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Introduction
Diamonds serve as an enduring symbol of beauty. Being among the most expensive minerals in the world, diamonds are a common feature in priceless jewelry pieces that remind many people of sheer elegance and luxury. The strong image of diamonds as an embodiment of opulence and exclusivity alludes to its highly lavish natural features. However, many remain unaware that diamonds have also figured in a strongly controversial social aspect, involving the funding of armed conflicts.
Armed conflicts stand as costly efforts in terms of both the required resources and the consequent damages that happen in return. Staggering amounts of money prove crucial to the success of wars fought between nations, notwithstanding the risk of destroying lives and properties. Diamonds have figured in such a controversy, as many war proponents have found those as profitable for their cause. Knowing that the lucrative jewelry industry attracts wealthy clients, war proponents have found ways to organize funding mechanisms for conflicts using revenues from mining and selling diamonds. Thus, the controversy revolves around the fact that commercial operations involving diamonds have enabled the perpetuity of wars between nations. This study investigates controversial instances related to the concept of the blood diamond, on how it affects the integrity of the trade and how to stop related activities in the name of espousing peace between nations at war. Emphasis lies on nations with Africa – a continent reputed as among the richest sites for diamond mining alongside being a hotbed for various political clashes manifested through civil and international wars.
Defining the Roots of the Blood Diamond
Understanding what blood diamond is necessitates the provision of its definition. A blood diamond refers to a diamond whose value paid by its owner went to the proceeds of a warlord or a group that organizes warfare for whatever cause. In other words, diamonds sold for funding war chests earn the label “blood diamonds”. While the consumer side may not have the intent to aggravate the blood diamond controversy largely due to the unawareness of consumers on the origins of the diamonds they purchase, the burden of responsibility lies on the sellers (Amnesty International).
Blood diamonds have become the subject of several conflicts around the world, particularly in Africa. The succeeding sections center the concern on blood diamonds in wars that happened within African nations, namely Angola, Ivory Coast and the Republic of Congo. All three African nations experienced warfare funded heavily using revenues from the commercial trade of diamonds. International reforms attempting to resolve problems coming from the three nations serve as the emphasis of later sections of this study, forming part of the larger concern to generate further recommendations on solving the controversy.
Angola
A former colony of Portugal, Angola possesses mines that are abundant with diamonds. Angola, being one of the most prominent exporters of diamonds in the world, has also become one of the most notorious hotbeds for the blood diamond trade. Civil conflict in Angola between different parties spurred in 1974 – a year after the nation declared its independence. Three organizations have figured prominently in the 1974-2001 Angolan civil conflict: the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) (Fishman 217-220).
The prevailing lack of legitimacy in Angola has led the civil conflict to grow stronger as the years advanced, with the UNITA stepping up its funding regimen through the sale of diamonds starting from 1992 to 1998. The proceeds of the sale amounted to an estimated $3 billion, setting off an alarm that urged the United Nations (US) to issue responses in the form of two resolutions. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 1173) served as the official recognition of the UN on the blood diamond trade being the primary funding source of the UNITA. UNSCR 1173 effectively banned organizations to use revenues from the blood diamond trade to fund any form of warfare (Pearce 51-59).
Despite the prompt response of the UN, the blood diamond trade continued to thrive unregulated. From rates between 19-20% in the 1980s, the blood diamond trade continued albeit with lower rates. That prompted the UN to act further on the problem with the help of Robert Fowler, the ambassador of Canada at that time. Fowler, through his self-titled Fowler Report, noted the importance of all factors responsible for the blood diamond controversy, which helps in motives to curtail the problem. The Fowler Report is a compilation containing a list of nations, organizations and persons that have proven involvement in the blood diamond trade in Angola. Given the provision of stronger facts coming from Fowler, the UN issued UNSCR 1295, one that provided tighter sanctions for UNITA and all those who use diamonds for trade in exchange for funding wars. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is another mechanism designed to curtail the use of diamonds to fund wars. Such is the center of discussion of another section later in this study (Pearce 51-59).
