Conflict amidst nations is a historical issue. Almost each and every country around the world has undergone either internal or external conflict. Some of the conflicts have been the most useful platforms for reconciliations. Meaningful reconciliatory talks have led to magnificent developments in the countries that had huge war problems. Equally, there are some other countries that have continued to stay behind because of the never ending wars. The consequences are deaths, tensions and poor cross boarder relations. The paper will take an in-depth study of the North and South Korean wars. The Korean wars are primarily the political, diplomatic and military correlations between the two countries following the division of the larger Korea after World War II.
According to Sun Zi, those who excel in war always move the enemy and never get intimidated by the actions of their enemies in the battlefield. Therefore, to retain the initiative in the war, it is required that the winning party in the battlefield forces the enemy to react in either way. The significance of the Huai Hai Campaign is that it is considered as one of the largest wars in the twentieth century and also the Chinese civil war that took place in the 1940s. Therefore, this campaign morale was based subduing the nationalists' ideologies for the communists' ideologies in the provinces of China. Operational art in this war was designed to achieve the best operational plans. The ability of every war to be won was by how tactful the skills to in that war apply in the long run.
The planning of the Huai Hai Campaign
The campaign of this war saw the up come of very capable forces and which served as powerful military components during that era. It associates with the development of political, social and economic structures that worked in support of the communist's armies in the field of war. The military strategies employed during this time and that had the overall effect of this campaign (Bjorge, Gary, and Army 51). Therefore, this shows that this campaign was envisioned rather than planned by the military warlords. Having proposed the campaign, Sung Yu employed some principles to realize the art of winning the war. The attacks relied on a dispersed approach, and isolated army forces were concentrated and very intense. Annihilating the enemy forces was their main objective and in this process, they stripped the enemy forces their effective strength at large.
During the process, the Sung Yu proposal was to have a complete battle victory and to seize or to hold a city or town or any geographical setting was not part of their objective. Superior forces were employed in the process, encircling the enemy forces and completely wiping them out. Though brutal, this approach in the battlefield served as an effective tool in allowing the forces win in major battles. According to this article, most of the enemy forces were completely taken out in the process (Bjorge, Gary, and Army, 79). It served as a win-win situation for the forces in the discussion. Su Yu was determined to exploit some vulnerabilities of the other forces through maneuvers in a bid to create the beat art of war strategies in the world. This is according to the topic seven, maneuvering. Sunzi also asserts that winning a war there is a degree of which the superiority in information acquisition about the enemy forces is better that jus the number of the fighting forces on the battlefield or when two or more parties are at war (Bjorge, Gary, and Army, 123).
Therefore, claims create a potential victory of for the forces that employ them. These descriptions given by Su Yu proposal showed the strategies employed by the communist strategies by their leaders and commanders. In these strategies, the armies were likened to water, in the sense that water maneuvers through the rocks and other factors and therefore if the army's maneuverability likens to that of water, victories was an obvious outcome. At a level of operational art and tactical skills and levels, Communists advancement towards the south of the Yangzi River was taken as a special priority due to their winning strategies. This was completely dependent on plans lay out according to the first topic, laying out plans in Su Tzu’s Art of War (Bjorge, Gary, and Army, 109).
They achieved local superiority, and this was shown through the destruction of the nationalist army one by one in the war field. With this, the nationalist army was at the other end ready to take a counteractive measure, by this, they employed the spirit of maneuverability and mass numbers. The first application of their strategy was the "hammer and anvil" strategy that was applied when ECFA attacked Jinan. This attack occurred on September. Since this was a poor approach and also poor operational art strategy, it was marked by a lot of failures. It was because of the inactive defense approach employed during the time ineffective. Planning a strategy in the art of war was evident when relief forces deployed (Bjorge, Gary, and Army, 89).
Major physical elements that are always pertinent to the operational arts are the geography of an area, terrain, weather and finally the infrastructure. The factors determine the number of military actions and how effective they get carried out in the process. They associate with factors such as movement and maneuver. Having a geographical position to your military advantage is important since it can at times determine how strategic attack (strategic offensive action) occurs. Therefore, these factors must be considered in organizing workable operations planning. Ina broader aspect, Huai Hai Campaign has fought plains in the southeastern parts of Yellow River (Bjorge, Gary, and Army, 95). The area was densely populated and therefore, hence needing larger operation level. The climate of the area was a combination of both the continental and maritime. The transportation infrastructure was an important feature in the war and therefore, the poor infrastructure in some areas made it harder to realize a good operational plan approach.
In Xuzhou to Gansu province, the rails that were present served as an important figure in the communists strategy and weaponry transport to the front lines. This railroad was the core of every logistic system during this war. Poor infrastructure caused more problems for the nationalists than the communist's forces in the same geographical setting. One of the explanations behind this is the kind of manpower employed by the two warring parties. Communists used largely human and animal energy for transportation as opposed to the nationalists who used mechanical power for movement (Bjorge, Gary, and Army 113). The strategy of the communists to infrastructure after or during an attack came in handy since most of the combat power of the nationalists completely depended on the machinery. A clear art of war strategy done by the communist's commanders was efficient in every way. Therefore, the routes and destinations of these people were easily changed due to their flexibility.
