PART A
Fowler and Brenner, in their paper, argue that the regulation of broadcasters as public trustees should be replaced entirely with a policy which views broadcasters as marketplace participants who are governed by the rules and forces that govern the marketplace. In the paper, they argue that communications policy by the Federal Communications Commission should be directed towards the improvement and maximization of the services that the public desires by making an adjustment of definition of public demand and specifying the categories to serve this redefined demand. This, they argue, should enable the commission to change its policy and determine the appropriateness of broadcasters through the criterion of their ability to objectively determine the needs of their audiences and their ability to meet these needs through normal marketplace mechanisms. In their paper, Fowler and Brenner also argue that the system applied by the Federal Communications Commission are heavily biased against the provisions of the first amendment since promote content control (Fowler and Brenner, 1982).
In their work, they argue that since it is a generally agreed economic concept that society is best off when resources are allocated in such a manner so as to satisfy all the wants of the people, consumer satisfaction should also be employed in the regulation of broadcasting. Their argument is that social utility is increased by promoting completion, removing barriers to entry and making policies which prevent the emergence and development of monopolies in any industry, including the broadcasting sector. Thus, the same principle should be applied to the broadcast industry to ensure that the communities in which broadcasters operate gain as much value from the operations and derive the highest level of satisfaction. This is in contrast to the trusteeship model currently employed which makes no provision for the need to seek and improve the levels of customer satisfaction but is rather guided on the basis of trusteeship which is vaguely defined as a standard of public convenience, interest and necessity. It is thus imperative that the economic principle of satisfying the needs of the customers be employed in the broadcast industry through the application of the marketplace policies and doing away with the trusteeship model which in essence serves very little interest of the customers (Fowler and Brenner, 1982).
Since the broadcast industry is characterised by allocation of frequencies for exclusive use by the broadcasters, there is a need for a better definition of the market in the broadcast industry if the policies of the marketplace are to be applied to the industry. The frequencies assigned for broadcasting cannot be allocated for other purposes regardless of the demand and by implication this is against the market principles which would require that in those circumstances players should compete with other businesses. The paper argues that the current system is as a result of the development of a spectrum market where a market would develop and would consist of buyers and sellers of the rights to use frequencies on an exclusive and protected basis. The current system of the operation of the broadcast market is thus based on exclusivity in market which is hard to define since broadcast spectrums are intangibles and rights to them are difficult to establish despite the fact of the existence civil and criminal sanctions. The argument therefore is for the deregulation of the allocation of broadcast spectrum so that in application of the free market principles, it is allocated to the highest bidder who then by implication applies the best use of the resource. This is in contrast to the currently applied model of trusteeship which requires that spectrum is allocated to players in the industry in the inefficient manner of exclusivity which is determined by the government. In essence, this means that the best interests of the consumers are not protected by this system of exclusive market which is determined by the government (Fowler and Brenner, 1982).
In the paper, the two authors also make a point of pointing out the weaknesses of the trusteeship model which is applied currently by the Federal Communications Commission which actually determines through its own definition what is best for the public interest. The responsibility of the broadcasters are effectively therefore not viewed as defined by the needs of the customers but rather on the responsibilities as defined by the Federal Communications Commission. This is a policy implementation which actually works against the interests of the public and is in contravention to the first amendment. The policy is also in contravention to the established economic principles of customer satisfaction in the allocation of resources, completion for those resources for the highest bidder and the use of those resources in the most efficient and profitable manner possible (Fowler and Brenner, 1982).
The trusteeship model which has been in use for many decades has many flaws. It uses the argument that of spectrum scarcity has been used to justify the use of the model. The scarcity of the spectrum available for use by many players has been used for the lack of the use of the marketplace model in the broadcast industry. However, according to the two authors and as justified by economic principle, all the resources are scarce and the interplay between supply and demand is what usually regulates the availability of a good or service in a market. The use of the trusteeship model is therefore far removed from the economic allocation of scarce resources in the society. This further makes a point for the application of the marketplace policy in the allocation of spectrum in the broadcast industry (Fowler and Brenner, 1982).
The scarcity argument is also not supported by the fact that spectrum usage has not reached a point of saturation. Therefore, it can be argued that efficiency in the allocation of spectrum in the broadcast sector through the use of the traditional trusteeship model is inefficient since in ordinary circumstances in the marketplace model, such a point of saturation will be in effect dealt with by a natural revision of the market through a competitive process in which the highest bidders will get the rights to the scarce resources. In effect, this implies that a point of saturation in the supply of spectrum in the broadcast industry will never be permanent and natural economic corrective mechanisms will apply if the market model is adopted (Fowler and Brenner, 1982).
The traditional media and the development of information production and distribution is mainly dependent on the resource ability and capacity of the players involved. According to Fowler and Brenner, this need for an ability to mobilise resources inhibits the development of information production and distribution and acts as a disincentive for new players to enter into the already existing markets since the lack of the financial resources required for the entry into such markets will effectively lock out any potential new entrants in the industry (Fowler and Brenner, 1982).
According to Volokh, the development of new digital media channels such as the internet present a better solution to the deregulation of the media since they offer platforms which are difficult to control and thus regulate. For example, the use of the internet as a form of media has ensured that there is equality in the distribution of information.
He also argues that the new digital media also offers a more market oriented system since new players can always enter the market if there is an unmet need, the barriers to entry into the market are reduced, the system offers no reason for market failure and there exists no inequalities in the market that need to be corrected.
