Abstract
This paper reviews the historical background of Jihadi-Salafism from the time of the crusaders. Jihadi-Salafists are depicted as elements of the broader Salafi movement, social and religious reformers who desire to restore the original beliefs and practices of the first three generations of the Muslim religion. The current Jihadi-Salafists draw their motivation from the perceived attacks on the Muslim community since the beginning of the European colonialism in the nineteenth century and the termination of Ottoman caliphate during the twentieth century. The first part of the discussion includes an evaluation of the United States foreign policy and how it has influenced the growth of Jihadi-Salafism, particularly in the years following the September 11 attacks. Nonetheless, some authors claim that the United States has played a balanced role in fighting Jihad. The last part of the discussion explores the perception that, had the West acted differently in their quest to fight jihadi terrorism, the situation would have been more desirable today.
Keywords: Salafism, Jihad, Jihadi-Salafism, foreign policy, radicalization
Over the past two decades, the Al-Qaeda has made several initiatives with the aim of overthrowing Western-backed governments, especially in North Africa. There have also been several attacks in countries like the United States and France by groups claiming to be Salafi fighters, declaring jihad “in the name of Allah” (Shaffer, 2016). However, their methodology and philosophy tend to vary with the first known Salafists, who seemed to be quietist in their political inclinations. This papers reviews the background of Jihadi-Salafism and explores how the United States foreign policy and past mistakes by countries in the West have influenced the development if this phenomenon.
Background of Jihad-Salafism
Jihadi-Salafists represent a portion of the wider Salafi movement. Glazzard, Jesperson, & Winterbotham (2015) describe Salafists as social and religious reformers who desire to restore the original beliefs and practices of the founding three generations of Muslims. They have a distinct perception of “the unity of God”, disregard the authenticity of polytheism, consider the Quran and Sunna to be the only valid references as far as law and authority are concerned, and oppose religious innovation. Many Salafists believe that compliance with Muslim rulers is essential, even though some of these rulers tend to be authoritarian. Salafists almost entirely do not support jihad against Arab governments because they consider rebellion to be detrimental to the Muslim community.
Nonetheless, the past several decades have seen the emergence of a new strain of Salafists that supports violence, which they perceive as a demonstration of jihad. Such perceptions have been embraced by several cells in the Middle Eastern nations and North Africa. The common objective of these groups is the use of violent jihad to create a new Islamic political structure and lifestyle. However, they tend to differ regarding the methodology and strategy that would be more efficient in achieving this objective.
What may be referred to as jihad has changed over time and geographical location. The Abbasids and Umayyads, which were the first two Muslim Dynasties, employed jihad to maintain control over their territories. Concerning this such an age, jihad may be classified as either offensive jihad or defensive jihad. Offensive jihad was considered to be the responsibility of Muslims on a collective basis whereas defensive jihad was regarded as an individual duty of a Muslim aimed at repelling invaders (Shaffer, 2016). The latter category of jihad was applied mostly during the Crusades and the Mongol invasion, at the period when Muslim nations were being attacked. The Jihadi-Salafists, especially those who were scholars, of that age convinced the Muslim Community that such an approach was not political-territorial; rather, that it was aimed at purifying Muslim identity and culture. For instance, Ibn Taymiyya, a fourteenth-century scholar, and jihadi-Salafist, held that any form of violence against the Mongol rulers of that time was justified, and stated that they were barely authentic Muslims by virtue of their desire to maintain their previous non-Islamic cultural practices and laws (Glazzard, Jesperson, & Winterbotham, 2015).
Today, Jihadi-Salafists hold that the Muslim Community has suffered major attacks since the beginning of the European colonialism in the nineteenth century and the end of Ottoman caliphate on the onset of the following century. Hence, they consider jihadi-Salafism to be justified because it is used as a tool to protect the Muslim Community against invaders of any kind (Shaffer, 2016). Thus, it is necessary to study this perception of jihad as a defensive responsibility because it tends to empower Muslims at a personal level rather than a government or ruler to declare jihad.
The United States Foreign Policy and Jihadi-Salafism
Scholars tend to hold different opinions regarding the role of the United States foreign policy in reinforcing Jihadi-Salafism. Some studies claim that the United States’ support for Israel and oppressive secular regimes among Islamic nations brings about the resentment that tends to strengthen Jihadist-Salafist groups such as the Al-Qaeda. Some also discuss the upsetting results of the war in Iraq on the image of the United States overseas (Shaffer, 2016). On the other hand, some authors disregard the perceived connection between the United States foreign policy and the growth of Jihadist-Salafism. Such commentators support the notion that the United States has played a rather balanced role towards combatting this phenomenon than it is given credit. The initiatives that the country has made, including applying pressure on Israel to allow Palestine to establish its state, supporting Bosnian Muslims, and intervening in Somalia in times of devastating political and social problems, are a demonstration of the role that the United States plays towards Muslims.
What the West should have Done Differently
In 2002 and 2003, in response to the September 11 attacks, the United States invoked the language of war, thereby falling into Osama’s trap. The US marched into Iraq and took hold of some of the country’s sacred Muslim sites. As a result, the Holy War against invaders that Osama bin Laden had visualized came into being. According to Neumann (2013), the war in Iraq has led to the increased rates of radicalization and Jihadi terrorism mainly against the United States. The invasion is being used as an ideological tool to recruit more members into terrorist cells.
France has also had its share of terrorist attacks, specifically in 2015. The United States President, Obama, came under considerable criticism when he failed to show up in the march by heads of states in support of France after the attacks in January that year that left twenty people dead and another twenty-two injured (Shaffer, 2016). Nonetheless, other countries in the West should avoid invading Muslim nations in future; rather, they should try and improve the security in areas that are potential targets of terrorist attacks (Shaffer, 2016). Concentrating so many resources in Muslim territories only serves to increase radicalization and the possibility of terrorist attacks.
Conclusion
References
Glazzard, A., Jesperson, S., & Winterbotham, E. (2015). Conflict and Countering Violent Extremism: Literature Review.
Neumann, P. R. (2013). The trouble with radicalization. International Affairs, 89(4), 873-893.
Shaffer, R. (2016). Jihad and Counter-Jihad in Europe: Islamic Radicals, Right-Wing Extremists, and Counter-Terrorism Responses. Terrorism and Political Violence, 28(2), 383-394.
