The second Battle of Falluja involved also known as Operation Al-Farr and the Operation Phantom Fury, included joint forces of Iraq, United States, and Britain offensive in the year 2004, during the months of November and December (American Veteran Center). It is considered the greatest war that ever took place in the Iraqi’s Falluja soil. The United States Marine Corps approved by the Iraqi interim government to launch the attack and lead the war against the Iraqi insurgency in Falluja. It was considered one of the greatest conquest the United States have combated using the submarine in an urban area since the Vietnamese Battle of Hue City in 1968 (Chang, 30). The operation that was launched was the second after the one that had taken place in April the same year when the coalition forces fought the first battle to capture or kill the insurgent groups that were held responsible for the execution of Black water security teams.
Strategic Context:
The Relationship of The Battle To Other Political/Military Conditions At The Time Of The Battle
The battled did not originate from nowhere, but from the fighting that took place in April 2004, after the murder of the four Black water contractors (Lowry 108). The fighting that was being faced in Falluja and other parts of the country were considered some of the first Iraqi intifada against the United States. During the same period, it is quite known that the United States military was not able to deal with the insurgency due to political, and the informational developments they were facing that time. Some of these weaknesses were driven by the presence of Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia, a Mahdi Army that attacked the coalition forces on the second day of April to respond to the move the coalition had taken, through the closure of Hazwa newspaper and the arrests they made to their top aides (Caputi 3). Meanwhile, other groups such as the Sunni Cells continued their operations outside Fallujah in an area known as Ramani, making the British call for a solution to halt the attacks.
Al-Jazeera broke out the news to the world claiming that the United States military had attacked and murdered over six hundred Iraqi civilians, and the images of the dead children were repeatedly displayed escalating havoc between the United States military and the insurgency groups (Caputi 4). These factors fired the clashes between the United States military and these factors forced the L Paul Bremer, the United States proconsul to prevail on General John Abizaid, who was the head of the US central command to halt the offensive operations on the ground (Chang 32). The actions marked the beginning of the unilateral ceasefire operation by the United States that lasted until the end of April that year (Chang, 32). The clashes that were initiated by the insurgent groups continued afterward. The insurgent development groups too had learned war tactics aside from the political developments that had taken place that time. They had skills and competence while fighting with the submarines. The most successful accomplishment was the ability to use media to publicize their acts, and they knew the importance of information operations on the outcome of the war.
Strategic objective that was served by the battle
The battled managed to combat the insurgence groups that had infested Falluja. These insurgence groups were known to be the cause of clashes that broke out in the town and outside the town killing innocent civilians (American Veteran Center). The mission was also a revenge mechanism for the four contractors that had been killed by the insurgence group.
Short timeline of events leading up to the battle
The battle began after the ambush of the four US contractors, leaving the brutally beaten bodies hanged, at the end of March 2004. The operation Vigilant Resolve also known as Falluja One followed with an invasion of 1st Marine Division so as to gain control of the city and demonstrate the coalition resolve (Matthews150). The pressures from the national, regional and international pleaded them to accede to a ceasefire and cede control of the Falluja Brigade. On July, the United States characterized the Falluja One a failed mission due to the infestations of insurgents in Falluja. The strategic outcome of the coalition’s defeat and its subsequent defeat was worse than expected (Chang 31). Al-Najaf was also known as the Pacific Guardian that took place between 5th to 27th August 2004. Belton Samara that took place between 1st and 4 October followed and finally the Al Fajr also known as Falluja II followed and it was one of the battles, which demonstrated the importance of political and military interaction. The battle saw successful Iraqi elections in January take place.
The Geographical Considerations That Influenced The Selection Of Strategic Objectives And The Resources Allocated To The Mission
Operational Context:
The Type of Operation Being Analyzed
The operation we are describing is a battle, as it characterizes a campaign that had military goals, for instance, its goal was to ensure that they faced off all the insurgent groups that cased chaos in Fallujah. The operation combines the use of different arms to combat the enemy (Lowry, 27). For our case, the military used sub-marines and fire arms combined with intelligent information’s and organization to bring the insurgent group down.
How the battle fit into the larger campaign plan
The battle planners knew that airstrikes were not the best tactic for the war but rather to keep a leading position in the information battlefield and invalidating the revolutionary leader through coercion to leave or even prove them wrong (American Veteran Center). The Operation Al-Fajr was selected as it put the Iraqi face on the attack and its goal was to ensure that the enemy leaves no doubt that the attack had licensed Independent Investigation Group (IIG).