Ivory Coast
Unlike Angola, the diamond mining industry in the Ivory Coast started recently in the early 1990s. Yet, Ivory Coast shares the same domestic situation experienced by Angola, as a successful coup in 1999 brought forth a civil war. The experience of Ivory Coast on diamond mining gave it an idea on the value of diamonds and the potency of resultant revenues to fund the civil war efficiently (Orogun 151-157). Hence, Ivory Coast became an important marker for diamond trade roots coming from Sierra Leone and Liberia, with revenues utilized for civil war efforts. Stable funding coming from the sale of diamonds prolonged the duration of the civil war in Ivory Coast, leading to the withdrawal of foreign businesses out of the nation. Drastic economic decline soon followed, as it became clear that the diamond trade in Ivory Coast strengthened civil war operations (Silberfein 213-230).
December 2005 saw the interference of the UN in the blood diamond affair rampant in Ivory Coast that time. The UN made the blood diamond trade in Ivory Coast illegal and enabled the stoppage of all mining activities on diamond within the nation. Yet, the direct involvement of the UN did nothing to stop the trade of diamonds in the Ivory Coast. Much of the northern section of Ivory Coast became the center of illegal blood diamond trading activities, as it uses the trade to fund reinforcements for arms. Thus, blood diamonds remain a problematic issue to this day (Orogun 151-157).
Republic of Congo
Compared to Angola and Ivory Coast, the involvement of the Republic of Congo on selling blood diamonds is not set in a high-profile manner. Rather, the Republic of Congo is in a position wrought by speculation, as it has faced disqualification and readmission to the KPCS because it could not provide a definite answer as to how the nation had high amounts of diamond exports in 2004. Lack of explanation on the origins of diamonds exported to other nations placed the Republic of Congo in a doubtful position, alongside cases of document falsification on the origins of diamonds. Yet, the Republic of Congo managed to gain entry to the KPCS again in 2007, despite the notoriety of blood diamond trading within it (Dietrich 99-110).
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS)
A major effort undertaken to prevent the further spread of blood diamond trading activities is the imposition of the KPCS by the UN. The KPCS is the product of the 2000 World Diamond Congress, where several representatives of industries related to diamonds have gathered to come up with a viable solution against the use of the diamond trade as funding generators for civil wars. To ensure that diamonds did not come from sellers whose proceeds direct to the coffers of warlords of civil wars, the introduction of several important measures became necessary (Grant and Taylor 385-389).
The main objective of the KPCS is to institute a certification system on all diamond exports at the international level. No diamond sale should undergo without the diamonds sold with the proper certifications in sealed covers. Anyone caught selling diamonds without the required certification will face court charges on trafficking illegal articles alongside other conspirators. Furthermore, diamonds without certification could not just pass from one nation to another without due declaration of its certification. Otherwise, those possessing diamonds without the required certification may face arrest, subject to the legislative prerogative of the nation involved. To further supplement the goal of avoiding the growth of blood diamond industries, prominent personalities in the diamond industry founded the World Diamond Council – the organization that certifies various processes for diamond product certification proving that it did not come from a conflict-ridden area (Haufler 403-410).
Governments of nations around the world, alongside nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and representatives from the diamond mining and production industries served as the main parties that agreed to the formation of the KPCS in the first quarter of 2002. November 2002 saw the finished product of the agreement, with the main parties having expressed themselves in the form of the rules agreed for the facilitation of diamond trade activities deterring blood diamonds. Apart from the widely held objective of keeping blood diamonds out of the market, the KPCS also has the goal to help develop the nations deeply affected by blood diamonds. Parties to the KPCS could hold dialogue with war-torn countries for consultations on any alleged use of diamonds as revenue generators for wars. Steps on ensuring that diamonds gain certification first before going on sale in the market becomes part of the developmental approach to helping nations impoverished by blood diamond-funded civil wars. With a strong deterrent against blood diamonds, the illegal markets will naturally die down and would consequently cause the downfall of civil war operations (Wright 697-705). Aside from that, the success of the KPCS became highly eminent in the way the sales figures for diamonds have increased. Diamond-based revenues would not have risen dramatically if trade activities on blood diamonds have not found deterrents. In return, diamond-producing nations previously wrought by blood diamond-funded civil wars saw figures of their national economies rise due to added efficiency on producing diamonds (Haufler 403-410).
