Critical Thinking On Ethical Analysis Of Nuclear Engineering Topics

William Ekastern is a nuclear engineer at the thermal-hydraulic department of nuclear reactor firm. He is a member of the Administrative Law Judge-Technical on the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board under the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Also he sits at the National Academy of Nuclear Engineers and the American Association for Advancement of Science and America Nuclear Society.
William finds himself in a challenging situation. A memo he wrote to his superiors concerning the potential impacts of operators to terminate High pressure Injection following the initial stage of LOCA at one of the plants receives a negative feedback. The memo was rejected because it was based on hearsay and the boss requires official documentation for it to be considered. However, the engineer colleague who reported the incident on his conversation with William agreed to write an official memo but after two months since he is engaged at the moment.
A colleague in his plant recorded a small over-pressurization transient that resulted in a pressure relieve valve to get stuck and fail to close after relieving steam. After the faulty indicator was reported, the operator terminated high pressure injection resulting from system recovery procedure indicated by the increased level in the pressurizer. The action would have been necessary if the primary system would have been in a subcooled state and since the system was in a two-phase state, no such action was allowed. It was noted that after 20 - 30 minutes after the termination of injection the pressurizer level collapsed and injection had to be initiated. The termination period lead to significant loose of fluid inventory, which under full reactor power, would have lead to adverse fuel damage.
After extensive consultations with members of the NANE, AAAS, and ANS, William had decided that a memo need to be circulated to other plants for such scenarios to be considered and appropriate caution exercised. The Nuclear Safety and Licensing Board are guided by principles that provide guidelines for the operation of staff in any plant. These include;
- Any action with probable harm on humans, environment and overall society should not be conducted
- Any activity at the plant will make reparations for harms done to others
- Any activity at the plant will not interfere with the freedoms of others
- Any plant at the plant will be executed openly in an honest and understandable manner
- Any employee or operator at the plant will respect other’s capacity to make rational decisions about matter affecting their lives
- All nuclear activities and project will keep its promises
As he waits for the next two months for his colleague to prepare an official memo of what happened, Williams is not certain with one thing. Similar occurrences can occur at any other plant within the waiting period. If high pressure termination occurs at a reactor under full power and insignificant burnup, it is possible, perhaps probable, that the core could be fully uncovered and massive fuel damage would be evident.
Williams’s case revolves around the public risk of nuclear power at the individual and the societal level. The plant management team does not conclusively explain what is to be done given the changing policy context for social movements, risk management at the societal level and nuclear power development aspects. For instance, it does not detail any action to be taken if incidents are reported but not documented officially. These are exacerbated by the lack of special attention to ethical aspects of nuclear power such as means and ends, use and intrinsic value, private goods and public goods, harm and equity considerations.
William is of the view that if the decision of his superior to demand an official memo before any action is taken, similar incidents of High Pressure Injection termination at full reactor energy could lead to dire consequences. Likewise, his colleague should be compelled to write an official memo within the shortest time possible as well as institute measures at the organizational level that dictate documentation of incident occurrences
Thus he is considering requesting an unprocedural call for a committee meeting to deliberate on High Pressure Injection termination processes by operators. He is, however, apprehensive that Michael Cooper, his supervisor will object to his opinion. Mike is of the view that calling an emergency meeting based on hearsay will negatively affect the credibility of the nuclear plants. It will depict the industry has unregulated and without stringent rules on protocol. Mike has been on the forefront of the nuclear infrastructure development for a while and his agency lobbied the government extensively to provide the much needed funding. A heed on his concern is a negative force that may result in tainting the image of the industry which is allocated much of public resources.
Another option on Williams mind is to wait for the next two months for the official memo. However, this option seems risky because an incident can occur any time before that period lapses leading to severe consequences. As a nuclear engineer, he is responsible for conducting plant reviews and recommending possible alterations to improve safety of employees. Also, he is responsible for recommending best plan of action to safeguard the company from losses.
The best course of action for William is to request for an immediate meeting with all the relevant stakeholders to review operators termination of High Pressure Injection. This, he can proceed through writing an official letter to NRC pointing out his concerns. Further, NRC could compel his fellow engineer to write an official memo as soon as possible. If he decides to wait for two months, anything can happen during that period and having communicated with his fellow engineer about the situation, he could be held responsible.
NRC has a provision for enacting programs by licensees for early identification of important safety-related concerns. In addition it advocates for sharing of operating experiences in a quick manner and proactive response by the management. Expanded sharing of knowledge locally and internationally improves safety. In addition, the regulatory authority factors in human performance as a critical element in plant safety. It thus, advocates for operator training and staffing requirements as well as improved instrumentation and controls for the operating plant.
William will, therefore, initiate a rapid review of the operating procedures of plant operators by forwarding his concerns immediately with the relevant authorities. Crisis meetings will solve the problem even if his superiors object to it. He will have discharged his duties effectively at the same time be obedient to internal mechanisms of conflict resolution. Considering William’s position and his experience at various nuclear committees and departments, his behavior will promote the fulfillment of his duties and responsibilities.