1.) Labour unions and employees opposed the extension of the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (IDIA) into war production because they believed that it was simply a tactic to give employers time to prepare for a strike, make business continuity plans in the case of a strike, or otherwise seek to the crush the resolve of the unions and their members before I strike could actually take place (Fudge & Tucker, 2004). This opposition was based on the fact that under the IDIA, worked were criminally barred from striking while an investigation of the dispute was being conducted. In other words, as long as a n investigations was ongoing striking union members and workers could be arrested. Consequently, any leverage that unions had in demanding change in the essential war production sector or striking was all but eliminated by IDIA’s extension. Under IDIA, armaments and war production employers could simple request the convening of a board of conciliation from the Ministry of Labour, then in essence “drag its feet” for as long as was necessary to resolve the issues that facilitated employee dissatisfaction or break union member support for the strike. This was possible for two reasons. First, the tightening labour market, increasing costs of living, and the inability to force a change from the employer strengthened the status quo which meant the employee during the IDIA process would potentially earn less and pay more than s/he was prior to the contemplation of striking (Fudge & Tucker, 2004). Secondly, while the investigation process was occurring, employers were given time to develop an alternate plan, such as hiring strike breakers, in the event that the IDIA process would end in a strike. In addition, many in the unions believed that the extension if the IDIA into war production also was incredibly biased for the employer and against the employee. To the sure, under this argument, the unions pointed to the fact that although the convening a board was request by the Western Federation of Miners, the Department of Labour (DoL), which is responsible for the IDIA process, failed twice to establish a board. On the other hand, when a board is requested by an employer, the DoL rarely fails to convene a board in a timely manner. All in all, the unions and employees, did not see the IDIA as an effective measure to accomplish its goal for stopping strikes and lock-outs while allowing for the opportunity of the unions and the employers to work out their differences. Instead, the unions and employees increasingly believed that the IDIA was simply a delaying tactic to provide employers with an unfair advantage.
2.) The end of the war in 1918 resulting in the confluence of a number of factors, such as the return home of thousands of decommissioned troops, the lack of those men to find work, and the continued intransigence of employers to give in to the demands of unions and employee resulted in a growing labour radicalism. Labour’s new radicalism increasingly concerned the government for the possibility of it leading to political revolution. Accordingly, the government began taking steps that it believed would limit the spread and effect of radicalism in Canada. First and foremost, the government made clear that it would support the employers. The reasoning behind this support was that for the good of the nation it was imperative that “social order and economic growth” be maintained (Fudge & Tucker, 2004). Moreover, such order and growth must be maintained within the “capitalist framework” supported by the employers rather than the socialist or communist framework advocated by many of the unions and employees (Fudge & Tucker, 2004). To be sure, regardless of the many differences of opinion in the government as to the best ways to appease and limit the labour’s demands, all agreed that any fundamental change to the current structure of property relations would be zealously opposed. Second, while the government repealed some of the wartime restrictions on unions and labour activities, it nevertheless maintained several of the more onerous laws. Two of the more important of these included the government’s abilities to arrest, detain and deport Wartime Measures Act (WMA) and the Orders-in-Council. On the one hand, the government was able to use the WMA to arrest, detain, and deport those immigrants involved in the labour movement who it thought were threats (Fudge & Tucker, 2004). On the other hand, through the Orders-in-Council, the government could, in essence, take executive action without debate. Third, the government implemented a “carrot and stick” policy. On the one hand, it used its power and authority to aggressive, arrest, prosecute, convict, jail and deport union leaders and members that were deemed threats to continued labour agitation and survival. The government also became actively involved in strikes that were deemed “serious”. For example, during the 1919 coal mine strikes in Alberta, the government, in essence, include “lock-out” language in the law (Fudge & Tucker, 2004). That is to say, employers were required to fire or refuse work positions to targeted labour groups under penalty of the law. The government’s “carrot” policy, on the other hand, included support for “responsible” unions and working with them to break-up the power of more radical unions and help them persuade workers that the best way to a better life would be a friendly approach achieved through employer-responsible trade union partnerships.
3.) Radical labour’s defeat during this period was threefold. First, and perhaps most important, was the fact that economic conditions had deteriorated to the point where simply getting and maintaining a job were more important than fight for and demanding higher wages and better working conditions. Accordingly, support for radical labour began to decline as employers had the ability, and government backing, to not only identify radicals within their midst, but also fire them and make sure that the indefinitely could not work again. This was further extended to anyone who was in anyway, involved with radical labour people or activities. Consequently, even if a worker might privately support radical labour, they would not say so or provide support for fear that they would be fired and/or excluded from employment. An even worse potential outcome was arrest and deportation. The second factor in the decline of radical labour was the difference of opinion within the Canadian labour movement, between more conservative union members and the supporters of radical labour on the best ways to accomplish union and labour goals (Fudge & Tucker, 2004). The conservative union members were represented by the Trade and Labor Congress of Canada (TLC). TLC leadership and support had traditionally been drawn from craft union members. Accordingly, they had historically been more will to work with the employers and the government to resolve any existing issues. There members were more likely to be skilled, natives of the country. After the end of the war, it was the TLC that supported the government policy of “responsible trade unionism” (Fudge & Tucker, 2004). On the other side, were the labor radicals who advocated more forceful actions against employers that resisted their demands as well as more fundamental changes to the political structure, such as the introduction of socialist policies. In 1919, the tensions between the two sides resulted in a split between the TLC and the radicals which reconstituted themselves as the One Big Union (OBU). The OBU was generally made up of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, as well as immigrants. Employers and the government were able to exploit the split and tensions between the TLC and the OBU by supporting the TLC and crushing the OBU. To be sure, without a united front, it was easy to dismiss the OBU demands and marginalize them as foreigners, rebels, and unprofessional trouble-makers. The third factor for the decline of radical labour was employers’ policy of pacification. This was normally illustrated by an employer’s cursory provision of a few basic demands of the labour movement, such as “pension plans, safety programs, lunch rooms and company newsletters” (Fudge & Tucker, 2004). In other words, employers would provide just enough to persuasively argue that they had “heard and answered” the worker’s concerns. Accordingly, employers would argue that there was no need to join a union. In the alternative, if joining a union had to be done, employers would argue that it would be best to join a responsible one. These policies worked to increase employee loyalty at the expense of the unions generally, and radical labour unions specifically.
