Few of the founding fathers generate such polarizing attitudes as John Adams. Viewpoints on him vary widely, as we will see in this paper. We will review two different articles dealing with perspectives on John Adams, mainly during his diplomatic period in Europe during the Revolutionary War. As we will see, some see his moves during this period as a sign of weakness, indeed possibly of serious illness; others see his bold and perhaps precarious actions as a necessary brinksmanship that shaped the course of the American Revolution and world events.
In “John Adams’ Health Reconsidered” by Ferling and Braverman (1998), it is argued that Adams suffered from a thyroid disorder, possibly thyrotoxicosis. The authors argue that this disease would explain many, if not all, of the inconsistencies in Adam’s behavior after 1771, when they argue he had his first episode. They believe that he suffered many breakdowns throughout his life due to the disease, and that these played roles in shaping history due to affecting his behavior. The evidence presented includes lifelong nervous breakdown-like symptoms (83), evidence of a goiter (an enlargement of the thyroid gland) (93), reports of erratic behavior from others (104), and Adams’ irritability and preference to work alone (99).
However, the evidence the authors present could fit any number of conditions, the most likely being simply stress. While they point out that stress is linked to thyrotoxicosis as a trigger, it is also obvious that stress alone could be the cause of all of the episodes which they describe without requiring any underlying cause. Adams was certainly under a great deal of stress throughout the revolutionary period and after. As Lint points out in “John Adams and the Bolder Plan” (2001), “By 1776, Adams was committed to the violent overthrow of the existing system and his fate was irretrievably bound up in the success of the undertaking.” (107). Certainly that alone could produce the kinds of symptoms Ferling and Braverman argue were indicative of a thyroid disorder. The long separations from his wife Abigail, herself ill with rheumatoid arthritis, and the rest of his family, during most of the episodes described could produce that sort of stress. Indeed, the authors themselves point out that, once in retirement, Adams did not appear to suffer from further symptoms: “No longer confronted with issues, events, and personalities that burdened his life with stress, he called his first decade at home the happiest period of his life.” (99).
In any event, while the article provides an interesting perspective on Adams that very well could be an explanation for some of his admittedly odd and erratic behavior, it seems to fall far short of proving a case (as is often the case with later attempts to diagnose medical conditions). Perhaps if the authors had demonstrated some sort of family history or incidents among descendents, their case would have been stronger, as thyroid disorders are often genetic. Instead, they established that a man with rather average health for his time period and under a great deal of stress exhibited symptoms that could be explained by a thyroid disorder. While a compelling idea, there is simply not enough evidence to make a true judgement on it on the basis of this article.
In contrast, George Lint makes the case in “The Bolder Plan” that the bold moves Adams executed politically and diplomatically were instrumental in shaping the image of Adams which emerged. He argues that, particularly in contrast to co-diplomat Benjamin Franklin, Adams took a harder stance on most issues (111). Lint explains that “It is John Adams’ boldness, his determination to control rather than be controlled by events, that has made him the most controversial diplomat of the revolution.” (105). He argues that “The issue, then, is not so much what Adams did or did not accomplish, but rather the methods and attitude he brought to diplomacy.” (105).
Lint points out that this extends farther back than Adams’ tenure in Paris. Adams penned the “Novanglus” essays, arguably setting the ideological reasoning for the revolution (107). He also supported a complete break with the crown from the beginning in the Continental Congress (107). Adams, Franklin, and the rest of the diplomatic team were unquestionably personally bound up in the fate of the revolution, yet they never communicated any sense of doubt in ultimate victory (111).
Adams idealistically pushed for a relationship with France which would be based purely upon commerce, not wishing to become entangled in the complicated alliances of Europe and holding to his idealistic view that what the United States needed was a clean break (108). The treaty ultimately negotiated was, of course, that of a military alliance. While Adams personally disagreed with the treaty, he was adamant that his new nation fulfil the obligations agreed upon (108). Some of this may have been posturing for recognition of legitimacy from the British crown, but there can be little doubt that Adams saw himself as a man of his word and sought for his fledgling nation to share the same values and to be known for it internationally.
Adams did, however, often write Congress in frustration, and became increasingly sceptical of their abilities to perform diplomatic functions (109). Lint argues that it was at that point where his approach to diplomacy became truly bold: “He was determined to follow his own instincts and felt no compulsion to soothe French sensibilities except as it might further his mission.” (109).
The article goes on to explore how the three very differing approaches to diplomacy made by Adams, Franklin, and Comte Vergennes in Paris, and particularly contrasts Franklin’s much more “‘friendly” approach with Adams’ “bold” one. Lint ultimately concludes that “In the end, the ‘bolder’ plan won out and validated John Adams’ view that if ‘the knowledge is in the head and the Virtues are in his heart,’ the successful diplomat ‘will never fail to find a way of communicating his sentiments to good purpose.’” (113).
Ultimately, these two articles explore very different approaches to looking at John Adams’ way of approaching matters, particularly in his diplomatic activities. The first approaches this by questioning the health of the subject and, by extension, the way in which he approached diplomatic matters. The second takes the position that Adams, an idealist, pursued a bold strategy, far bolder than expected by contemporaries, to ultimately achieve success with his goals. These two different approaches to the same subject matter underscore the controversy still applied to John Adams to this day. As with so many prominent figures, it would appear doubtful that the controversy will ever reach an end.
References:
Ferling, John, and Braverman, Lewis E. (1998). “John Adams’ Health Reconsidered”.The William and Mary Quarterly Third Series Vol. 55, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), pp. 83-104.
Lint, Gregg L. (2001). “John Adams and the ‘Bolder’ Plan”. In Ryerson, Richard Alan, John Adams and the Founding of the Republic. (105-114).
