China vs. Taiwan
One of the longest going conflicts of the 20th century is the one between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Taiwan (ROC). Taiwan was once a province of China. In 1863, the Qing Dynasty took control of Taiwan eventually making it, its own province in 1885 (Spence, 1999). After falling to the Japanese during the First Sino-Japanese War, it returned to Chinese control, under the authority of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in 1945. Today, while Taiwan may seem to be a fully functioning nation-state; it is officially, still considered by both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing and the KMT in Taipei to be a province of “China.” The only difference between both governments’ stances is that the CCP regards it as a “renegade” province of the mainland that will eventually return mainland control, while the KMT views at as the last remaining non-Communist province that will eventually “liberate” the mainland. To be sure, both nations currently adhere to a policy known as the “One-China Principle” (TOC, 2005). According to the One-China Principle, there is only one legitimate representative of all of China including both the mainland and Taiwan. On the one hand, the CCP, see themselves as the legitimate government of China since the establishment of the PRC in October 1949. The KMT, on the other hand, consider themselves as the legitimate government of China and have been since the founding of the ROC in 1911. That difference in who each consider to be the legitimate ruler of China goes to the very heart of conflict between China and Taiwan.
The KMT began in1894 as the Revive China Society by Sun Yat-sen, a staunch Chinese nationalists and supporter of democracy, who advocated the overthrow of the Chinese Imperial Qing government with a republican government (Spence, 1999). The Qing were defeated in 1911 and the Republic of China was established in January 1912. While power formally transferred a president and a parliament was established; the political situation did not improve much. The provisional President, Yuan Shikai, was not very effective. Indeed, instead of being ruled by a corrupt monarchy, China was ruled by an equally corrupt president. Sun’s Revive China Society merged with a few other political groups to form the KMT is 1912 (Spence, 2009). Sun was elected as the new party’s chairman. In 1913 elections were held and the KMT was able to win a majority of the seats in the newly created parliament. Feeling threatened by the power and influence of the KMT, Yuan eventually used a failed coup attempt to expel the KMT from the parliament and eventually dismiss the parliament altogether in 1914. Sun and many of the KMT leaders fled to Japan and called for a second uprising to overthrow Yuan, who had now declared himself emperor. Before a rebellion could be launched however, Yuan died in 1916 and control of China was splintered among the group of powerful warlords and former Imperial military men. Sun returned to China in 1917 and eventually resurrected the KMT in 1919 and based it in Guangzhou.
At about the same time that Sun was reestablishing the KMT in Guangzhou, Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu, two prominent intellectuals who met a Beijing University, discovered a common interest Marxist philosophy. Eventually Li and Chen set up a Marxist study group which included Mao Zedong. In 1921, the CCP was founded on a boat in Jiaxing near Shanghai. While Chen was not able to attend, he was nevertheless elected as the leader. Once established, the CCP began to receive support and resources from the USSR.
Meanwhile, looking for support from anywhere he could get it, Sun also contacted the USSR, who agreed to provide assistance if Sun and the KMT would agree to cooperate with the CCP. With no other options available, Sun agreed. By 1923, the CCP was in essence, merged into the KMT. While outwardly, there was only the KMT; inwardly the KMT and CCP operated their own organizations with the common link being the respect and deference both had for Sun Yat-sen. On the one hand, CCP members, who dominated the KMT’s left-wing, took prominent positions in leadership. On the other hand, many of the pre-1923 KMT members dominated the party’s right-wing.
In 1925, Sun Yat-sen died and control of the KMT fell to leftist Wang Jingwei and rightist Chiang Kai-shek, who was also the commander of the KMT army. Without the common bond of Sun, however, tensions between the KMT and CCP became increasingly apparent. In 1926, the KMT set out to conquer the group of warlords who controlled parts of northern China. This was supposed to be the beginning of the campaign to eventually unify China under one government namely the KMT. The KMT took three routes hoping to eventually meet together in Beijing. Wang headed the western force whose target was the central Chinese city of Wuhan. General Bai Chongxi headed an eastern force whose target was Shanghai (Spence, 1999). Chiang headed a middle force whose objective was to take Nanjing. By most measures, Chiang’s campaign was successful. By the fall he and his army had gained control of most of south, central and eastern China and were poised to take Nanjing and Shanghai. But before any further advances could be made, however, in January 1927 Wang Jingwei, who has successfully taken control of Wuhan, declared the establishment of the KMT government in Wuhan. Feeling threatened by Wang’s declaration, Chiang quickly gained control of Nanjing and Shanghai, and by March 1927, declared the establishment of the KMT government in Nanjing.