The Huai Hai Campaign: first stage
In the first stage of Huai Hai Campaign, both the nationalists and communists employed the Sunzian concepts on the act of war. The communist's forces had already secured areas such as Shandong, Hebei, and Henan. It was a perception created by the art of war by the Sunzi. Their main objective was to realize the vulnerability of the nationalists' side; this strategy was to be achieved through a severe blow to their enemy forces. Defending the Xuzhou-Bengbu by nationalists was a strategic plan to create invincibility. This was bids to identify the communist's vulnerability. This shows that both sides had the intention to attack the other at their weakest points. Series of events occurred during this time and on 6th November Nationalist, respective forces relocated as had been planned by their military commanders. It was agreed on the previous day. Relocation of these units was characterized by some shortcomings including loss of communication channels this made the 181st Division exposed at Zhanggongdian and were very vulnerable to some attacks from the Communists (Bjorge, Gary, and Army, 163).
Communists' approach of the art of war and strategic planning was efficient and was majorly attributed to the excellent works of their operatives and agents. Intended actions of the nationalists were known, and this served as an important tool in encircling the seventh army. In this case, the Seventh Army shifted their course and moved towards Grand Canal on the west bank. The communists commander in play during that time Su Yu learned of the action and through his intelligence and made an order to hold the Seventh Army prevent them from crossing the river. This was a success to the Communists (Bjorge, Gary, and Army, 172). These clearly indicate how the Sunzian art of war and strategy served in landing them victory. There is a total link to the topic nine, Army on the March.
The Huai Hai Campaign: the second stage
In the second stage of this campaign, in Su Yu's view, this was an opportunity to attack the enemy and claim a victory of this last phase. With regards to the Sunzian doctrines on the art of war, he claimed that attacking the enemy forces sooner would be beneficial. The weather issues came into play during his approach to this strategy. This had come after a loss the nationalists had suffered at Jinan (Bjorge, Gary, and Army, 187). The two factors combined, he said would result in reducing the morale of the nationalists ‘army. Sunzi describes shi (translated as energy) in his article on the art of war as very vital. Su Yu desire was to follow this approach and take complete control of the situation. Strategic military planning was of great importance to this mission at large. This was appreciated by the Su Yu strategies in some ways due to their employment all throughout the war. In this situation the topic four, tactical dispositions, the strategy Su used was in a manner to win and take complete control of the war.
A series of events that occurred at this time included the contesting for the central position. The area was of great importance to the communists during this Huai Hai Campaign. Planning before and during this campaign was a vital strategy. Control of the central position was taken in a bid to separate the Nationalist armies in Xuzhou and destroying them (Bjorge, Gary, and Army, 244). The battle was won, and their primary goal now was to defend the central position and protect it from the nationalists.
PLA and Korean War
China's People's Liberation Army-PLA is reputed as the world's largest military force, with over two million troops. It consists of five service branches which include; rocket force, strategic support force, air force and the ground effect. Its soldiers have been serving both in the field and in the air. Part of the robust force has also been deployed on the high sea. It is under the command of the central military commission of the Communist Party of China (Allison, 1304).
Over the past few decades, the Chinese people's liberation army- PLA has experienced tremendous growth. Apart from the huge number of troops and tanks, the military boasts of the most rigorous soldier training in the world. The success and remarkable growth of this army have a long standing history backdating to the period just after the world -war II. It waged its first major external war in Korea within the period 1950-1953. It was the most significant battle ever fought by the army in its military history (Allison 1305). It had intervened to help quench the war in Korea. The success of this army has been associated with the PLA's application of operational art at the campaign and tactical levels of warfare. Under this strategy, on this topic, there was a laid out plan by the Army during this war. According to Sun Tzu, winning any particular war is a vital aspect attributed to the state.
Under the strategy discussed in chapter one, laying plans, he goes on to say that five factors are associated to the winning of war in any situation. The factors here include moral law, method, and discipline, commanders’ power, heaven, and earth. On the element of moral laws, the people of China were completely loyal to their leader during this time. The above features were are evident in that, the PLA leaders have been credited as talented planners making thorough preparations before launching any military attack. These tactics and structures were realized and tested in the war of Yan'an, and operations against the Japanese, this was in the year 1945.Although China was militarily feeble, the long presence in the war made them bold. In a well-schemed approach in planning as a strategy of the art of war, the villages of Yan'an were armed, and this gave the Eight Route Army a strategy for defense.
Pingxingguan battle validates the art of war by Sun Tzu in his book under the topic waging war and attack by stratagem. He says that there is no particular possibility of a country having benefited from an extremely long warfare. Here there was an ambush of the Japanese army unit called 21st Brigade if the Fifth Division. As a result of negligence, this group entered a large ravine that was made them vulnerable. This attack was made by small groups and hand to hand combat was applied. This meant that the enemy forces could not get the time to deploy their military might using the present artillery. Therefore, this proves that attacking an enemy when the enemy is not expecting. Divulging beforehand the military devices leading to victory should be avoided.