However, it must be clear that the KPCS is not altogether a runaway success upon its implementation. In fact, the scheme has encountered streams of criticisms based on its efficiency to trace the origins of the blood diamond trade. Global Witness, for assistance, disused the KPCS as its certification scheme for diamonds due to the lack of concrete showing that it could eliminate the roots of the blood diamond trade (Wright 697-705). Another inevitability proponents of the KPCS should face is the fact that governments around the world have segments tainted with corruption. Thus, the licensing system boded by the KPCS may not fulfill its strongest potential to deter blood diamond trade activities through proper certification. Bribery, being among the most common practices associated with corruption in government, has affected the process of KPCS certification in some diamond-producing nations. Officials tasked to certify diamonds tend to receive offers up to $100 just to bypass the process towards outright certification (Grant and Taylor 385-389). Furthermore, the failure to extract accountability from governments of nations in agreement with the KPCS has led to the stunted success of the program. Accountability rests on the records of diamonds sent for exportation and importation alongside costs. On paper, such proves effective as a deterrent against blood diamond trading activities. However, many nations resorted to noncompliance, with many finding basis on corruption. Thus, the deliberate failure of nations to observe accountability did nothing to curtail trade practices on blood diamonds effectively (Gooch 189-210).
Synthesis
Noteworthy throughout the literature provided is the fact that diamonds could cause problems within diamond-mining and producing nations in Africa. The funds coming from the diamond-related industries in Africa tend to end up on the funds prepared for civil war by warring factions within nations in the continent. Logically, it follows that ending all diamond-mining activities is a strong way of ending the blood diamond trade as well. Yet, the potency of the mining areas on diamonds and the strong impact the diamond trade brings in to the national economies of producer nations make such a logical decision hard to implement. In fact, it goes without saying at this point that the presence of diamond mining activities is consonant to the presence of blood diamond mining activities as well. In short, the difficulty of stopping blood diamond trade lies on the reason that the land in affected nations in Africa is so abundant with diamonds, that stoppage of any mining activities could become a source of conflict in itself. Thus, the introduction of the KPCS proves as a strong call for reform on the part of governments of nations and figureheads from diamond-related industries to streamline diamond mining and production against the perils of producing blood diamonds. Despite the idealistic take of the KPCS on the matter at hand, it nevertheless still has some lapses, particularly with the problem of corruption. Verily, not all those who agreed on the formation of the KPCS have the willpower to turn down corrupt practices, given the difficulty of monitoring national diamond-related activities. Despite the encouraging factor of the KPCS to inspire the growth of war-torn diamond-producing nations through the deterrence of war, it remains unknown as to what extent corruption could render itself as a fully damaging factor to those struggling nations. With that, it becomes essential to develop advanced schemes supplemental to the KPCS aimed at deterring corruption in certification processes of the KPCS. Unless an effective deterrent to corruption in affected nations arises, civil wars will continue to run and cause damage to lives and properties.
Conclusion
The blood diamond trade continues to be problematic for many domestic and international policymakers, as it stands as the main funding mechanisms of many civil wars, particularly in Africa. The UN, through its KCPS, may have been trying its best to eliminate blood diamond activities, but corruption gets in the way of otherwise ideal reforms. Thus, the problem of corruption stands as an important arena for troubleshooting this matter. Further research on the blood diamond trade in Africa should include specific factors specialized on fighting corruption. The KCPS may stand as an enormous step forward by governments wanting the civil conflicts run by blood diamonds to end, but people need to take many more steps forward against corruption in order to make its elimination possible someday.
Works Cited
Amnesty International. Conflict Diamonds. n.d. Web. 31 May 2013.
Dietrich, Christian. "Blood Diamonds." African Security Review 10.3 (2010): 99-114. Print.
Fishman, Julie. "Is Diamond Smuggling Forever - The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: The First Step down the Long Road to Solving the Blood Diamond Trade Problem." University of Miami Business Law Review 13 (2004-2005): 217-220. Print.
Grant, J. Andrew, and Ian Taylor. "Global Governance and Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley Process and the Quest for Clean Gems." The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 93.375 (2004): 385-401. Print.
Gooch, Tina. "Conflict Diamonds or Illicit Diamonds: Should the Difference Matter to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme." Natural Resources Journal 48 (2008): 189-214. Print.
Haufler, Virginia. "The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global Governance and Conflict Prevention." Journal of Business Ethics 89.4 (2009): 403-416. Print.
Orogun, Paul. "’Blood Diamonds’ and Africa's Armed Conflicts in the Post—Cold War Era." World Affairs 166.3 (2004): 151-161. Print..
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Silberfein, Marilyn. "The Geopolitics of Conflict and Diamonds in Sierra Leone." Geopolitics 9.1 (2004): 213-241. Print.
Wright, Clive. "Tackling Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme." International Peacekeeping 11.4 (2004): 697-708. Print.