How the Campaign Plan Supports the Larger Strategic Objectives
The aim of the battle was to remove the insurgents and not to attack nor destroy the city. The application of the intended guideline, the military managed to develop courses of action in the entire information domain, hence hoisting the IO threshold and generating additional movement room to battle the operations that took place in Fallujah (Chang 32). The deliberate counter of the enemy information campaigns, premeditated and carry out IO shaping functions and carefully planned leader engagements, public and military diplomacy actions helped in the battle (Chang 31). The military managed to build a strong support base, for combating in the advance operation through well-synchronized, integrated, and completed actions helped in massing the information for the operations.
The Geographical Considerations Influenced Operational Planning
The fact that Falluja was an urbanized environment, it was relatively complex to plan a successful operation. The fact that the town was situated near a river and that a superhighway split it into two was challenging for the operations (Chang 31). To combat this challenge, the setup checkpoints to ensure that no insurgent left the town. The civilians were encouraged to leave the town to avoid getting caught up in the battle. During the battle, they ensured that they surrounded the entire city to avoid escape or retreat of the insurgent group.
The “Lines of Operation” For Both Sides in the Battle
Both groups took control of different parts of Fallujah to combat its enemy at its full capacity. The military controlled close to seventy percent of the city. Their lines of operations ensured that no insurgent group left the city. They occupied the western Fallujah from the north. The other combat team took the eastern part of the city that included the US and the Iraqi troops. While the war progressed the, it took its operations to the Euphrates River, on the differing side of Fallujah, and seized Fallujah General Hospital. It also held the two bridges of the river to disrupt any retreat from the insurgent groups (Lowry 109). The insurgent groups took over the city residents and hideouts to perform their operations.
Order of Battle:
The Organization of the Opposing Forces
The US troops grouped itself into two combat groups. The first group consisted of 3rd and 1st Battalions and Marines respectively, 3rd and 5th Battalion and Marines, Naval Mobile Battalion 4 and 23 Seabees and the US Army 2nd Battalion/7th Calvary. The Combat team seven comprised of 11th Battalion/8th Marine, the US Army 2nd Battalion and 2nd Infantry and 2nd Battalion and 12th Calvary (American Veteran Center). The 1st Battalion Black Watch encircled Fallujah. Task Force Black, helped with the air strikes. Meanwhile, the insurgent groups dug tunnels and trenches and even prepared spider holes. They occupied and filled darkrooms with flammable liquids, and they even blocked streets in preparation for the war. They placed Jersey barriers in homes to create points of attacks with unsuspecting troops that entered the building (Matthews 151). They trapped buildings, vehicles, wired doors, and windows to grenades
The Types of Forces (Infantry, Mounted, Air Units, Naval Units,) Engaged
The forces that were engaged in the battle included the US Army, the British and the Iraqi forces, sailors, ISF, sniper teams, and Navy personnel support roles (Lowry 110). They grouped themselves into two regimental combat teams. The Insurgent forces were made of hardcore and part-time insurgents that included Chechen, Saudi, Iranian, Filipino, Libyan and Syrian combats. They were Iraqi nationals and foreign mujahedeen groups.
Weaponry Systems (Artillery, Armor, Aviation) Significant To the Conduct of The Battle
Some warfare items were used for during the war including, snipers that were employed six sniper teams, F-16 Fighting Falcons, F-15 Strike Eagles, Thunderbolts and AC-130 gunships were used in controlling the city (Caputi 12). Aerial vehicles were used for reconnaissance and precision strikes (American Veteran Center). Armored bulldozers were employed to plow the streets; guns were used by the troops as they maneuvered the city. The insurgent groups utilized firearms, flammable liquids, grenades, and explosives to attack their opponents.
Works Cited
American Veterans Center. 2015. 14 March 2016. <http://www.americanveteranscenter.org/avc-media/magazine/avq/avq-issue-ii/operation-phantom-fury-the-second-battle-of-fallujah/>.
Caputi, Ross. "The Human Consequences of US foreign policy in Fallujah ." 6 November 2004. Justice for Fallujah Project. 14 March 2016. <http://thefallujahproject.org/home/sites/default/files/FallujahPrimer.pdf>.
Chang, Tao-Hung. "The Battle of Fallujah: Lessons Learned on (MOUT) in the 21st Century Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain." 2008. 14 March 2016. <https://sa.rochester.edu/jur/issues/fall2007/chang.pdf>.
Lowry, Richard S. New Dawn: The Battles for Fallujah. New York: Savas Beaty, 2010.
Matthews, Matt M. Operation AL FAJR:A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.