In 1950, (NKPA) invaded across the 38th Parallel with over 135,000 men. The out- numbered Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), which did not have enough anti-tank weapons or combat aircraft, field artillery suffered heavy casualties. North Korean army units entered Seoul on June 28(Allison, 1304). The American X Corps porous assault at Inchon started on Sept. 15, 1950. Douglas MacArthur, who was the General of the Army commander-in-chief of United Nations Command, planned to free Seoul and crush the NKPA between X Corps and Eighth Army, triggering its breakout from the Pusan Perimeter on Sept. 16. It prompted the People's Liberation Army to move with speed into advancing its forces into the Korean territory.
China's first offensive at the Korean War
According to Sun Tzu, in his book in chapter eight, there is the employment variation in tactics. In this particular case, the army employed the tactic of the element of surprise on a larger scale when volunteers from China advanced into Korea during the month of October 19, 1950. The republic of China was in a position to deploy about 200,000 troops into North Korea without being noticed by the intelligence of UN which was under the command of the United States and used them to cut off the UN columns pushing toward the Chinese border. These volunteers ejected from their hiding places especially hills that were near the area called Unsan in North Korea, in the wee hours of the first day of November 1950, throwing hand-held explosive devices commonly referred to as the grenades and firing guns at the not expecting soldiers of America and allied forces, during that time. Survivors of the initial previous attacks described on the degree of how shaken they were. Attack by the Chinese forces and their not very superior infantry had left not in a position to attack safely. A number of soldiers from the communist Chinese had advanced into the north (this number amounted to thousands) west and northwest, against very scattered U.S. and South Korean army units who were moving into the fields of North Korea, in the ends. The Chinese appeared to come out of nowhere as they stormed around the flanks and over the erected and established defensive positions of the not expecting United Nations.
The element of terrain in chapter ten according to the book is of great importance. The terrain is described by six aspects including, accessibility of the ground, how entangling the field is, narrow passes, strategic heights and enemy positions on the ground. Regarding the overall organization, the PLA army had four broad divisions; Commander in Chief, Acting Chief of Staff, First, Second, Third and Fourth Field Army. At the time of the Korean invasion, the first field army was manning the North-West China and the Xinjiang region; the second field army was deployed in West China preparing to move into Tibet. The third field army was in east China coast preparing to advance into Taiwan while the Fourth Field Army stationed at South China coast was preparing to seize the Hainan island and eject the remnants of the KMT forces. Regarding machinery, the army had comparatively primitive equipment. There were little artillery, few trucks, very little air support and no armor forces. Most of the equipment they possessed had been earlier captured from previous attacks and were of American and Japanese origin. Some were turned over by the Soviet.
On July 27, 1953, an agreement called the Armistice got signed, and this marked the end times of the War aimed at resisting the aggressiveness of the US and help Korea. Between the months of March 15 to October 26, 1958, volunteers from the Chinese side withdrew from Korea in groups of army units and returned to China (Gervais 49). At the end of this war, China undoubtedly suffered the most with over 900000 casualties. About 20,000 were missing and approximate number of the injured amounted to 500,000. The cost of the Korean War to China proved expensive and unsustainable. The end position of Communist China is considered a draw and, therefore, flexing their muscles to prove to the world their military might and power. North Korea was an ally of the communists Chinese and therefore China had to enter the war in order to protect an ally. This showed that china would not tolerate any foreign military actions along its borders.
Korean War is one of the most significant war ever fought by the People's Liberation Army. It is evident from the fact that it inflicted the highest casualty figure ever experienced by the army in its 40-year history. Also, it equipped the PLA with valuable combat experience which has made it mature as a military force. It also enabled PLA to realize the need to upgrade its weapon inventory to meet the technological demand of modern war. Similarly, PLA recognized the need to professionalize the military human resource (Gervais 57). The modernization program of the PLA initiated to a sudden halt in the late1950s.The reasons for this was the souring relations with the Sino-Soviet. Mao had become highly suspicious of the Soviet's communist regime since they were pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence with the western powers. Consequently, the Soviet had to withdraw its military from China. Primarily, the Korean wars can be perceived as wars of conquest and a show of superiority and there have been a lot of attempts made to call for a unification. Firstly, the paper takes a significant overview of the events that lead to the division of Korea. From the year 1910, the Korean peninsula was under the control of the Japanese government.
Work Cited
Allison, Fred H. "Help from Above: Air Force Close Air Support of the Army, 1946-1973 (review)." The Journal of Military History 68.4 (2004): 1304-1305.
Bjorge, Gary, and army command. Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese PLA's HuaiHai Campaign. Diane Publishing, 2004.
Gervais, John. The Army's Role in the Air/Sea Battle Concept: A World War II Pacific Theater Case Study. No. atzl-swv. Army Command And General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Ks School Of Advanced Military Studies, 2013.
