On the day Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated on June 28th, 1914 in Sarajevo, it could not have been known to anyone alive at the time how vast the scale of consequences would become. But the balance of power among the European nations had been offset in recent years and decades due to various events that placed various pressures on the nations involved and set the stage for the large European conflict that was to come. While the war was certainly by no means inevitable, the rising pressures within the various nations as well as increasing pressure between the various nations built up over many years. When the Archduke, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, and his wife Sophie were gunned down by a young Serbian nationalist, Gavrilo Princip, on the streets of Sarajevo, various elements in different governments looked for ways that they could use the conflict to make gains for themselves not only on this issue, but other existing pressures as well. The complicated network of alliances that existed ensured, for example, that if a conflict broke out between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, that Russia would back Serbia to protect its interests in the Balkans and perhaps even gain control over the Bosporus (depending on who the Ottoman Empire would side with in the conflict, as it would also be taking place in their backyard), France would be obligated to back Russia, and Germany would be able to jump in and attack France in the name of backing Austria-Hungary, but in reality in order to do something about the long-standing tensions between Germany and France and to use their long-thought about “Schlieffen Plan” to launch an invasion which was supposed to cripple France within a matter of weeks, before Russia could mobilize to attack Germany from the east.
In order to approach this, we should perhaps look more closely at the pressures each country was under. A good place to start would be Austria-Hungary. As David Fromkin points out in Europe’s Last Summer: Who Started the War in 1914?, the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy was under a great deal of internal pressure. They had carried Metternich’s absolutist ideals into the 20th Century with some degree of success, the multi-national empire had become more and more vulnerable to the nationalist sentiments being expressed by more and more of its ethnic groups. In 1867, tensions between Magyar-dominated Hungary and the Hapsburgs were nominally solved by the creation of the “Dual Monarchy”, which made the Hapsburg Emperor also the King of Hungary, but allowed “Transleithania”, a region comprised of the Kingdom of Hungary with Transylvania, Croatia-Slavonia, and the port of Fiume, greater freedom over domestic affairs. Later, the Croats were also given greater control over their affairs within Transleithania, as well. This gave these ethnic groups- the Magyars and the Croats- a “special” status within the multi-ethnic empire. As the 20th Century dawned, nationalism among these groups rose, and so did tensions within the empire. One problem in particular was that the population was neither homogenous nor equal- the Magyars, in particular, dominated a large population in which they themselves were actually the minority. Another problem was the neighboring Slavic state of Serbia, which had gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1835 following a series of uprisings. The pan-Slavic movement would end up causing a lot of pressure to create an independent Slavic state through force, and this was particularly a problem in the southern areas of the Empire, because attacks could be planned in Serbia but deployed in the Empire with relative ease. Indeed, in the case of the assassination, this is precisely what happened. One great irony of the assassination is that Franz Ferdinand had been one of the most liberal members of the Hapsburg family, and had supported more freedoms for ethnic groups within the empire, particularly the Czechs and the Southern Slavs.
The pan-Slavic movement also had been causing problems between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia. Russia, as another powerful, multi-ethnic state but dominated by Slavs, began to take on a role as a “protector” of the Slavic peoples. While Serbia and Austria-Hungary had a tense relationship, Russia was eager to position itself as an ally, ostensibly to aid the Slavs and the pan-Slavic movement, but in reality just to create conditions that might be favorable to them to perhaps gain territory over neighboring Austria-Hungary. The tensions with Serbia had been on the rise for some time, and Austria-Hungary desired a localized war with the small nation in order to maintain dominance over the South Slavs. There were also some indications that the Serbian military had been at least partially behind the attack. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, then, set about composing an ultimatum to Serbia that was designed to be rejected as far too ridiculous terms in order to create a pretext for invading Serbia.
Ultimately, it could be argued that Austria-Hungary sought war in order to save itself. At the heart of the matter, it was a major power that had long been in decline. It had made a conscious choice, by following absolutism to the letter, to remain relatively where it was in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna. Its population and industrial base were too small to maintain it as an international power. Although the phrase “sick old man of Europe” is usually used in reference to the Ottoman Empire, the problems that were brewing within the Austro-Hungarian Empire could well have warrented use of the phrase. It would certainly be in line with the phrase that would become common among the German General Staff in only a few years’ time, namely that being allied with Austria-Hungary was akin to being shackled to a corpse.
