Introduction
Thesis: Even though the Germans had waged successful wars using the Blitzkrieg technique against countries like France and Poland, the technique was not a war-winning innovation. This is proven in the Nazi German defeat to the Russian and Western Allied forces.
The view that Blitzkrieg technique could be used successful during wars
Used mobile artilleries and tanks supported by soldiers on foot and aircraft to launch faster and surprising attacks that immobilize enemies leaving them with no time to respond.
The technique was successful in the fight against the Polish and the French.
The view that Blitzkrieg had weaknesses that led to its failure
Its effectiveness relied on good weather conditions like autumn that enabled rapid attacks that left the enemy with no time to respond.
It was suitable for small countries like Poland and France, as its use on Russia led to exhaustion of resources and supply that gave Russians time to reorganize and fight back.
The rapid movement of the ground infantry, a key component of the technique, was only possible where there were good transport infrastructures and flat landscapes.
Blitzkrieg is ineffective against enemies with great air superiority as witnessed in the defeat in Russia following bombardment by Anglo-American.
Conclusion
After a heavy defeat following the soviet invasion, it is evident that Blitzkrieg was not a war-winning innovation by the Germans and therefore could not last long.
Blitzkrieg, literally meaning lightning war, was a military technique introduced by the Germans during the World War II. The tactic was characterized by surprise and faster speed of attack that left the enemy with little time to respond. At the time, German exploited the technological opportunities to promote their operational, tactical, organizational, and conceptual advances in wars. The Blitzkrieg method involved the use of tank thrusts along with mobile artillery that had the capability to keep up with tanks on the ground (Powaski). The tanks were used to destroy defensive lines of the enemies. Powaski points out that they also had support from the aircraft that would first clear areas considered dangerous for the tanks. Moreover, the FM radio communication was used by the infantry to relay information about the enemy to the supporting units once they had broken through the enemy defense lines. Besides, a backup from a mobile infantry was responsible for consolidating the new territories gained as well as protecting the tanks. This method was successful in the fight against the Polish and French, small countries that were rapidly covered by the advancing infantry. At the time, the German saw Moscow as a strategic position and with the defeat of the Soviet would help bring down the British resistance. In 1941, a war campaign was launched against Russia using the similar tactic. Initially, the method was successful as the Germans advanced over 300 miles into Russia. However, within time, Russian forces were able to fight back ending with a devastating defeat of the Germans (Knox and Murray 181).
The failure of the Blitzkrieg can be attributed to several factors. First of all, effective implementation of the plan relied on the good weather condition. The Blitzkrieg method demanded constant mobility and rapid but swift strikes with devastating effects on the enemy’s military, commercial, industrial, or political targets. This would give a little time to the enemy and limit their ability to reorganize and react to the attack (Powaski). Compared to other warmer regions of Europe like France, Belgium, or Poland, the Russian winter was freezing and brutal. Such adverse weather conditions killed most of the German soldiers and slowed down the movement of the ground forces and mobile artilleries like motorcycles and tanks. It could therefore not be used during winter seasons or any adverse weather conditions that in any way limit the infantry movements. The Blitzkrieg was also a mechanized strategy that required a lot of resources like fuel to facilitate its objectives. In a war with a country big in size like Russia, the Germans supporting units had to cover large distances as they move deeper into the country to replenish supplies at the war front. The expansive areas to be covered by supply units exhausted resources and gave more time for the enemy to reorganize and launch counter-offensive attacks. The infantry at the war front were depleted with supplies easily, which meant that the soldiers had to slow down the offensive until the arrival of supplies. As the war with Russia was coming to an end, the Germans had critical shortages in ammunition and fuel stocks. The Anglo-American had employed a strategic blockade and bombing of the German units contributing to the starving of the forces of much-needed supplies. In the end, the supply lines were extended, making the Nazi Germans concentrate fuel supplies to panzer divisions instead of the fighter aircraft. In the end, nearly half of Tiger tanks owned by the Germans were abandoned.
Another weakness of Blitzkrieg was that it relied on good infrastructures and flat landscapes. The tanks could move with ease and performed better on dry lands and flat landscape as seen in the earlier stages of the invasion of Russia and the 1944 Battle of the Bulge. The good transport infrastructures that were there in Western European countries were not present in Russia. Instead, there were muddy and broken passageways in most Russian areas coupled with an ineffective railway system. Combined with the rugged terrains, the shipments of fuel, food, ammunition, and other necessary resources suffered a major setback. This forced many German units to go for days without food. Ideally, in wooded, hilly, urban, or marshy areas, the Germans infantry were vulnerable to attacks in close-quarter combat and could not launch attacks at full speed. During the later years of the war, the German’s air superiority was declining as the allies gained significant air power. This was a blow to the Blitzkrieg method as it heavily relied on air support from the Luftwaffe aircraft. According to Knox and Murray, the aircraft played a major role in protection and support of tanks, and ground infantry as well as quick delivery of supplies.
The growth of the Western Allies’ air-to-ground aircraft in the lead up to Operation Overlord German vehicle instilled fears into the Germans who became reluctant to advance during the daytime. In fact, during the 1941 Battle of Normandy, the Western Allies deployed the Hawker Typhoon, an aircraft that had devastating effects on the German’s infantry, armor, and motor vehicles. Besides, an enemy with high-powered anti-aircraft and anti-tank warfare can easily destroy a side using the Blitzkrieg tactic. As evidenced in the 1940 Battle of France, the 4th Armored Division of the French forces together with the British 1st Army Tank Brigade made a significant attack on the German’s infantry; penetrating through the columns of advancing troops at times.
The design of Blitzkrieg by the Germans did not prove to be a war-winning innovation. Even though the Germans achieved success with its use in France and Poland, the failure can be linked to the military planners who failed to keep up with changes in warfare as the war progressed. As the Western Allies improved their air superiority, it would have been crucial to improving on the same as the mobility of ground forces depended much on air support. The element of surprise and rapid movement of the ground infantry is also limited to flat landscape only. In larger enemy territories, the military employing Blitzkrieg can experience logistic issues with the supply of ammunition, food, medical, and fuel among other supplies that could starve the advancing troops at the war front. Besides, the long distance over which supply units traveled gave the enemies more time to organize and response. The over reliance of the method on the weather conditions and the transport infrastructure is also one of the contributors to its failure. The strategy can be effective during the autumn season compared to the adverse winter conditions. Blitzkrieg can also be useful in short duration fights against enemies with limited mechanization and air power. However, the evolution of military technologies saw the adoption of anti-tank and anti-aircraft mechanization that dwarfed the earlier threat posed by Blitzkrieg. The over optimism of the Germans in combination with reluctance to deploy new strategies rendered the Blitzkrieg innovation obsolete.
Works Cited
Knox, MacGregor and Murray, Williamson. The Dynamics Of Military Revolution, 1300 - 2050. New York, US: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Print.
Powaski, Ronald E. Lightning War. Hoboken, N.J.: J. Wiley & Sons, 2003. Print.
