The purpose of Marc Ereshefsky’s article, “What’s Wrong with the New Biological Essentialism” is to explore the new biological essentialism and to critically evaluate it, as the title suggests. The author is intending to demonstrate that the biological essentialism should be rejected, because it implies increased costs for being adopted, while the benefits are inexistent.
The first premises that the author uses to sustain his argument is based on the HPC Theory and Biological Taxa. Homeostatic property cluster (HPC) theory includes two components: (1) HPC membership kind requires no similarities, but (2) there must be stable properties in order to ensure the successful induction.
The example that the author provides refers to the Canis familiaris, stating that each dogs have stable properties that determine their appurtenance to that species. Based on the HPC theory, the similarities between the members of this species are given by their homeostatic mechanisms: interbreeding, shared ancestors. Although the HPC perceive this as a form of essentialism, the author does not consider it as a solution for supporting the biological essentialism for three reasons: (1) HPC is inconsistent with the biological theory; (2) HPC theory is unsupportive of the explanatory circle for identifying the taxon essences; (3) the theory combines the kind/individual distinction. Ereshefsky argues that there should be a clear distinction between kind and individuals and since for the HPC there is not such a difference, he considers that this theory should be regarded with suspicion, as any other form of essentialism.
The second premises that the author debates for sustaining its view that the biological essentialism is arguable is founded on the rational essentialism and Devitt’s challenge. This theory sustains that species possess relational essences, as they are descendent from a common ancestor, or are part of a specific interbreed population. The author presents Devitt’s position in relation to this theory, which rejects it, considering that it fails to respond to two significant questions: the taxon (Why specific organisms are members of certain species?) and the trait question (Why do members of a specific species have certain traits?). The author elaborates a complex argument to answer to Devitt’s questions, demolishing the scholar’s perspective on relational existentialism.
While Devitt’s theory sustains that it is not sufficient to explain the traits found in specific species by citing the relations between them, Ereshefsky claims that their intrinsic essence that count for the specific traits.
As such, in explaining why do zebras have stripes, there is needed an analysis of mechanisms that are intrinsic to embryonic zebras, which are transmitted from generation to generation, perpetuating the same traits. However, the author argues that it is not sufficient that specific taxon to possess specific intrinsic mechanisms for developing certain traits. For instance, zebras have the ontogenetic mechanism that determines the appearance of the stripes, but this mechanism is not specific to all zebras.
In conclusion, Ereshefsky agrees with Devitt’s view that the relational essentialism merely answers the trait question, but he suggests that this approach should not necessarily lead the intrinsic essentialism, as biologists consider that the intrinsic properties of organisms determine their traits, but are not essential for the taxon membership.
In relation to the second question, which refers to organisms’ membership to specific species, the author concludes that what determines a species is the occurrence of specific relations. In other words, intrinsic properties do not impose the conditions for being member to a specific taxon, rather the occurrence of the relations determines the organisms to belong, to be engaged in one specific species than another.
Next, the author questions whether the relational essentialism is a form of essentialism. His answer is not positive and he elaborates on the arguments provided by Okasha, who sustains that while certain relations provide the necessary conditions for a membership in a kind, they do not satisfy the explanatory requirement. Interbreeding or genealogies do not explain the traits that are common to members of a specific species. However, other aspects, such as genotype or the developmental environment can explain it. The author of this text, however, considers that Okasha rejects too soon a core feature of essentialism, namely that the essence of a kind determines the explanation of the typical features and traits of a kind’s members. He states that relational essentialism is not essentialism because it does not satisfy the main aim of the essentialism.
In the end, the author concludes and re-states that there can be adopted the new biological essentialism, but there are many costs with no benefits.
