The Hostage Crisis, a Key to Understanding Modernity
In the history of human civilisation, there were very few ages characterised by stability and even less as peace. As no other species humanity can be characterised by warfare and conflicting nature of behaviour. There is probably no such region in the world, where there would not be various conflicts and were war did not take place. On the other hand, there are those regions where conflicts are transferred with mother's milk. The region of Middle East is the best example of such region. The Arab-Israeli conflict was a cornerstone of regional, interstate relations for almost two millennia. That is why the contemporary deadlock and constant instability in the region are conditioned by the relative status quo within this conflict. On the other hand, under conditions of globalisation the old conflicts and new threats to global, national defence involved interest of global powers in the region and resulted in different dynamics of interstate relations.
Taking into consideration all mentioned above aspects of international relations, the studied topic of this essay is the implications of 1979 Iranian Hostage Crisis on the contemporary US/Middle East relations. In this framework, the central thesis is that this crisis created a precedent of American response to Islamic fundamentalism and subsequently created the image of the United States in the Middle East. In its turn, dynamics of Iranian-American relations afterwards contributed to diminishing stability in the region and became the second source of regional division - supporters of US and supporters of Iran or rather those who had benefits from being on each side from time to time. In this context, it can be argued that contemporary events in the Middle East and the War on Terror were mainly conditioned by the long-termed implications of the Iran-American relations, which were triggered by the Hostage Crisis. In order to prove the aforementioned significance of the crisis, it is essential to track chain of events this crisis started and its impact on Iranian-American relations today. Secondly, perceptions of the conflict from each side are of particular importance in order to realise the differences between two positions. Finally, conditionality of contemporary US position in the Middle East is explained from the point of the Hostage Crisis and constantly hostile American-Iranian relations.
In order to understand the meaning of the Hostage Crisis of 1979, one would have to return to the world history in the aftermath of the World War II and desire of the winning parties to spread their style of political; regime in the newly developed or freed countries. This was the time of the beginning of the Cold War. Under these circumstances, interference of the global powers into internal affairs of other countries was an every-day business. In other words, international relations were following the realist paradigm or were driven exquisitely by national interests. Under these circumstances, the newly-established democratic regime of the Iranian Premier Mossadeq was overthrown in 1953 during a coup detat initiated by CIA and resulted in return of the shah and imprisonment of Mossadeq (Blight 76). From strictly geostrategic perspective and desire to keep Iran's alliance in opposition to Soviet Union and maintaining stability in the region, this move can be justified. From the point of Iranian population, destruction of the democratic movement was a national insult to remember and a reason for the payback (Farber 52).
On the background of this historical legacy, the Hostage Crisis gains certain rationale of its occurrence, features of development and enduring implications. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 had already denounced US as the "Great Satan" for its support of shah's authoritarian regime and its violation of human rights (McAlister 125). The trigger of national unrest and subsequent attack of the American Embassy was Carter's decision to allow the shah admission into American territory for medical consultation (Harney 324). From the point of the Iranian population and Khomeini government, US gave shah support and political asylum from national justice (Lahlou 50). This event resulted in attack of the American Embassy in Teheran on 4th of November 1979, when 52 American diplomats were taken hostages and kept imprisoned for 444 days (Hemmer 81). The meaning of this event was only in the fact that Iranian rebels have violated pillars of diplomatic relations and that they demanded the return of shah in exchange for hostages. The meaning of the event was, in fact, that United States has faced another unfamiliar challenge in foreign affairs - Muslim Fundamentalism and importance of revenge for certain cultures was alien for the American foreign policy and American mentality in general (Blight 72).
Looking on the Hostage Crisis from the historical perspective, Iranian people and government, which supported the event, wanted revenge for the decades of terrible rule in favour of somebody's interest (Albright 358). The importance of payback and revenge in Muslim culture is of a particular importance for understanding of this rationale and further implications of this crisis on negotiations and bilateral relations in general. From strictly ideological perspective and cultural differences in world perception, coup of 1953 was not forgiven by Iranian people also because already in 1950's United States were viewed as protector of human rights and Western democracy (Albright 357). Thus, by placing illegitimate, authoritarian regime, US had destroyed its democratic image in Iran and further on in the region itself.
In the historical context, the difficulty of negotiations and reluctance of Khomeini government to release hostages gained additional rationale. In other words, Iranian did not only want to return shah back into the country and prosecute him according to their laws, but also required revenge in the form of humiliation for the cause of their two-decade disastrous regime - to humiliate US in international affairs and in the region (McAlister 142). That is why Carter had various rounds of negotiations starting from promises to return shah, not to interfere into Iranian internal affairs and settling economic issues together with lifting imposed embargo and political restrictions (Kaussler 347). The very fact that Carter's negotiations were fruitless and that in the end of the day Teheran was actually dictating the tone of negotiations was the main Iranian punishment for the American intrusion into their domestic affairs a decade before (Hemmer 81). The most popular slogan of the time was "America cannot do a thing" (Lahlou 51).
Under those circumstances, failures to conduct negotiations and to rescue hostages resulted not only in a lack of trust to the existing government but also in the national mistrust in American government in general (Harney 323). Just as contemporary terrorists, Iranian government targeted people and mad them doubt their authorities rather than simply start a war with the country. Already in 1979, it was clear that unlike conventional war, which targets a single enemy and unites a nation, terrorist activity and taking hostages, aims at people's hearts and minds but in a reverse way. In other words, it aims at creating self-doubt and inability of people to trust their government (Albright 358). This was particularly ruinous for the American society in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and massive public dissatisfaction with the foreign policy of the country.
