Question 1
(1) A word child was identified as legitimate child, there is a gap in arguing in case of illegitimate child.
(2) It was concluded that if a woman is not a lawful wife of a father and this child is his legitimate child, than this child cannot have illegitimate mother
Question 2
(3) Graham-Perkins JA argued that (1) supports the fact that a child can be legitimate child of his father and cannot have illegitimate mother, while the primary argument of Smith JA puts parents in a different situation regarding the custody.
(4) He argued that if the situation (2) occurs, than it is that there is a gap in ruling that claims a mother can take custody of a child even if she resides with the father, as it is not clear if it is a father of a child.
(5) Consequently, (3) and (4) can be argued that a child cannot be legitimate child of illegitimate mother and, thus, the father of illegitimate child can have the same rights for custody.
Question 3
There is definitely a gap in identifying what constitutes of the terms “mother”, “father”, “child”, and “legitimate/illegitimate”, which is the main problem in the decision of Smith JA and argument of Graham-Perkins JA. While it was claimed that (1) is the only case identifying a child; it is not clear how to deal with the custody ruling regarding such a child. Also, in the (2) situation, it is not clear if Smith JA meant that illegitimate mother can have custody or a legitimate one. Therefore, the argument and conclusion proposed by Graham-Perkins JA is quite clear, as (4) emphasizes the need to identify the rights for custody of a legitimate mother, rather than a woman who simply resides with a father of a child. In the result, it is possible to assume that the custody can be granted to either or both of the parents of the illegitimate child, as in this case, both mother and father have similar rights.
Question 4
The question argued in R v Campbell is quite controversial, as it is possible to look at it from different points of view. At the same time, the syllogism of Darling J is not correct. First of all, he confronts a position that has two arguments defining the guilt of an applicant: a) he is Egyptian and b) the applicant failed to notify the registration officer about his intention to stay in the country. Darling J tries to imply that the applicant cannot be considered as an alien only on the basis that he is Egyptian. However, his opponent does not claim that the applicant has to be incarcerated and deported only on the basis of his nationality. Darling does not confront the fact that the applicant, being a citizen of a foreign country, did not notify the registration officer about his desire to stay. From the logical point of view, Darling J is not correct as well.
Firstly, being Egyptian citizen makes the applicant an alien immediately, as he is not the citizen of a country and, as he does not have the permission of residence here, he has to be considered an alien. Secondly, he does not notify the officer about his intention to become a resident and, thus, lived in the country illegally, which makes him an illegal alien and a subject of deportation. While the court argued that the applicant was guilty in this crime and he admitted committing it, it has the ground to charge him. Darling claims that calling a person an alien on the basis of his nationality is a syllogism, but if individual does not have the permission to reside in the country and he is still the citizen of a foreign state, he becomes an alien automatically, despite the nationality whether it is Egypt or another country. One issue if not quite clear, if Avory J claims that the applicant knew English very well, he could have been asked to plead guilty/innocent when hearing the charges. Nevertheless, the argument of Darling J is not correct.
