Introduction
Civil uprising in Syria has become an international humanitarian crisis. Five years after the Syrian Arab Spring, armed conflict rages on without any indication of abatement. While a solution amenable to the conflicting parties is elusive, understanding the underlying causes and the consequences of the continuing conflict is important to determining a solution.
How did it begin?
Syria’s formation as a nation state created a volatile political environment. Syria has been governed by an authoritarian regime. Syria’s government from 1970 to 2000 was a dictatorship by Hafez al-Assad, from the Alawite minority sect. It was through the armed forces that government controlled opposition. Massacre of Muslim opposition in Hama in 1982 exemplifies the extent that the government was willing to do to maintain control. (Rather et al., 2015). The Sunni majority also protested what they considered to be harsh restrictions on religious education (Fildis, 2012). Increased discontent by the majority population made opposition inevitable. Since 2000, Bashar al-Assad took over with unsuccessful attempts at reform. Protests were also quelled through military force. (Rather et al., 2015)
Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunisia in January of 2011 that called for political reform created an atmosphere of resistance that swept through Syria (Gleick, 2014). Civil uprising in Syria in March has been associated with protests that occurred in Egypt and Tunisia in the past few months (Lynch, 2014). Protesters in Syria aligned with calls for change in government that were realized in Egypt and Tunisia. Unfolding of events did not result to this outcome in Syria.
In March 2011, protesters marched through the streets of Deraa to condemn the violent arrest of some young people who painted protest slogans on a school wall. Government forces shot at protesters. This triggered stronger sentiments that led to more protesters. (Rodgers et al., 2016) In 4 June 2011, government forces fired upon protesters in Jisr al-shughour. Protestors became violent and ransacked a police station. When military forces were asked to attack the village, a group defected. (Rather et al., 2015) By 2012, anti-government protests reached Aleppo and Damascus. As of 2015, 250,000 people have died (Rodgers et al., 2016).
Although, the civil uprising started as a non-sectarian protest, it eventually transformed into a sectarian uprising due to outside interference. Hezbollah, a Shiite militia that originated from Lebanon, openly supported the Alawite government. ISIL, a Sunni militia group, comprised one of the opposition groups in Syria. Turkey supported the opposition. Qatar and Saudi Arabia supported Sunni sentiment for reform in Syria. The United States, United Kingdom, and France strongly condemned government armed response to the protests, especially the alleged use of chemical weapons. In the meantime, Iran provided diplomatic support and training of Syrian government forces. Russia and China opposed a United Nations resolution condemning the Syrian government. Transformation of the civil uprising into a sectarian conflict can be attributed to propaganda from foreign parties. (Lynch, 2014; Rather et al., 2015)
What is happening today?
Today, the situation in Syria has escalated to the point of creating a “humanitarian and regional security crises that is beyond the power of any single actor, including the United States, to contain or fully address” (Blanchard et al., 2015:238). Neither the government or opposition groups are capable of consolidating their power in order to stop the civil conflict. Bashar al-Assad is not likely to be able to assume control of the country because of defections among the high-ranking officers of the armed forces as well as the strong alliances between opposition groups. (Sharp and Blanchard, 2014) Opposition groups are also unlikely to topple the government because of strong disagreements over the political visions for the country. The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces was formed as a coalition of Syrian opposition forces in Qatar in 2012, but it has little real influence in Syria. Moreover, many of the opposition groups have set goals that differ from the political direction preferred by the international community. Fundamentalist and extremist opposition groups, such as ISIL, have also taken a more dominant role in anti-government opposition to the point of alienating other groups with less extremist views and those that received support from the United States. Creation of the Islamic State, covering Iraq and Syria, was declared in 2014. Assertion of the Islamic State is sustained by extremist opposition groups comprised of members from within Syria and from neighboring countries. Neither the government nor an alliance of opposition groups is likely to be able to achieve victory and end the conflict anytime soon. (Blanchard et al., 2015)
Foreign influences on the now sectarian conflict also continue, efforts have not led to peace or direction towards peace. Iran, Turkey, and Sunni Arab governments are all asserting their influences on the sectarian conflict (Blanchard et al., 2015). Air strikes against extremist fighters of the Islamic State were commenced by the United States in 2014. Russia also conducted airstrikes in 2015. Air strikes still continue without making headway in stopping extremist opposition groups or ending the conflict. In addition, the United States and Russia held a meeting with government and opposition representatives in Geneva in January 2016 to discuss a path to the resolution of the conflict through a transition process towards an electoral government. There is yet no indication of the agreement of the Assad government or opposition parties to this solution. (Rodgers et al., 2016)
What is the likely outcome?