Germany, Austria-Hungary’s ally, was hawkishly looking for a war. Under Kaiser Wilhelm II, the General Staff of the Military (the most important people in the German military structure of the time) had devised many plans for an impending European war. The Schlieffen plan had been devised to knock out France early on. Of course, France had long expected hostilities along their shared border, and indeed, wished to reclaim the disputed territories of Alsace and Lorraine which had been taken from them following the Franco-Prussian War. The military buildup on both sides of the border had been massive. The Schlieffen plan sought to avoid fighting the French where they expected them to; of course, the only way they could achieve this was by invading Belgium. They apparently did not believe that the British would join in to honor their commitment to guaranteeing Belgium’s neutrality that had been made in the 1839 Treaty of Belgium. Yet indeed, the Britain proved themselves quite willing to go to war to protect Belgian neutrality, and sent an expeditionary force almost immediately to combat the German aggression.
Within Germany itself, the pressure for war had created a crescendo. The German Empire had only existed since 1871- prior to that, there had been hundreds of small German principalities and free states. The largest of these, Prussia, began machinations in the 1860s to united and dominate these German-speaking areas, and ultimately succeeded in doing so following the Franco-Prussian War. The German Empire was founded in 1871 in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles after the capitulation of France. The Empire was under the control of the Kaiser, who in turn appointed a Chancellor who set most of the political agenda. Bismarck, for example, was Chancellor in the beginning, and the “Iron Chancellor” ruled with an iron fist. But Bismarck focused on the domestic scene. Germany had come too late to the colonies game, and most had already been gobbled up by other European powers. He saw little purpose in pursuing a colonial type of foreign policy. Nevertheless, Kaiser Wilhelm II was eager to continue empire building. He ultimately saw war as the only way to achieve this. It was for this reason that, in 1914, Germany had the largest land army in the world. At the same time, even despite this, the Germans were terrified of a two-front war between France and Russia. They also felt that they were entirely surrounded by enemies, leading to what was almost paranoia. It was for this reason that it was of vital importance to knock out France quickly, so that troops could be transferred to the Eastern front before the Russians could mobilize a sizeable military force from across their vast territories. It is clear that the German psychological fear of the power of Russia was perhaps a bit of an overestimation, given their recent military loss in Manchuria in 1905 and the many instances of military incompetence and internal instability (which would eventually knock Russia out of the war entirely in 1917 in a separate peace signed at Brest-Litovsk), but Wilhelm II and the General Staff greatly feared Russia and felt pressured by the idea of a two-front war. This certainly explains the many “Dear Nicky/Dear Willy” letters exchanged between the Kaiser and the Tsar, cousins, during the July Crisis. It also explains the reasoning behind the Schlieffen Plan.
All of these political pressures combined to turn the continent, which as David Fromkin points out, is the smallest in the world and frequently considered a “mere peninsula of Asia” by some geographers, into a pressure cooker. Each Empire and country was facing their own pressures, internal and external alike, and, for their own reasons, thought that war would relieve some of that pressure. Instead, it would lead, as we know, to most of their downfalls. The Russian empire would fall to Bolshevism in 1917, the Tsar and his family executed, and the empire would become the Soviet Union. Austria-Hungary would fall bit by bit in October of 1914, as the various ethnic groups formed their own states based on American President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. The German Empire itself would collapse in revolution on November 9th, 1918, with the Kaiser abdicating and leaving the country for exile in the Netherlands. The Ottoman Empire would survive the war, but only barely, dissolving in 1922 after capitulating to an uprising that began as a result of the war. Yet going into the war, most of the nations seemed to behave as though the war was a welcome relief, something that would end the years of stalemate and building pressure on the overcrowded continent. All of these countries had, in going into the war, apparently neglected to consider that they were barely getting away with controlling their own people. Even Germany had been a multi-ethnic state at the time, with huge numbers of Poles, French-speakers, and other ethnic groups within its borders. The empires had believed themselves to be stronger than the nationalities they dominated. In Austria-Hungary in particular, the war was much more of a gamble than they had believed going in. It ended up completely dissolving any hegemonic threat they had over the individual ethnic groups, and the empire itself went on to collapse because of it.
Works Used:
Fromkin, David. Europe’s Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? New
York: Vintage Books. 1994. Print.
