Political Science
Introduction
How does the commercial peace theory, in the long run, attempt to avoid wars and not create them? In order to understand, or answer this question, scholarly articles written by McMillan’s (1997) Interdependence and Conflict; Buzan’s (1984) Economic Structure and International Security; Lynn’s (2005/6) War, Trade and Utopia; and Rowe’s (2005) The Tragedy of liberalism How globalization Cause the First World War are considered.
The world witnessed two major World Wars, during, and after which, a number of countries came together to form unions and blocs. The Soviet Bloc was an amalgamation of countries that formed the erstwhile U.S.S.R (Eastern Bloc), and followed a pro-Russian Communist regime, while the U.S, Britain, France, Germany and a host of other European, and pro-American countries came together to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). During this period, NATO countries witnessed economic growth, as member countries did business with each other on terms that were favourable to both sides of the business. Sadly, this was not the case with the U.S.S.R, and its allies, and soon, the people from the Eastern Bloc began public protests demanding that their country breakaway from the U.S.S.R and join their prospering neighbours. Gradually, the Soviet-led bloc disintegrated and Europe joined as one under the European Union. In citing this example, one sees the importance or power, of the commercial peace theory where, during peace, economic growth and prosperity is achievable, whereas ‘power politics,’ a termed coined by Domke (1988:15-16) in McMillan’s (1997) Interdependence and Conflict, to mean “the use and threat of force against other governments” can only bring destruction and humiliation.
In the past few decades, there has been a growing interest among policy-makers, and economists, on understanding the importance of economic interdependence and political conflict. This subject assumed significance ever since countries across the globe welcomed globalization, and because of the popular notion that inter-dependence on one another has fostered cooperative political relations. It is perhaps on this ground that the European Economic Community was born. China, an economic pauper in the 1950s, has become a very powerful economic power in the world today, largely due to the then U.S President Nixon. China was an unknown nation in the 1940s and early 50s because of its reluctance to open up to the world. With almost all of its industries crippled, and fighting to keep its economy alive, President Nixon saw an opportunity for American businesses to flourish, and offered to help the crippling Chinese economy. The rest is history. Today, China is a vibrant economic giant; it has all kinds of manufacturing and service industries, and has its own ship-building, automobile, airplane, heavy industries, hardware and weapons manufacturing units. None of these would have happened, if not for the commercial peace theory introduced by Nixon. For the United States to tame a powerful Russia, it had to seek a country that was large in size, and in close proximity to Russia to keep it from adventuring beyond its borders, and China was a suitable candidate. Thus, by making peace with China, the U.S could show Russia that it had an able ally next door. For China, the economic growth was more important than being a hostile economic disaster, and thus, Nixon’s commercial peace theory won the hearts and support of China. Buzan’s (1984:598) view that “a liberal economic order makes a substantial and positive contribution to the maintenance of international security,” and that international economic relations have little or no bearing on political conflicts. Businesses will run even if political conflicts between two governments occur.
According to McMillan (1997), if one were to go by the liberal tradition that even if there was a case of uneven growth in a region like Asia for example, it wouldn’t matter much, as the major powers like China, India, Russia, South Korea and Japan, were interdependent in business, and such economic dependency would not be compromised for the sake of a conflict. Therefore, “Political, economic, sociological, and sophisticated liberalism propose the hypothesis that interdependence decreases international conflict, or at least de-creases incentives for conflict” McMillan (1997:35). She goes on to say that from some of the earlier arguments connected economic liberalism with less chances of war based on the belief that international commerce would somehow “quell the passion for conquest that seemed so prevalent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” (Hirschman 1977:79). While the exact mechanism by which commerce was expected to generate goodwill among countries is not well specified, it was perceived as a ‘powerful moralizing agent’ that could improve the economic and social conditions of their natives by imbibing in them “good manners, industriousness, frugality, and punctuality among other things,” says Hirschman (1982:1465). In naming ways by which interdependence can be expected to decrease war, she draws on certain issues which she believes remain underdeveloped. One such issue discussed by Stein (1993) is the argument to understand the international conflict or cooperation in terms of economic interactions. His argument is based on the fact that while trade is a function of individuals, international conflict is an activity of states, how could the state/society relationships develop. His suggestions are, “interdependence is a state policy; and interdependence generates societal and governmental pressures for its limitation and its continued growth, and so, interdependence will generate new forms of conflict that states must manage to sustain the process of globalization” (Stein 1993:266).
