Aircraft Cabin Safety
Accidents are complex systems that happen when multiple failures and factors accumulate and finally blow out of proportion. The failures and factors that accumulate are jointly sufficient to cause various types of accidents. Aircraft systems are complex systems that have the potential multi-causal conditions. The conditions rarely arise but when they do they create a possible trajectory for an accident. Most of the factors that cause these accidents are always present way before they are triggered and an accident occurs. Additionally, most of them are actually triggered by the organization of the system itself due to its design, the hierarchical relationships, communication patterns, policies, staffing or the managerial decisions. In the aviation industry, various types of accidents have happened over the years and they all have had different effects. Some of the notable crashes that were highly disastrous include the MH17 and MH370 crashes as well as the Tenerife disaster. The Reason Model which was developed by James Reason suggests some of the multiple contributors which often align themselves each time an adverse event occurs. Thus, each system has to develop barriers that will cushion against the errors which occur during the adverse events. The model gives people in the aviation industry a platform through which they can model interactions and complexities for the anticipated high risk scenarios since it gives them a means of understanding how aircraft accidents occur. James Reason developed this model in an effort to come up with the most effective ways of avoiding aircraft disasters by first ensuring that people have some background knowledge on what really causes these accidents. The model has greatly influenced the cabin safety culture since most of the injury and impact is often felt in this area (Walker, 2016). This paper seeks insight on the major influences on safety in the aircraft cabin by identifying the specific hazards, interventions and defenses based on the framework of the Reason Model.
The Reason Model finds reason to link human error to some of the fatalities that are encountered in the aircraft cabin. The four main levels of human failure which influence each other have majorly influenced the safety measures that have been put in place in the aircraft cabin. One of these levels associates the unsafe practices carried out by the operators or the pilot that ultimately leads to accidents. Actually, most of the investigations on plane crashes have often focused on this area where most of the causal factors are uncovered. Most of the actions of the aircrew actually lead to accidents. For instance, the cabin crew may fail to appreciate the safety measures put in place and even allow the passengers to break them occasionally. In one instance, a passenger was given the go-ahead to use the lavatory even though descent had commenced and the seat belt sign had already been illuminated. The passenger had to stay in the lavatory until the plane touched down. Such an incident increases the risk of the passenger getting hurt in the event that they panic and decide to walk out of the lavatory. The ground members may also allow unruly passengers to enter the plane even though they know that these people may pose a threat to the passengers on board. Sometimes, these people do not take their time to assess some of the behaviors exhibited by passengers as they board the plane and thus leave the passengers on board at the mercy of these people. Sometimes, the aircraft’s instruments may not be scanned properly while they are in penetrating Instrument Meteorological Condition (IMC) or in instrument IMC. This may cause immediate or potential grave consequences, especially when the instruments are authorized only for visual meteorological conditions. These failures are the holes that the Reason Model talks of ("Revisiting the Swiss Cheese Model of Accidents", 2016).
The model also highlights some of the unsafe acts that have greatly contributed to aircraft cabin safety since they could be linked directly to about 80 percent of all the aviation accidents. The unsafe aircrew conditions can be categorized based on the substandard practices committed by the aircrew and the substandard conditions that surround them sometimes. The substandard conditions of the operators can be linked to the influence of their mental state on their performance. These people may work for long hours without sleep or they may be influenced by other stressors and this may lead to mental fatigue, distraction, task fixation, and the loss of situational awareness. One of the accidents that can be associated with this is an accidental slide deployment, which may cause serious injuries to people in or around the aircraft (Passenier, Mols, Bím, & Sharpanskykh, 2016). For instance, a junior flight attendant once deployed a slide of the Airbus 340 3R accidentally due to fatigue. The slide had to be replaced and this caused delays in the returning flight. In another incident, an attendant deployed the slide while answering a call button from a passenger. Even though nobody was hurt when the slide was dropped, the accident that could have occurred would have been grave. The operators may also carry out substandard practices which may be reflected in poor communication practices or mismanagement of resources. For instance, the operators in charge of the crew may give them the wrong procedures which may expose them to danger during execution. One example is when a member of the crew executes a wrong procedure in operating the steam ovens. The ovens may explode and their contents plus the team may injure the person operating it and those around him (McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, & Cromie, 2010).
Inadequate supervision as highlighted in the model also governs the aircraft cabin safety. The supervisor must ensure that the members of the crew have all that they need to succeed. Thus, they must provide them with motivation, leadership, training opportunities, and proper guidance. Some of the practices, if not taught well, may lead to injuries while performing the acts of service to the passengers. Turbulence is one of the causes of the non-fatal air accidents. This causes injuries to the flight attendants and the passengers. These people must be taught how to handle severe and unexpected air turbulence and how to ensure that the passengers are always safe during search events. The supervisor may fail to inform the crew on some of the dangers associated with certain practices within the plane. For instance, it is common to find flight attendants walking in the plane up to the point where it starts to take off. This is majorly contributed by the fact that they sometimes have to finish the assigned tasks within the duration of the flight and this is challenging if the period is relatively short. Sometimes, the flight attendants may fail to secure the luggage properly and this could lead to injuries if they fall. These things are all attributed to poor supervision since the actions of these attendants is mostly a reflection of the knowledge that they have acquired through the training and how it actually is working against them (Luxhoj, 2016).