In the near future, civil unrest will continue in Syria (Sharp and Blanchard, 2014). The country is already trapped in a vicious cycle of intensifying violence with external parties preventing the possibility of internal resolution of the conflict (Rosiny, 2013). Statistics also show that the average number of years of refugee displacement has gone up to 25 years (Rodgers et al., 2016), which means that the conflict in Syria could continue for two more decades.
Resolution of the conflict is conditioned upon the achievement of two key factors. One factor is the voluntary stepping down of Bashar al-Assad to allow a more representative government. However, this only occurs if Iran stops supporting the Syrian government. The other factor is the emergence of an opposition leader who is able to consolidate the opposition to take over governance. However, the dominant opposition groups in Syria are Hezbollah, Islamic State, and Kurdish opposition (Rodgers et al., 2016). All of these opposition groups have roots in foreign countries and lack the legitimacy to rule Syria. At the same time, these groups have also been tagged as extremist and/or terrorist groups by the international community. A government led by these groups are unlikely to receive international recognition.
Change in government is best achieved by power sharing, which operates as a mechanism for immediately easing the conflict by addressing distrust among opposition groups and concerns over marginalization of smaller groups by a dominant opposition group. Any power sharing mechanism has to be complemented by institutions that accommodate intergroup cooperation in order to succeed. (Rosiny, 2013) These institutions are non-existent.
How is it affecting immigration throughout Europe?
More Syrians fled the country as the conflict escalated. In 2013, more than one million Syrian refugees have fled to neighboring countries (Rosiny, 2013). In 2015, 2.7 million Syrians are seeking refugee status in neighboring countries and Europe (Blanchard et al., 2015). Turkey welcomed 2.5 million refugees. Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt also processed large numbers of applications for asylum. Syrian refugees have also flooded Europe. Germany, Serbia, Hungary, and Sweden are the leading countries in accepting asylum applications from Syrian refugees. (Rodgers et al., 2016) Finland, Norway, United Kingdom, France, Austria, and Italy are now also processing asylum applications. Tensions are already emerging due to the burden of the influx of Syrian immigrants, especially in the countries that serve as entry points to Europe. There is also disagreement over the quota system for distributing the 160,000 Syrian refugees that the European Union agreed to take in and the commitment of the member countries to provide asylum. (BBC, 2016) Aside from the financial burden of hosting refugees, the long-term socio-cultural and political impact of receiving Syrian refugees is likely create more tensions in Europe in the coming years.
Conclusion
Civil conflict in Syria is caused by the volatility of authoritarian governance, sectarian division, and external influences. Protests became violent as a result of the armed response of the government to protests. Civil uprising transformed into sectarian conflict primarily due to propaganda from foreign parties. At present, the conflict has escalated to the point that no immediate solution is in sight. Power sharing emerges as a potential solution as long as the current leader is willing to step down and an opposition leader emerges who can consolidate the opposition to establish a stable government. While a solution to the conflict is not yet in sight, refugees are flooding to neighboring countries and Europe. While Europe has pledged to receive refugees, tensions are already emerging from the burden of accepting asylum applications. Easing these tensions are tied to the resolution of the conflict in Syria.
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