ABSTRACT
This study tries to evaluate the tenure of Paul Bremer as the governor of Iraq and as the US envoy in Iraq between May 2003 and June 2004. During this tenure, Bremer was the leader of Coalition Provisional Authority which was the recognized leadership by the United Nations in Iraq. This study evaluates the critical decisions which were made by Bremer whether right or wrong and gives its own opinions on the way the decisions would have been made. The study also evaluates the leadership provided by Bremer on the critical issues on the governance of Iraq. The paper concludes that, Bremer’s tenure was of mixed success as some of the decisions made were critical while others did not auger so well with the Iraqi population.
Paul Bremer at the coalition provision authority
INTRODUCTION
Iraq has been a country torn by war for many years. Prior to 2003, Iraq’s conflict with the world super powers and the United Nations was at its worst. The Saddam Hussein government was in constant conflict with the United Nations due to the breaching of the alleged weapons decree set by the UN. The situation in Iraq was further worsened by the 2003 attack on Iraq by the United States and the British government. Following the toppling of the Iraq administration after a month in war, the US government took over the leadership of Iraq. Paul Bremer arrived in Iraq after he was assigned as the US presidential envoy in war torn Iraq. He took over as the director of the office for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance (ORHA). The office occupied by Mr. Bremer was transformed by June 2003 to become Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which was headed by Paul Bremer making him an executive authority in Iraq. Bremer was allowed to rule by decree. Bremer implemented several decrees in Iraq including,CPA order number 1 which banned Saddam Hussein Ba’ath Party in all forms of participation in the new government that was being established and CPA order number 2 which disbanded the Iraqi army. Holding the capacity as the leader of the CPA, he approved the Interim Iraqi Governing Council which had its mission in seeing the Iraqi people’s interests being represented in the governance. The members of the council were selected from the groups and individuals who had a hand in supporting the America’s invasion of Iraq. However, Bremer retained all authoritative power on the council’s proposals. Bremer, was also given the power to constitute and implement the Iraqi constitution which later turned to become a major problem as the draft that handed in by the coalition provisional authority had recommended banning of all political parties which did not agree with the role of the US in elections, privatization of the majority of Iraqi industries and allowing the interim governing council to sign a binding agreement while still being unlisted. The CPA led by the US government formally handed in power to the Iraqi interim government of Iraqi on 28th June 2004 and on the same day Paul Bremer left Iraq.
A Bremer term in Iraq was not only crucial but also challenging in several ways. Critical decisions were required to be made, and they had to be right. Right in the middle of the turmoil was the ambassador who was the representative of the US and also the governor of Iraq. Although many people view Bremer tenure as a failure, he was a huge success in Iraq. Endowed with much experience in foreign policy, he managed to balance the role as both the foe and the ally to the Iraqis. Bremer made several significant decisions in Iraq. One of the most significant decisions was the implementing of coalition provisional order number one which banned all the Ba’ath party members from participation in the new interim government. This order was not only bad for the Americas stay in Iraq but also very unpopular in Iraq. The people who were members of the Saddam Hussein led Ba’ath party were professionals and elites from all over Iraq. They constituted teachers, doctors and other professionals who had an important say in the politics of Iraq. This meant that Bremer denied the most potent group of people in the society their right to participate in the politics of their nation. These people had the ability to influence other people, which could have resulted in the people of Iraq turning against the Bremer led CPA.
However, Bremer could have averted this discontent among the Iraqis by allowing the members of the Ba’ath party to participate in rebuilding their nation. In this case, the role of the CPA would have been vetting the participants to check on their records to the past overthrown government. This would have averted the crisis since the Iraqi people would have seen the US as practicing participative governance as opposed to selective and manipulative governance.