The hazards addressed based on the Reason Model can be prevented using a number of interventions. One of these is the Safety Management System training which targets all the four levels of the reason model. All the people working within the airline have to go through this training which is based on their activities within the industry. Going through the process ensures that people working within the airline understand how to identify hazards, how to assess risks and mitigate against them, the methodologies and the principles that they can use for conducting audits, and how to communicate effectively. This helps them to know some of the reaction mechanisms that they can employ so as to reduce the number of fatalities during such accidents. One of the interventions that have been put in place are emergency oxygen gas masks which come in handy when the aircraft suffers a pressurization failure. At such times, the atmospheric pressure becomes too low and would not meet the oxygen requirements of the passengers. The crew members should understand how they work and how to avail them to the passengers as the plane makes an emergency landing. This will reduce instances where people succumb to altitude ailments like hypoxia (Čavka, Čokorilo, & Vasov, 2016).
According to the model, some of the accidents that occur can be attributed to unsafe acts which influence the performance of the cabin crew members. An organizational strategy that has been put in place to reduce incidents of accidents includes the introduction of shifts so as to allow the crew members to rest in between flights. This is better than the strict rules that previously governed the scheduling of flights and the distribution of roles (Yoo, Yoo, & Lee, 2013). Thus, when cabin crew members show up for work they perform with high levels of alertness. The establishment of a Fatigue Related Measurement Systems and their integration with the safety management practices for the given airline helps to eliminate the risk of accidents caused by fatigue on the part of the cabin crew staff. This ensures that the crew focuses on active delivery and closely monitors the movement of the passengers so that they can give them the appropriate signals at the right time. It also ensures that they avoid fatal mistakes like the careless placement of luggage which may fall and injure passengers during flights. This alertness will help them to report to the cockpit crew immediately they discover that people are not on their seats when the plane is about to land. Thus, they will perform the required checks and ensure that everyone is safe before the plane begins to go down (Lee, Stewart, & Kao, 2016). This will only be realized if the holes within the organizational conditions and unsafe acts are sealed.
The cabin is also equipped with the necessary facilities for safety announcements, which are always done on board. This is another deterrent that will cushion against the holes in one or more of the four levels of the Reason Model. Before the plane departs, the cabin crew must inform the passengers to stow the carry-on baggage and ensure that their chair tables are stowed or locked and their seats are upright. They must also inform the passengers to fasten their seat belts. Passengers who are seated close to the over-wing exits must be informed on the importance of the safety measures associated with the area since they are better placed to help in case of emergencies. Thus, the crew making the announcement should ensure that these people are attentive and should be ready to ask any of their questions. The same announcements should be made when the aircraft is about to land so that the passengers are not caught unawares (Yoo, Yoo, & Lee, 2013). Doing this will help to ensure that all the safety aspects are adhered to, and that the risk of accidents are minimized.
The interventions that have been put in place may be carried out effectively but still fail since no system is perfect. The cabin crew may do all that they can to take care of the passengers’ safety issues. However, some passengers are so stubborn and may insist on breaking the rules. In other instances, the passengers may fail to implement the concepts of the announcements simply because they do not understand the official language used at the moment. One of the deterrent measures that have been put in place to help avert such a situation is the use of a platform that takes the demographics of the passengers into account when determining the kind of language to be used in making the announcements. In some instances, they may need to incorporate translators or videos to ensure that the message is passed across effectively. Doing this enables them to capture the attention of all the passengers when the announcements are made so that no one misses out and ends up in a risky situation (Berkhahn, 2012). Sometimes, passengers are too stubborn and may insist on leaving their window blinds open even when they have been instructed to close them. Electronically dimmable windows have been equipped on some of the aircrafts and the cabin crew can easily set and block them in “full clear” mode for taxi when the plane takes off and climbs up to altitudes of above 10,000 feet. Above this altitude, the blinds are often opened and passengers can now operate them freely (Atak & Kingma, 2011). This measure is great in ensuring that rules are observed by all passengers for their benefit.
Aircraft cabin safety is an important factor that should be put into consideration so as to minimize accidents and to ensure that passengers and the airline crew are safe regardless of the situation. The Reason Model developed by James Reason links some of the aspects of human behavior to the common accidents that happen occasionally. The four levels of causative factors identified in the model are unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, organizational conditions, and local conditions. Failure of one or more factors accumulates and triggers the accidents that we normally encounter in the aviation industry. In this context, failure is symbolized by holes on one or more of the levels. However, interventions and defenses can be put in place to shield against failure at any of these levels by ensuring that the needed facilities and resources are available to address the shortcomings of the system. Some of the causes of the accidents in the aircraft cabin are low oxygen levels at high pressure zones, turbulence, unruly passengers, mistakes in slide deployment and cabin crew incompetence. However, the incorporation of emergency oxygen masks, safety announcement equipment, electronically dimmable windows, and safety manuals used in operating some of the equipment. This has helped to reduce the holes in one or more of the levels in the Reason Model and greatly contributed to reduction in accidents.
References
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