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The concept of abortion as a deliberate termination of pregnancy, not as the spontaneous event called miscarriage, is tenuous to define because such definition varies according to its contexts, be it legal, bioethical, religious, or even cultural.
In the legal aspect there are issues on rights, quasi-rights, personhood, and potentiality (International Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2, 4-5). In the moral (as well as bioethical and religious) side (3-4), there is moral right, “at birth” notion of the human person, viability, “first movement” argument, consciousness and ability to feel pain, and unicellular zygote as the point of life’s existence.
Schorge, Schaffer, Halvorson, Hoffman, Bradshaw and Cunningham (chap. 6) defined abortion as the “induced termination” of gestation at a point before it is considered viable. In our culture, the term abortion implies a considered intention to end pregnancy to distinguish it from the word ‘miscarriage’ which is spontaneous rather than deliberate. The researchers used the definition of ‘abortion’ that the National Center for Health Statistics, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) use to set the break at “prior to 20 weeks’ gestation or a fetus born weighing less than 500 g”.
These definitions are contentious considering the fact that life appeared to already exist at 11 weeks when the fetus already experience exploding sensory development (Baby Center). “Some research suggests that she may be able to hear your voice now.” Mariner (1558) noted that United States jurisprudence defined viability as “between 22 to 26 weeks of gestation”, adding confusion to the point at which viability exists.
The concept of viability, defined as dependence on the pregnant woman, thus giving her the right over the fetus on deciding whether to have an abortion or not (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 3) is not definitive because such dependency may easily be applied to geriatric parents, too.
The correct and acceptable definition of abortion continues to be subject to largely contradicting areas of controversial contentions in the aspects of morality, law, and pragmatic philosophy (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1-8).
In essence, the definition of abortion rests largely on how the bioethics and law defines “human person,” reflecting history, culture, and medical technology. It is clear that setting of viability at 20 weeks’ gestation leaves so many questions of validity to make it useful in the definition of abortion. Francis Beckwith (16) argued that “what is crucial morally” rests upon the being of a person, and not on whether he or she can functions like humans do. This means that the existence of a human person does not depend on the existence, appearance, or use of human function. Instead, a human person is so because he or she is an entity who has the natural capacity inherent in human beings that give rise to human functions, regardless on the attainment of those functions. “Natural inherent capacity” however is not the same as having certain capacities of a human person, which entitles in law the rights, protection, privileges, responsibilities of a natural person (Smith 283).
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (3) noted that the argument stressing fetus, viable or nonviable, as “potential human adults” will not hold because it remains vague how actual rights could be derived from the mere potential of having such rights at a later time. Feinberg (145-151) insisted that potential ability to have rights does not confer rights. In his example, the President of the United States and thus Commander in Chief of the army cannot become the President of the USA and Commander in Chief of the army in the years before his election even if he has the potential to be so. It would be illogical to think otherwise.
Taylor (97) opined that the term ‘human being’ as synonymous to ‘human person’ figures primarily in moral and legal debate in the issue of abortion. He wrote, “a person is a being with a certain moral status, or a bearer of rights. But underlying the moral status, as its condition, are certain capacities.” He described a person as a being with a sense of self, a notion of the future and the past, can hold values, and makes choices. A person must be so however damaged these capacities may be.
American jurisprudence, however, recognizes a person based solely on the rights and duties ascribed to it, and not because they are human (Supreme Court of the United States 113).
The equal protection that law provides applies only to that person or “individual.” The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (sec. 15) stated, “every individual is equal before” the law and under this law. It is his right to receive equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination, be it based on race, ethnic origin, color, religion, gender, age or disability (mental or physical). Right as a reflection of protected personal liberty therefore “encompasses the freedom to believe that abortion is ‘an act of violence against innocent life’” as well as the freedom “to disagree about the moral status of a fetus and the reasons for having children” (Mariner 1557).
Any definition of ‘abortion’ available today falls short of internationally acceptable standards that experts in different fields of study can readily agree upon. Medical science and technology still cannot prove without doubt that from the moment of fertilization up to the 19th week of gestation, human person still does not exist. Neither can religious proponents prove scientifically with satisfaction that human life begins in fertilization; much more prove that personhood begins at fertilization. Legal jurisprudence, too, itself dependence upon the testimony of medical science as acceptable evidence of fact, cannot define ‘personhood,’ and consequently ‘abortion,’ according to the limited definition from that field.
Unless law is able to define ‘abortion’ in a manner consistent with an accurate determination of the point in pregnancy when life in a human person begins and such point used as the basis for the definition of ‘natural person’, any definition of abortion will fall short. For that to happen, medical science and technology must be available to confirm such a point of life’s existence in a human person in gestation with a reasonable degree of certainty that religion and philosophy can agree. With that fact in place, it will be easier for law to follow.
If definition be made on ‘abortion,’ it must be a tentative one at best pending any breakthroughs in the medical scientific field towards the determination of life, at which point in gestation it begins, as an initial basis for the definition of the ‘human person.’
It is however proposed that ‘abortion’ be defined as ‘the deliberate termination of pregnancy of a human person at a point after the spark of human life exists.” Determination of that specific “point” rests upon the advancement of medical science and bioethics to the point of consistency with the Christian view of the existence of human life. Without such consistency, a universally accepted definition will remain elusive.
Works Cited
Babycenter.com. “Your Pregnancy: 19 Weeks”. Web.
Beckwith, Francis J. “Abortion, Bioethics, and Personhood: A Philosophical Reflection”. The
Southern Baptist Journal of Theology. Spring 2000. PDF File.
Feinberg, Joel. “Abortion and the Concept of a Person,” in: The Problem of Abortion. Cited in:
“Abortion.” Wikipedia.org. Web.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Abortion”. Iep.etm.edu. Web.
Mariner, Wendy K. “The Supreme Court, Abortion, and the Jurisprudence of Class.” American
Schorge, John O, Joseph I Schaffer, Lisa M Halvorson, Barbara L Hoffman, Karen D Bradshaw
and Gary F Cunningham, ed. “First-Trimester Abortion”. Williams Gynecology. 1st ed. McGraw-Hill Medical. Print.
Smith, Bryant. “Legal Personality”. Yale Law Journal. Jan. 1928. Print.
Supreme Court of the United States. “Roe v. Wade – 410 U.S. 113.” Justia.com. 22 Jan. 1973.
Web.
Taylor, Charles. “The Concept of a Person”. Philosophical Papers. Volume 1. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 1985. Print.
