called and held to account
Introduction
Traditional models of accountability, primarily those of elections and legislative scrutiny, are no longer sufficient in holding governments accountable. While Emy and Hughes (1988) argue that accountability dilemmas have been long standing within ministerial government, they see accountability failures as an indication of mechanisms corrupted by political interest. The rise of new social movements is a strong indication of the collective desire of citizens to interrupt the “chain of accountability”. The desire to influence political decision makers is a reflection of a growing assumption that the democratic deficit facing most western governments requires experiments in democratic governance in order to call and hold institutions and officials to account (Sabel, 2001, pp. 123).
Are new social movements creating better government through attempts at holding governments accountable? This essay will explore the role of new social movements in shaping the relationship between citizens, officials and government apparatuses and discuss the broader implications on governance, policy and practice. In order to evaluate engagement between social movement actors and government within the context of governance, this essay will focus on sub-politics and will highlight shifts in the consensus on how accountability functions within hegemonic institutional arrangements as well as the linkages created by social movement actors.
Governance and New Social Movements
New social movements have been on the rise in many western nations and are often directly connected to statistical increases in democratic participation (Pateman, 1970). “Participation theory offers an antidote to a stark revisionism [of democratic elitism] which sought almost to define the people out of democracy altogether” (Maddox, 2000, pp.108). Social media and corresponding developments in Internet technology has made it easier for citizens to reimagine their democratic citizenship. Cognitive dissidence with the mechanisms of government gives cause for individuals to pressure governments to acknowledge the broader process of democratization (Keating, 2000, pp. 4). Governance encompasses all the informal linkages that integrate control and authority in the structures of government and therefore is a much more accessible framing for actors traditionally considered ‘outside’ the system. Public-Private partnerships are an example of ‘new public management’ mechanisms for creating accountability around new forms of governance.
New social movements reflect two fundamental components: collective thought and political action. Temporal or time evolving linkages are created between individuals, who form social bonds in order to pool and mobilize resources in order to create a desired political goal. In Australia, new social movements have emerged in palliative care (Barry, 1998), labour (Olson, 2004), and environmental and indigenous issues (Merlan, 2005) and have effectively used collective resources to create new forums for deliberative decision-makings (Barry, 1998). Social movements place pressure on the established order by making representative claims against government when public perception perceives institutional actors as longer accountable to the political mandate they were hired to fulfill. Barry (1998, pp. 41) argues that such processes “increase the possibility of opposition and conflict. At the very least, issue-focused social movements challenge the conventional wisdom and its practices and [often] change them.”
Counter Accountability
In evaluating the changes to palliative service care policy, Barry (1998) found that social movement actors (primarily end of life care professions with political capital) reframed the discussion of dying as one about human rights rather than religion. Within the span of a decade special interest groups within the holistic palliative movement, such as hospital administrations and residential care facilities, began fixing themselves firmly in partnership with higher levels of government (Barry, 1998, pp. 39). Barry (1998, pp. 41) argues that intelligent leaders, with access to diverse “cannons of knowledge”, significantly influenced how health policy change was managed within a wide range of ministerial mechanisms and public administration subsystems.
The pragmatic and cross-sector practice of individuals brings forward renewed notions of accountability within the traditional political domain. Using O’Dwyer and Unerman’s (2008) critique of functional accountability we can view such engagement as altering how accountability operating within an evolving political system. The traditional model of government is based on functional accountability, which determines how the use of power is prescribed to and exercised by political actors. The review of the use of power determines whether or not said actors function within those rules.
In order to function, accountability requires a system wherein actors respond in a mechanistic manner in accordance with these pre-establish norms. Party loyalty for example fits will within the framing of functional accountability. However, as Antonio Gramsci observed of all political systems while spending 11 years in an Italian fascist jail cell, when dominant groups begin to loose legitimacy so too weakens the social institutions that legitimized their power to begin with (Gramsci, 1971). Much in line with Gramsci’s theory on organic intellectuals, new social movement theory argues that individual actors are key to the outside forces, which have historically shaped political institutions. Through collective action, political persuasion, and pragmatic advocacy non-government actors participate in the reshaping of government processes (Barry, 1998).