Part B
Techno-fundamentalism, as defined by Siva Vaidhyanathan , refers to the behaviour of individuals who accept without question what is presented to them without making objective considerations on the implications of what they are using and the risks presented by their usage of their technologies. It is essentially a belief that the problems that are encountered will be ultimately solved by advancements in technology.
Techno-fundamentalism is indeed a problem since it presents a rather simplistic view of the challenges that are brought about by the advancement of technology, especially regarding the development of digital media. Techno-fundamentalism is a challenge since by embracing the misguided view that technology will offer solutions to the problems that are encountered, it effectively diminishes the decision making abilities of those who are faced with problems and instead of following what is expected to be the rational decision making process, they commit this ability to technological development, either current or future. This erosion of the human ability to make decisions based on the current situation is dangerous since it increases the overdependence on technologies rather than making rational use of technology where it is merely applied to make the day to day life easier and more enjoyable.
Social groups on the internet such as Facebook also perpetuate techno-fundamentalism since they present an easy platform for users to create human connections through assumed values of trustworthiness. Many social networks simply employ the use of algorithms to define human personality through the use of scraps of information that users provide. This information is used to create identities which are then used to create connections.
Techno-fundamentalism is promoted by the fact that many products of the internet are as a result of the need to service human needs through the use of digital technology. New digital technologies have been described as new designs of power and thus the advocacy by Siva Vaidhyanathan’s against techno-fundamentalism are founded on objective grounds which should be examined objectively to determine ways of overcoming it.
Techno-fundamentalism effectively means that individuals do not have the correct knowledge of the power that technology has over their lives and do not actually have a clear understanding of how power in the digital technologies really works and affects their daily lives. It implies a blind dependence on the comforts that are brought about by the abilities of digital technologies without making objective questioning of how these technologies have control on their users.
Technology, especially digital technology which is used popularly, is not as neutral as its users may think. In the usage of such technologies, principles are applied which permit and discourage certain kinds of usage and thus in effect determine the choices, if not the behaviour patterns of the users. A good example which is given is the Google search engine which uses complex algorithms to determine which pages are on top of any search results of a search query. It is not within the powers of the user to determine which choice of the results will appear on top but that is a decision made by the search engine company. Therefore, it means that the company influences the behaviour of the users since it is them who decide which pages to display first on the results. Essentially, it means that the company has power over the choices which the user of such a technology makes since many users are not likely to go beyond the first few pages of a search result. Human value judgements are affected by the use of this technology.
It is also argued that the nature of the architecture of new digital technologies presents the evolution of a new status quo in which those who control such technologies are able to control to a certain degree various aspects of the lives of the users. The owners of such technologies can set the agendas and by extension the human values that we rely on as a society. It is through the setting of such agendas through the use of technology that users are not aware of that techno-fundamentalism is presented since they involve the usage of technology without necessarily asking for an objective explanation of how such information is derived and presented.
According to Cladwell, the internet presents a powerful tool since it offers a network without a centre, thus making it difficult to control and subject to the normal regulatory channels. It therefore presents a better and less inhibited method which is cheaper to enable people exchange information. However, the internet has also led to the evolution of parties which seek to exercise considerable control over the users of internet and present dangerous concentrations of power through which actors in the internet can exercise a market power which can threaten the effectiveness of the internet. In effect, according to Cladwell, the internet can be easily used as a source of power by some players to perpetuate techno-fundamentalism since they are able to control the human decision systems in such a manner as to allow for the unquestioned use of the products offered over the internet.
Question 2:
The question of whether a globalized media would promote an open exchange of ideas is best answered by a comparison of the traditional media and the emerging information sharing platforms made possible by the development of digital technologies, specifically the internet.
The internet has been described as a network without centre. It essentially means that the internet does not have a central point of control which can be used to regulate its activities and by implication, the control of the internet can shift form one point to another without the barriers that would be present in the shifting of traditional media. In comparison with the traditional mass media systems, the internet is far difficult to control.
The current system of production and distribution of mass media products is very costly and involves high levels of resource input. It has thus been argued that this system seems to emphasize more on the rich who have the resources that can be employed in the production and distribution of the media. In this manner, those who do not have enough resource endowments cannot distribute information and thus whatever information that is distributed is based on the opinions of the rich. This is very unlike the emerging digital technologies which is cheaper compared to the traditional mass media and offers an opportunity to those without substantial resource endowments to make their voice heard and disseminate information.
Another indication of imperialism of the mass media its lack of diversity; the systems used have no alternatives since they are the only ones which can reach the largest number of users are reached. This is in contrast with the new digital technologies which offer a more democratic space where any person can offer an opinion easily and cheaply.
The traditional mass media was also characterised by lack of equity and diversity, a factor which is absent in the new digital technologies. In these technologies, the barriers to entry into the market are reduced and unlike the traditional media which was characterised by imperialism, new players can actually always enter into the market if there is an unmet need, the system offers no reason for market failure and in the system, there is no inequality to correct.
According to Vaidhyanathan, Google has developed exceptionally along the lines of the new digital technologies. In one of the best examples, he shows how the internet has been used to organize, coordinate and execute revolutions in countries such as Iran. He also demonstrates how Google tried and failed to make inroads into the Chinese market despite its policies fighting repression and perpetuating repression at various points of its operations in China. This change of strategy shows that even in the new forms of digital media, imperialism which was characteristic of the traditional forms of media are still present in the current digital forms of media. This is because the actions of Google in China indicate a firm which is driven by its own selfish profit interests rather than the search for equity and fairness for the people whom it serves.
References
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