With two declared KMT capitals, one under the right-wing leadership of Chiang and the other under the left-wing leadership of Wang, open conflict between the sides seemed inevitable. Chiang was the first to move. In April 1927, Chiang ordered the expulsion of all CCP members in the KMT in Shanghai as well as the elimination of any suspected CCP members who were not affiliated with the KMT. By the end of the month, the result, which became known as the “Shanghai massacre” was an estimated 12,000 killed (). In Wuhan, Wang had initially collaborated with a number of CCP leaders including Chen Duxiu and Mao Zedong in administering the Wuhan government. However, following an attack by a Chiang loyalist unit, Wang quickly realized that he would not be able to resist Chiang militarily. Accordingly, he also ordered the expulsion from the KMT of CCP members. Wang eventually also gave up his claim of Wuhan being the capital and rejoined Chiang in Nanjing to form a loyal opposition group to Chiang’s leadership.
With any semblance of unity now eliminated, Chiang extended and expanded his anti-communist separation campaign. By the summer of 1927 thousands of communists and suspected communists were killed around the country. In response, the CCP organized a fighting force composed of CCP veterans of the Wang’s force, farmer, KMT deserters and anyone who opposed the KMT rule. On August 1, 1927, this rag-tag force attacked KMT forces in Nanchang, a city to the south of Wuhan. After some initial success, they were repulsed by the better trained and equipped KMT forces. Without reinforcement, the force retreated to the south. Although defeated, the group inspired other CCP groups to take up arms against KMT forces. Eventually, a number of these groups joined together in a nearly inaccessible mountainous area near Nanchang were they trained and reorganized themselves as a more disciplined fighting force.
Those initial clashed between KMT and CCP forces in 1927 marked the beginning of the First Chinese Civil War which lasted from until 1937. During those ten years, in addition to fighting among themselves, both the CCP and KMT toke part in a range of non-military activity. For instance, after defeating the remaining warlords in northern China, the KMT established authority over most of China and began building a nation including developing international relations with other nations, unifying the economy and construction an infrastructure. The CCP, who had been chased from the cities, settled into the rural areas, reorganized, trained and developed the unique brand of peasant based revolution. Again, these are activities that energize the current conflict between the governments as each has history ruling and administrating the country.
In 1937, a truce was achieved between the CCP and KMT which resulted from the kidnapping of Chiang from a hotel in Xian by one of his own generals. The general then contacted the CCP and invited them to discussion on the fate of Chiang and the future of China faced with the threat of being overrun by Japanese troops. The CCP agreed to send a delegation. The talks ended with the release of Chiang and his agreement to work with the CCP in a campaign against the Japanese. As in the first KMT-CCP cooperation during the early 1920s, while on the surface, this truce works as both had a common enemy in the Japanese, under the surface there was deep distrust and feelings of wanting to exact revenge from both sides.
Similar to the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925, Japan’s defeat and surrender in 1945 eliminated the common interest shared by the KMT and CCP. Almost immediately, open fighting broke out between the two groups again. In contrast, to the 1920’s however, the KMT was not as powerful or unified as it once was. The demands of running a nation combined with fighting a war seriously degraded to KMT ability to fight and control areas under its authority. On the other hand, while the communist vigorously fought against the Japanese, the fact that most of their forces were rurally located saved them from facing the brunt of Japanese attacks. In addition, Soviet forces that had evicted the Japanese from northeast China turned over the territory and arms that they gained to CCP forces. By 1949, the CCP was able to turn the tide of battle eventually leading to the defeat of the KMT and their retreat to Taiwan which was renamed the Republic of China. While the CCP initially tried to take Taiwan, their efforts were unsuccessful.
The KMT was nonetheless isolated in Taiwan even though most of the world at that time recognized them as the legitimate government of China. While the US was initially wary of continued support of the Chiang regime, the Korean War changed their calculations. Fearing a possible communist take-over of all of East Asia, the US decided that it was in its best interests to support Taiwan militarily and economically (Kan, Aug. 2014). The US also decided that it would be best to minimize the chance of conflict between the two nations.
Between 1949 and 1979, the movement of people, goods and communications between China and Taiwan was non-existent. While physical confrontations tapered off in the 1950s, a war of rhetoric and symbolism became a permanent part of both governments’ policy. As mentioned, to this day, both governments adhere to a policy of mutual non-recognition. In 1979, diplomatic relations between the KMT and CCP were reestablished. While this has led to increased connections between the people of China and Taiwan, the governments themselves are formally still at war. Indeed, the civil war that started in April 1927 has never officially been ended and the conflict between China and Taiwan continues with no permanent ending in sight (Kan, Oct. 2014).
References
Kan, S.A. (2014, Oct. 10). China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy – Key Statements from Washington, Beijing and Taipei. Retrieved on December 7, 2014, from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf
Kan, S.A. (2014, Aug. 29). Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales since 1990. Retrieved on December 7, 2014, from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf
Roberge, M. & Lee, Y. (2009, Aug. 11). China-Taiwan Relations. Retrieved on December 7, 2014, from http://www.cfr.org/china/china-taiwan-relations/p9223
Shlapak, D.A., Orletsky, D.T., Reid, T.I., Tanner, M.S., & Wilson, B. (2009). A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
Spence, J. (1999). The Search for Modern China. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company.
Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC – TAO. (2005, Mar. 14). Anti-Secession Law. Retrieved on December 7, 2014, from http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/OneChinaPrinciple/201103/t20110317_1790121htm