Another significant decision by Bremer was the CPA order number two which disbanded the Iraqi army. This decision has become one of the major points of criticism of CPA under the tutelage of Bremer. The decision to let over 400000 Iraqi soldiers home and jobless was a recipe for disaster in Iraq. The move left many soldiers disgruntled, and the only option they had was to turn against the CPA in order to protect their jobs, which were put under threat by the order. By undertaking this act, many youths who were extremely trained in combat were left to join militia groups, which would have worsened the situation in Iraq. Bremer’s decision to disband the army, although taken with a considerable forethought by the US government was not a sound one.
Although, the plan to disband the army and raise a new one would have been seen by Iraqis as a move to symbolize the irreversibility of the previous regime, the Iraqis would still have in mind that it was the US military that destroyed the initial infrastructure which they had. The move would also have seen a proportion of the members of the military being re-absorbed in the military and others failing to make the cut. This would have left many people unemployed, and thus creation of moves to form armed groups. Bremer could have considered changing the top leader in the army to lead the new administration. This move could have been easier and cheaper as appointed head of the military could have been vetted and led to reforms in the new government.
Finally, the most significant decision was handing over the leadership of Iraq to the interim governing council. This move by the CPA to hand over the reins of power to the council was the most appropriate. The CPA leadership was seen as stringent, and several assassination attempts had taken place on the top CPA leadership. This meant that, although it might have been seen as premature to leave the country, the situation regarding the US was still not acknowledged by the Iraqis. The most important decision was to give the local governing council the mandate to run the country while the US acted as the oversight on the developments in the country.
BREMER’S LEADERSHIP STYLE IN IRAQ
Although it cannot be truly said that Bremer followed a specific leadership style, his style can be viewed as both transactional and autocratic. Some of the decisions which were made by CPA were by decree, meaning that Bremer alone had powers to make laws which would be followed. The people of Iraq had little or no power to participate in the decision making of the way the country was run during the period which the CPA was ruling. Bremer had absolute powers to select the Iraqi members of the governing council from the group of people who were not opposed to the US interference with the Iraqi elections which made him more dictatorial in one way. Although Bremer had the task of reporting to the United States secretary of defense and the president of the United States of America, under which the CPA was under, he was not liable to the people of Iraq with whom the major decisions which he made affected. The decision to disband the Iraqi army may also be viewed as a flaw in the type of leadership by Bremer. The order, which was supposed to be reported to his seniors in the US, was not discussed until the day prior to its announcement that it was presented to the president although no issue of the decree was raised. This meant that Bremer powers overlooked the hierarchy in which it was supposed to follow, which was inconsistent with the procedures laid down.
The act to ban the members of the Ba’ath party and purge them from employment can be seen as autocratic. The professional who comprised of over 30000 elites were banned from participating in politics and also sacked from their previous employment. This decision did not consider the negative impacts to the economy of Iraq and could have caused more harm than good to the nation in general. Bremer could have tried to integrate the elites and get people from Iraq to help implementation of some of the decisions like banning of the Ba’athist’s and the disbandment of the Iraqi military.
Option for transition of power
Bremer should have recommended the immediate handing of power to the Iraqi interim government where people of Iraqi would be allowed to form the government slowly being aided by the United Nations and the US. This method was not tested among the other methods, but it had proved to work in almost similar circumstances in Afghanistan in late 2001. This would have allowed the Iraqi people rebuild their nation’s infrastructure and ensure well-functioning of institutions in the country, which would have propelled Iraq to new heights both economically and in terms of stability.
CONCLUSION
The United States went to Iraq to try and put up a model of democracy and creation of lynchpin that would become the beacon of peace in the entire region. The success of CPA under Bremer will be looked in many different facets, but it can be said that many of the decisions that the US made are yet to bear fruits. Bremer’s CPA clearly could not have fully implemented its mission with the time, money and manpower they had. This not only proved to be a poor strategy as the money for the project remains unaccounted for in the short stint that Bremer served as the leader of the CPA but the large US troops that remain in Iraq cannot prevent the rise of another regime similar to that of Saddam Hussein.
References
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Hoge, W. (2004, February 20). UN team to finalize Iraq sovereignty plan. Retrieved May 25, 2013, from world security network: www.worldsecuritynetwork.com
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