4.) The government’s concern over the growth of radical labour was largely based two elements socio-political stability and continued economic prosperity. The socio-political stability concerns were a manifestation of the domestic and international environment that existed at the end of the war. Firstly, the waning years of the war such the first successful modern labour revolution occur in Russia and the establishment of the first communist state. Those events raised deep and extensive fears among many in the government that such a revolution could happen in Canada as well, if the radical labour movement was not controlled or eliminated. Secondly, those fears in the government were made more real with the founding in 1921of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) in 1921. Many of the people instrumental in the founding of CPC were deeply involved in radical labour movement or supported its activities (Fudge & Tucker, 2004). The CPC platform was attractive to many, young unemployed men who had become disillusioned with the current state of affairs in Canada and without a job had plenty of time to attend CPC study sessions and rallies. In addition, the CPC’s advocacy for the rights of women helped to attract more women than other movement. Third, the end of the war brought a wave of immigrants to Canada. A significant portion of these immigrants were from eastern Europe and Scandinavia. Many of these groups had real and personal experience with communist theory, methods, and principles. As new arrivals they also had difficult times getting jobs. Accordingly, many joined the radical labour movement as opposed to the more conservative labour parties of the TLC. In joining radical labour, they were vital in helping integrate communist and socialist principles within the movement and further separate radial from conservative union ideas. Taken together, these three raised specific fears in the growth of radical labour (Fudge & Tucker, 2004). One of the illustrations of these concerns was the fear that government officials had of the spreading unionism among law enforcement and firefighters. The fear with this is that if the spread was not stopped, “converted” police and fireman would oppose government orders to suppress radical labor, or, use their power and position to actively attack government anti-labour policies and orders. In other words, the fear was that rather than a to protect and serve the government, the police and firefighters would support and encourage radical labor. From an economic prosperity perspective, the concerns were that radical labour could shut down the economy at the very time that the economy needed to be its most productive. These fears were illustrated in the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919. Widespread support among the city’s unions resulted in a city-wide strike that brought the community to a standstill. The fear among government officials was that if such efforts would spread to other cities and communities, the whole nation could be brought to a similar standstill.
5.) The government emphasis on a return to industrial voluntarism was just one part of their overall plan to limits and control the rise and spread of radical labour. One of the key aspects that facilitated its implementation was that the government had ready support from a large number or “responsible trade” unions such as those that were associated with the TLC. To be sure, with the help of the TLC the industrial voluntarism had a ready-made framework that the government could actively and persuasive argue is the best alternative to radical labour. Accordingly, through industrial voluntarism, the government could say that it was supporting the peaceful, reasonable, and legal efforts by labour to obtain higher wages and a better situation for employees. In other words, it was not being an obstacle in the worker’s path to a better and more fulfilling work-life. The idea underlying this posture was that if employers and unions voluntarily resolve issues between them, why would the government be needed to compel a resolution. Instead, the government would simply support the self-regulated outcome. The reality was that more often than not the government was supporting the employer and the union, tacitly. On the one hand, the government did little to stop employers from acting oppressively against unions, such as through firings and blacklisting, which seriously degraded their ability to organize and made them more susceptible to give in the employer demands (Fudge & Tucker, 2004). In some cases, the government actively assisted the employers in identifying troublemakers and arresting union leaders. On the other hand, the government would push “responsible” unions such as those within the TLC, to come to terms with employers so that they could insulate “unfriendly” radical unions and single them out as irresponsible organizations that had other motives. For example, whereas the agreement between a responsible union would find wide support in the government, courts and the media; radical labor unions were portrayed are being filled with criminals, deviants, revolutionaries and communists who wanted to overthrow the country. One of the problems with the governments new re-emphasis on voluntarism was whether there were enough employers who would agree to concede to at least some of the desires of the responsible unions (Fudge & Tucker, 2004). In other words, the policy would not work if all employers refused to share some power and give up some wealth. In fact, as the 1920 came to an end, more and more employer refused to abide by industrial voluntarism principles. This was the result of their efforts to break the unions, their unwillingness to concede, and the failure of the unions to attract the support they needed for put pressure on the employers to concede. The government, never really being willing to fully support the unions, eventually decided to do nothing more to increase employer-union relations (Fudge & Tucker, 2004). Interestingly, failure of labour in the workplace here facilitated their entry into the political realm.
References
Fudge, J. & Tucker, E. (2004). Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers’ Collective Action in Canada, 1990-1948. Toronto, CN: University of Toronto Press, Inc.