While the general feeling that interdependence fosters cooperation, there are other observers who believe the opposite could occur, as increased interdependence will in all probability, generate political discord. What’s more, there is a strong feeling that interdependence or economic exchange will have no bearing on international economic politics and national security. Lynn (2005/6), in War, Trade and Utopia, says that in order to understand the consequences of interdependence on politics and society, one has to analyze “the depth and nature of the industrial interdependence that is forged between two nations. Lynn says that though the gross trade between the U.S and China are impressive; “the U.S import stands close to $250 billion from China and Hong Kong in 2005/6,” “the key fact that there is hardly a complex product that rolls off its assembly lines that does not contain multiple components from China,” acts as a catalyst for serious thinking. Imagine if China refused to supply components that were extremely vital for U.S operations because of international differences, it could become extremely difficult for the U.S to run its business as usual; necessitating the government to act against the Chinese. As Lynn (2005/6:31-32) emphasized, “This growing fragility of the industrial system can become a domestic problem, and could both, exacerbate its inherent faults, and transform the industrial system into a platform, which could possibly force the two nations to act against each other politically.” As Andrew Grove, the chairman of Intel said, in the spring of 2001, that “any conflict in or around the Taiwan Strait that resulted in truncation of trade, could result in the ‘computing equivalent of’ a Mutually Assured Destruction.” This is synonymous to a hungry man, on the verge of starvation, murdering a person out of desperation. Buzan (1984), in Economic Structure and International Security, says that because of the dominance of the military and political factors in determining the use of force, the impact of economic structure on international security will be inconsequential. In support of this view, Buzan (1984:621) says that if there were a weak or failed liberal system in a country that is struggling to defend its interests, it would hardly be the ideal ground to build a benign mercantilism, and so, would be hard to judge the success of mercantilism as a whole. Therefore, liberal systems are unstable, irrespective of how they functioned. Even if liberal systems functioned successfully; as many experts would like to believe, “they would pose periodic threats to the use of force. This is because of their inability to create durable political institutions of sufficient scale and strength to match their economic reach” Buzan (1984:623).
Rounding up the discussion on how does the commercial peace theory, in the long run, attempt to avoid wars and not create them, Rowe (2005:408) says that it would be premature to conclude that globalization pacifies international relations, because “modern liberal scholarship has a few shortcomings; first, the relationship between globalization and international peace remains theoretically underdeveloped, and second, empirical studies on globalization and peace were dominated by large-N statistical analysis.” Therefore, these analyses need to undergo qualitative studies to trace the steps included in the liberal theory to predict its outcomes it predicts.” Such qualitative studies are yet to be carried out. Rowe (2005:446-7) disapproves the theory that globalization brings peace; in fact it was globalization that led to World War I. Instead of bringing prosperity and peace, globalization in the nineteenth century failed to constrain the powerful countries of pre-war Europe, because they “needed the capacity for violence to sustain an international order that enabled peaceful interaction.”
Conclusion
Having studied the scholarly articles of McMillan’s (1997) Interdependence and Conflict; Buzan’s (1984) Economic Structure and International Security; Lynn’s (2005/6) War, Trade and Utopia; and Rowe’s (2005) The Tragedy of liberalism How globalization Cause the First World War, the results are inconclusive to safely say that the commercial peace theory, in the long run, attempts to avoid wars and not create them. While McMillan (1997) strongly recommended that the commercial peace theory of interdependence could avert wars, and bring peace, Lynn (2005/6), and Buzan (1984) were convinced that liberalism could not guarantee national security, and could, on the other hand, lead to war. Rowe (2005) was more forthcoming by suggesting that it was premature to jump to any one conclusion on whether liberalism or interdependence could, in the long run, attempts to avoid wars and not create them.
McMillan’s (1997) views were positive, but do not consider the possibilities of their failure, while Lynn (2005/6) and Buzan’s (1984) views are questionable. The point is that it would be hard to accept their views for the simple reason that any nation that relies heavily on foreign trade or investment will be reluctant to risk going to war, because their offense could offend their economic partners, and the fear of being isolated. Iran, once a very close ally of the U.S, had a robust business relationship with the U.S. However, following the coup, the nation became their worst enemy. During the reign of Shah, Iran prospered, but it did not guarantee the continuity of their relationship. This incidence clearly demonstrates that liberalism or interdependency does not guarantee peace, but yes, this incident cannot be construed as the final verdict. As Rowe (2005), rightly pointed out, further research is mandated to confirm either of these theories.
References
McMillan, S (1997), Interdependence and Conflict, Mershon International Studies Review, Blackwell Publishing, Vol. 41, No. 1, p. 33-58
Buzan, B, (1984), Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case, International Organization, MIT Press, Vol. 38, No. 4, p. 597-624
Lynn, B, C, (2005/6), War, Trade and Utopia, The National InterestRowe, D, M (2005), The Tragedy of liberalism How globalization Cause the First World War, Security Studies, Vol.14(3), p. 407-447, DOI: 10.1080/09636410500323153