In more contextually driven terms, this means that new social movements assemble counter-hegemony or a new form of consensus on functional political norms such as accountability. “By [focusing] on the needs and motivations of individuals and the details of organizational activities” a new research agenda might evaluate the persuasiveness of social movement actors on the mechanisms that traditional political actors, such as Senators of executive office staff use to hold each other accountable. Audits have served within the functional model to maintain public trust in accountability and increase performance of the public sector (Lonsdale, Wilkons, & Lin, 2011). Yet the governing and performing of audits or administrative tribunals are off limits to social movements actors. They can participate in the predetermined functional capacities, but generally they must abide by the rules set by federal regulatory executives.
Accountability and Social Governance
If social movements encompass the political ideologies and actions held by a collective majority then their ability to engage within the hierarchy of government directly correlates to how government actors are held to account. It also stands to reason that actors outside the official boundaries of government are giving rise to popular perception that politicians are only able to theorize about.
Critiques of electoral systems, in Canada, the United States and Australia, demonstrate that the extent of the democratic deficit in these countries may be a direct result of a rapidly diminishing decision making model. Trust in government is being eroded from within. In his evaluation of mechanisms for accountability, Mulgan (1996) found that growing conflict between levels of government, such as the Senate and House of Representatives in Australia, is characteristic of a rudimentary breakdown of political norms across an entire political system. Therefore, the function of distributive accountability is open for renegotiating at lower levels of government.
This is where governance takes on a more solid form in debates around hard politics. This has led actors from both sides to question who is in fact best suited to examine and scrutinize legislators and their ‘reviewers’ (Senators) alike (Mulgan, 1996, 198). The Australian Senate and Legislative branches of government have both undergone legitimacy crises leading political scientists, and even elected officials, to argue for the formalization of legitimacy mechanisms informally brought forward by social movement actors. Such mechanisms include social governance, which is systems oriented approach for negotiation and collaboration in the increasingly decentralized management and administrations of natural resources, including water (Walis, Ison, & Samson, 2011). Walis, Ison and Samson (2011, pp. 412) believe that environmental movement actors have created space for themselves within local management by bringing public attention to the public policy failures of the state in conserving and preserving a diminishing water supply.
Given that social movements have placed increased scrutiny on various levels of government, while at the same time proposing and participating in alternative governance mechanisms, one may also argue that they are radically altering the norm of accountability itself. New public management, and even new social management approaches often emerge at the sate level during times of re-democratization, as was the case in Brazil in the 1980’s (Alvez, 2013). However, dilemmas of upholding accountability will continue to emerge if “new structures of political action, outside of the old ones, whose efficacy undermines the legitimacy of traditional democracy [do not offer] an equivalent form of accountability on its own” (Sabel, 2001, pp. 122). Within this approach social governance offers a different policy-making process that integrates new stakeholders and their situated knowledge on the ‘wicked problems’ ministers and legislators are no able to solve on their own (Svedin, O’Riordan, & Jordan, 2001).
New Models
There are new models of accountability emerging at lower levels of government that are challenging traditional models. Many argue that social movements are not only able to hold governments accountability when traditional accountability fails, but perhaps more importantly, contribute to a system wide shift. However, when a political system shifts, new configurations must also be evaluated. Rather than suggesting that social movements are not a coherent model alternative because they lack the same level of mechanistic function, any discussion surrounding the replacement of traditional accountability structures should interrogate who accountability is held to account.
Sabel (2001, pp. 123) suggests that there are political, social, and procedural limits placed on any complex configuration of political actors. Within this configuration the delegation of accountability is not only influenced by social actors but by economic ones. Keating (2003) finds, in the Australian example, that market driven forces do not necessarily reflect a mandated change in accountability but an informal experimentation in governmental efficiency (doing less with more). The economic imperative does not necessarily impact the social one. Therefore, public-private partnerships may shift who is accountable and when, the underlying assumptions may still be the same. The result is that sublevels of government, such as bureaucracies, must function within a new hierarchy of accountability wherein public interest, executive mandates and private mechanisms are engaging in new ways. This reality leaves lots of room for social movement actors to use their social capital to hold new and old decision-makers to account.
Conclusion
Intractable social, economic, political and environmental problems put pressure on government structures, actors and norms. Accountability is a norm that plays a prominent role in how governments steer society towards a more sustainable future. As different ideologies compete for political influence, no assumption about the functionality of government will be left untouched. The rapidly diminishing efficiency of the traditional model of accountability leaves many within out outside of government looking for new ways of doing good policy work. Social movements are still understudied but initial research indicates that they have a positive influence on governance processes and subsequent policy outcomes.
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