In the framework of the aforementioned, implications of the crisis on the American side and humiliating nature of negotiations and deterioration of country's position in the region and in the Cold War dichotomy, United States could not do anything but to make sure hostages come back home (Hemmer 71). On the other hand, the lesson was learned perfectly well. In order to avoid internal and external disruption of the American status and supremacy of democracy over authoritarian rule, US had to take actions in order to save its face in the region and in the world. The main conclusions of this crisis were the following aspects. First of all, US had to take into consideration public opinion and coverage of foreign events in the national media (Kinzer 42).
Secondly, through the first acquaintance with the Islamic fundamentalism, US realised that the main target of new enemy is national and international status of the country and in order to keep the face US would have to be capable to make a proper response (Farber 73). In other words, US could not let Iran go with the damage it did for its status in the region and the world. Under this circumstances action required a counteraction, which, in the American case, was a systematic limiting of Iranian activity in the region and in the world. This included economic embargo, support of Saddam Hussein in Iraq-Iran war, monitoring of UN humanitarian help in the country and continues denouncing of the Iranian nuclear program (Kaussler 348). Although it may seem that American sanctions against Iran and general attitude to the country's policy were conditioned by various action conducted by Iranian government in a certain time, the whole rationale for the friction and actual conflict is conditioned by the Hostage Crisis and by necessity of US to re-compensate for political failure of that time (Lahlou 50).
Although some political analysts argue that "American behaviour towards Iran is sometimes an exaggeration of power", from the point of international relations, it is a compensation for previous inability to keep American influence and active support in the region of the Middle East (McAlister 102). The difference between revenge and compensation is that revenge is driven by emotions, while compensation is driven by cold calculations. From strictly geo-strategic perspective, in order to avoid further spreading of challenges for American democracy and positions in the world, more radical actions were to be taken against the source of instability and certain threats spreading (Farber 75). In this context, by targeting Iran as a violator of international law and imposing sanctions against the country, US was securing not only its position in the world, but also in the region. In other words, in order to show that US is capable to deal with the regional challenge to its foreign policy, extra measures were to be taken.
Looking back into the history of US /Middle East relations, it can be argued that although American support of Israel was a crucial argument in anti-American discourse among the Arab countries, it was the Hostage Crisis that triggered the contemporary perception of US in the region and subsequent foreign policies. In this regard, US established its position as a country that would not tolerate any threat from another country and that any state challenging democracy and human rights would end up like Cuba, Northern Korea and Iran (Kinzer 50). From one perspective, it contributed to softening of bilateral relations with various counties in the Middle East region mainly because commonality of interests remained crucial for states irrespective of ideologies (Farber 76). On the other hand, continuous sanctioning of Iran and devastating implications of the First Persian Gulf war, during which US supported Hussein's Iraq, created a certain martyr status in the Muslim world.
Until a certain extent, it can be argued that the Hostage Crisis created a "need for action" syndrome of American behaviour in the region (Sick 530). This syndrome can be observed in the American war on terror and general dealing with Muslim Fundamentalism. In other words, massive response to a certain challenge with devastating consequences for reasons of those threats reminds until certain extent American support of Hussein against Iran in 1980s (Hemmer 72). Although, from a strategic perspective, actions can be justified and viewed as pre-emptive measures for potential terrorist acts or tacking hostages; from the point of international relations, these actions might be viewed more as an attempt to prove one's presence in the region and suggest that US had nothing to fear from the Muslim Fundamentalists (Kinzer 51).
The problem in this case is not the war conduct in response for terrorist activity, but inconsistency between means to an end. In this context, just as isolation of Iran resulted in the creation of a martyr and a strong anti-American opposition within the Muslim world, so did the invasion into Iraq and Afghanistan, which resulted in undermining of American positions in the region and strengthened anti-American discourse (McAlister 87). The crucial point in both cases was that actions taken directed states, without consideration of implications for the peaceful population. In this context, one of the lessons which should have been learned from the Hostage Crisis and the whole history of American-Iranian relations was that population is a key for influence in any country, but in Muslim world of the Middle East in particular (Blight 76). Just as Iranians used media and denial of negotiations to undermine, American government's position among American population so could have US done during the Hostage Crisis and War on Terror, as well. Although, this was not done initially, in the further stages of American/Middle East relations discourse was changed from the retribution for 9/11 attacks to a necessity for changing existing regime in those countries into democratic or at least a more liberal one within the Muslim law (Sick 530).
Overall, from all mentioned above it can be concluded that the Hostage Crisis was not only important in the American comprehension of the Muslim world. It was also a turning point of American-Iranian relations, which contributed to the contemporary discourse of American/Middle East relations. In this framework, both sides of the conflict created stereotypical ways of thinking about one another. From Iranian perspective, US policy is driven by personal interest and economic benefits which do take into consideration interest and rights of other states; therefore, they oppose any American decision. From American perspective, Iran as a challenge for American influence in the region and a threat to national and international security. Therefore, the existing hostile relations were used over the last 40 years as a means of manipulation by various countries in of the region, which again did not contribute to regional stability.
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