolute importance of not being strangled by subjectivity, the moral essence of freedom, and the liberating capacity of reason.
Kant believes that reason is the natural, unique attribute of human beings, or the inborn capability to freely exercise their volitions. It is the power of reasoning owned by humans which grants them their distinctive freedom. Specifically, this is the freedom to consciously exercise free will or to make a decision independent from other natural desires. Such is autonomous will also independent from other people (Indaimo, 2015). This reason is the core foundation of the moral identity of every individual, “reason, be itself and independent of all experience, ordains what ought to be done” (Indaimo, 2015, 25). It is the ability to exercise reasoned free will which makes individuals human and exceptionally moral.
Karl Marx: Reason and Freedom
Karl Marx argued that freedom has three requirements. First, that the person be autonomous or self-willed by rational and universal ideals; second, that the state's institutions and laws also be rational, in order that in following civil laws a citizen follows the rules of his/her reasoning; and, third, that culture and sentiments have been shaped so as to reinforce and go perfectly with these rational laws (McCarthy, 1992). According to the Kantian system, the potentiality of freedom demanded that the spiritual self not be situated in the phenomenal, causally driven, natural world. A 'thing-in-itself' sphere, other than the natural, was required as the spring of autonomous free will (Pasternack, 2002). Marx, in repudiating the presence of a nameless thing-in-itself, denies the presence of this 'thing-in-itself' sphere and hence should create another theory of freedom.
Marx firmly believes that freedom “is the generic essence of all spiritual existence” (McCarthy, 1992, 216). In order to make sense of Marx's ideas one must have an understanding of his idea of reason and its connection to the state and freedom. Primarily, for Marx, reason evolves. For instance, freedom evolves from being the exclusive right of certain people to being a universal attribute of the entire humanity. Each institution or domain in the state develops its own reason that evolves in accordance to the inherent rules of its existence. Such is its special freedom, and it should autonomously evolve in its own way (Marx et al., 1972). Marx argued that moral virtue is the accomplishment of freedom. Marx believes that freedom functions as a law in a state. Laws are the necessary universal standards through which freedom, the growth of reason, gains a theoretical form autonomous (Marx, 1975) from the prejudice of people.
Universal laws represent reason; in contrast, the specific interests of people are incidental, biased, and trivial. To be governed by specific interests instead of by rational universal law is to be subserviently, unreasonably, and immorally subjected to a specific thing. Laws cannot be subjected to desires; desires should be subjected to laws (Wood, 1981). Adopting Rousseau's idea that subordination to individuals or objects is bondage whereas submission to universal rational law is freedom (Rousseau, 2010), Marx claims that people should abide by the law. Laws should ensure the protection of people's specific interests. He further argues that natural laws of freedom are developed as rational state laws. Therefore, laws are representation of real existence in consciousness. Because laws represent reason, when a person stops obeying these freedom laws the state can force him/her to abide by the law and hence, as explained by Rousseau (2010), it forces the person toward a state of freedom.
Only with the complete realization of human reason or spirit could moral virtue develop. Because reason is universal, its most important requirement is the rational state, wherein the common issues of law and morality are completely reconciled. The real foundation of morality is not personal behavior, but social unity. Based on these ideas, Marx declared the rational state as the “concretisation of human freedom” (Marx, 1975, 200). In the rational state, a person is autonomous or self-willed-- the state is secure, unified, and resistant to self-contradiction. Marx asserted that “a state, which is not the concretisation of rational freedom is a bad state” (Marx, 1975, 200). A bad or flawed state is defined by weak autonomy, self-contradiction, insecurity, and conflict.
Similar to Kant, Marx asserted that freedom is autonomy or self-determination, the subordination of the self and its fundamental roles to one's rational, conscious actions. This notion of freedom has been labeled by several prominent philosophers, like Hegel, Kant, Rousseau, and Spinoza as 'self-possession', 'autonomy', and 'moral liberty' (Wood, 1981, 51). According to Marx, 'negative' freedom, or the lack of force or restrain on people, has importance primarily because it creates the possibility of exercising freedom in a more profound, proactive way. The support of Marx for this idea of freedom is clear-- to have freedom “in the materialistic sense” (Wood, 1981, 51) means being “free not through the negative power of avoiding this and that, but through the positive might of making one's true individuality count” (Wood, 1981, 51). Simply put, Marx believes that the connection between reason and freedom rests in the fact that individuals have to own a sense of purpose through social relations.
Under a state of freedom, once individuals realize their needs for purpose, meaning, agency, and community, they gain self-respect, which is accompanied by the “self-realization of all” (Thompson, 2015, 82). The core objective and ideology of a Marxian theory of reason and freedom is to remodel social and economic relations in a way that satisfies the needs and desires of everyone and facilitate rational freedom and gratifying self-fulfillment. Human freedom, according to Marx, requires the development of one's own capabilities and reasoning and the strengthening of social relations and human dignity. Dignity is a moral objective and norm for the appraisal of a person's purpose and value and the emotion and experience that accompanies the attainment of that goal. Dignity, based on Marxist theory, rests not only in a person's self-worth and his/her self-consciousness, but in the self-consciousness of everyone (Thompson, 2015). Basically, Marx believes that self-realization or self-consciousness is the fulfillment of reason, which would eventually lead to freedom. The 'categorical imperative' (Thompson, 2015, 82; Wood, 1981) is to promote and empower the self-consciousness of all, which essentially requires confronting, criticizing, and revolutionizing the domination of a capitalist system, its ideologies and political economy that hinder the dignity and self-consciousness of others.
Conclusions
The connection between reason and freedom has been one of the focuses of the Kantian and Marxist system. Both Kant and Marx believe that one cannot exist without the other, which means that reason and freedom are interdependent of each other. For Kant, it is only through reason that one can conceive of his/her freedom. It is the existence of reasoned free will that makes freedom possible for an individual. Marx echoes these Kantian ideas and adopts them to develop his own account of the relationship between reason and freedom. For Marx, rationality and freedom are needed for the attainment of the self-realization or self-consciousness of all, which could, in consequence, destroy the oppressive forces of capitalist domination.
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