Introduction
Gun-related violence is one of the hugest problems on the United States legal and political agendas. In accordance with one of the recent estimates, 26.55 citizens of the United States suffered from some form of gun-violence in 2013. Moreover, 11, 110 homicides (3.55 per 100 000 residents). The report of the United Nations Organizations investigated that 67% of all homicides in the United States of America involved the use of firearms (Braga, Pierce, Bond & Cronin, 2008).
Yet, some states launched specific policies designed to reduce this rate. In 1996, the Boston Gun Project (also known as ‘Operation Ceasefire’) was launched, aiming to reduce the homicide victimization rates among the youth in Boston, Massachusetts (Engel, Tillyer & Corsaro, 2013). The objective of this paper is to examine its efficiency from the scholarly positions and to discuss the potential of its future development.
Policy Goals Description
Developed as a synergetic product of the scholars from the Harvard University and the Boston Police Department, the program was positioned as a solution to the reduction of gun violence, unauthorized gun possession and related violence in the Boston neighborhoods. The program operated versatile methodological solutions, which ranged from apprehension and prosecution of the offenders to their psychological counselling. It was specifically focused on the young offenders (Braga & Pierce, 2005).
Theoretically, the policy assumed a deterrence-based approach (Braga, Pierce, Bond & Cronin, 2008). In other words, the policymakers and administrators attempted to create the neighborhood environment, in which the costs associated with crime perpetuation will be significantly higher, than the benefits, which emanate from it, and therefore, potential offenders would forbear from engaging in the illegal activities. This program was an integral part of the large-scale crime reduction community project launched in Boston.
Policy Successfulness
Several subsequent pre-post analysis of the criminological situation in the city of Boston concluded that the project was a considerably successful one. Thus, Braga and his co-researcher Pierce (2005) concluded that the rates of violent youth homicide rates were significantly reduced. In particular, the scholars reported that the juvenile gun-related crime reduced on 64% during the examined period. The average mean fell from 3.5 per 100, 000 to 1.3 juvenile homicides (Braga & Pierce, 2005).
When the analysts added other variables to the matrix (such as unemployment and educational rate; other factors which are typically linked to increased criminological situation in the neighborhood), a substantial reduction in juvenile homicides, which was attributed to the results of the cease-fire program, did not change.
In addition, the program resulted in a 25% reduction of the gun-related accidents within the city limits, as well as in a 45% reduction of the most violent district - D-2. Furthermore, the number of calls for service decreased on 32% in the city (Braga & Pierce, 2005).
In general, the study was a considerably successful one, because its major objective - crime reduction rate was accomplished. However, in a purely theoretical perspective the change was not significantly different, because the juvenile delinquents were deterred from committing crime by the imminent punishment only (Braga & Pierce, 2005). However, much of the today psychological evidence clearly demonstrates that this type of crime deterrent is the least effective (McElreath, 2013). In contrast, when a potential criminal becomes psychologically persuaded that his actions will not result in any positive effect for him, not only he will forbear from engaging in criminal activities in the future, but also start the process of socializing.
Finally, creating this program the scholars unanimously concluded that it was fraught with fragrant cases of police brutality (Braga, Pierce, Bond & Cronin, 2008). In particular, evidence suggests that in many cases the police resorted to the unauthorized interrogation techniques, which are essentially inflicted severe psychological traumas. In order to find out where the accomplices of a particular apprehended individual may be, the police sometimes used beatings, sleep deprivation and other 'intensive interrogation techniques'. Despite the fact that the use of such methods was justified from the social print view, it seriously undermines theoretical and philosophical foundations of the United States legal system (McElreath, 2013).
Future Developments of the Policy
Although Operation Ceasefire was a rather successful project, the problem of juvenile gun violence still persists on the United States law enforcement landscape. Thus, developing and improving such an effective policy for the contemporary needs of the different United States communities appears to be a justified approach. In particular, the policy should be significantly modified in the following dimensions.
Firstly, it seems to be justified to promote this local Boston initiative to the nationwide scale. The research demonstrates that the most dangerous regions United States are located in the South. Adapting the experiments from Massachusetts to the realities of the militants may be an effective approach to reduce juvenile criminal rates there.
Secondly, regardless of its effectiveness, the program attracted a cacophony of voices of the notable United States human rights activists, who started to criticize its methodology. Brute force and coercion should be replaced with legitimate use of special techniques by the police crews, who should be continuously informed that brutal actions might have long-term psychological effects on the juveniles.
Finally, the program should be actively advertised in the media. Today, the community is not much aware about its existence. Yet, the practice evinces that strong social support significantly increases the chances of successful policy development and implementation (McElreath, 2013).
References
Braga, A., Pierce, G.L. & Bond, J.; Cronin, S (2008). The Strategic Prevention of Gun Violence Among Gang-Involved Offenders. Justice Quarterly 25: 132–162
Braga, Anthony A., Glen L. Pierce (2005). Disrupting Illegal Firearms Markets in Boston: The Effects of Operation Ceasefire on the Supply of New Handguns to Criminals. Criminology & Public Policy 4 (4) 45-72
Engel, R., Tillyer, M., & Corsaro, N. (2013). Reducing Gang Violence Using Focused Deterrence: Evaluating the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV). Justice Quarterly, 30(3), 403-439.
McElreath, D. (2013). Introduction in law enforcement. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
