Perception can be defined as the process by which interpretation and recognition are affected by the object to the subject. In this paper, I will be analyzing the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the causal and disjuctivism theories. Perceptual experiences are divided into three categories: hallucination, illusion, and veridical perception. The various philosophical theories of perception can be assessed using various principles. The three important principles include the representational principle, the phenomenal principle and the common factor principle. The common factor principle states that there is a commonality of underlying mental state amongst hallucination, illusions and veridical perceptions. The phenomenal principle states that if one is consciously aware of a property then it is necessary for the owner of that property to exist for the sake of conscious awareness. However, the vital hats or tests of a perceptional theory are the phenomenological hat that has its focus on the conscious perspectives of visual experiences, and the epistemological hat that has its focus on the role of perception in giving human beings information about the outside world. Disjunctivism explains that when the subject sees the objects they see objects as if they are seeing the whole world. On the other hand, causal theory explains that when the subject sees the object, the object will form the experience to the subject. The perception in terms of the causal theory is geared towards creating experience to the subject.
Thomas Nagel phenomenological argument states that perceptions are typical conscious experiences. He presents several questions about perceptions. “Something likes to perceive, we can ask what it is like to perceive: what specifically is it like to see a pink elephant, to be tickled or to smell coffee”. The vital role of philosopher of perception is to model for about perceptions in a manner likely to give weight to the status of consciousness and thus used while assessing philosophical theories of perceptions based on their considerable strength and weaknesses. The bottom-line for a philosophical perceptional theory is thus its adequacy in having at least two different hats and the hats are perceived by the subject.
The disjunctive theory rejects the concept of common factor principle. It thus claims that the mental states involved in bad case of hallucination and in a bad case experience of perception are different even in cases where the experiences are indiscriminable of the object. Practically, disjunctivism has been utilized in the place of relationalist or naïve theory of perception. It thus means that the least condition for cases of perception is met as the theory encompasses an endorsement of the phenomenal principle. Unlike any other theory, the nature of disjunctivism claim suggests that there is no significant importance of getting other conditions to qualify visual experiences as cases of perception. It thus connotes that if a disjunctivism analysis of visual experience is correct for a visual experience, then the visual experience qualifies to be a case of perception if it is not hallucinatory perception. Disjunctivism in this case offers a reinterpretation of “seems” statements. Disjunjctivism will thus follow the argument that “I seem to see a pink elephant” is a considerable way of saying that “Either I see a pink elephant or I am having a hallucination of a pink elephant.”The translation of the first statement will automatically lead to the commission of the existence of bad case/ good case common factor. The second statement can also made true by arguing, “I actually see a pink elephant or I do not see a pink elephant but it is as if I see”.
Hallucination and perceptions are different in their status as perceptual evidence. The epistemological disjunctivism refutes the claim of similarity of perceptual evidence subjects across indiscriminable cases of hallucination and perception. Paul Snowdown makes clarity on the possibility of disjunctivism. “divide cases where it is true that it appears to the subject as if P into two sorts; one is where the subject is in a position to know that Pand others where the subject is in a position to know merely that it appears to be P”.
Metaphysics disjunctivism states that the qualification of mental states as distinct as long as they contain different constituents. Disjunctivists will thus hold that the constituents of subjects of perception evidence include perceived objects. The only concern following metaphysical disjunctivism is its appearance, which seems that the difference between it and other philosophical perception theories in support of Common Factor Theory is terminological.
The context disjunctivism states that the difference in context qualifies two mental states as distinct. One a theory to endorse the representational principle then it has to accept that visual experiments have contents. The phenomenology of disjunctivism states the condition for qualification of two mental states as distinct to be the difference in phenomenal character.
The main question that faces all the theories of disjunctivism hence its weakness is the indiscriminability of hallucination and perception, which appears to be factual. The detachment of perceptual context questions from perceptual phenomenology supports the conclusion that hallucinations and perceptions share phenomenology despite the difference in content.
The causal theory assumes that the perceptual experience is events that are embedded in the natural causal work which are influenced by mental and physical perceptions. It argues that the things that we see and perceives give our experience and understanding of the world better. The causal theory can be explained by use of the light meter. This is where there are electrodes which in the brain of an individual. The electrons will make an individual to have an experience on how the landscape looks like. The electrons build an experience in the mind of individual. This experience is very important as it helps an individual to see and perceive the landscape. It assists an individual in that the individual will be able to view and perceive the landscape. Through such experience and perception, an individual will be able to understand the landscape very well.
The cases of seeing require someone to augment what they are seeing. Grice the philosopher argues that human beings need to restrict what they are seeing. This will help them understand and perceive well what they are seeing. This will ensure that the get away from problems of seeing, where an individual may distrusted from premature experience. It is argued that an object needs to be building an experience in the subject or someone who sees that object but not for the subject to build an experience in the object he or she sees.
The causal theory objects disjunctivism in the theory argues that the objects should build the experience to the subject but not for the subject to create premature experience in the object. With the modifications that are made the analysis of seeing would only be perceived if the subject has visual experience and only the object caused the experience. Such experience would be satisfied if it fulfils these conditions. However, Lewis argues that the case about seeing is too strong. He rules out the cases of both prosthbetic and non-standard seeing. He compares with some individuals who have different principles of visual systems to the rest of other individuals. His argument is that those individuals would see things differently and this will lead to abnormal causal relations. He argues that such individuals would not be said to see. He however says the science using this principle would develop a prosthetic eye. The eye could be perfected and thus produce seeing effects as the normal eye would.
The subjects’ causal relations would therefore be abnormal and thus will prevent them from seeing. In this case, Lewis’ suggestion is that the proposed modification should reject as it might be deceiving the subjects from seeing and rules out a possibility that such individuals actually see. He further suggest that the experience build should be counterfactual meaning the experience should be build by the object and should depend on the scene before the eyes of the subject. The concept underlying here is that the object seen by the subject should bring changes and these changes would be reflected in the visual experience build.
Strawson argues that the causal theory has a conceptual truth. He argues that the idea of things present is responsible for perceptual awareness of our seeing. This is because an individual’s perception is the basic way of informing himself or herself. This helps an individual to inform himself or herself about the world. It is a way, which is used to inform ourselves about the world and the independent existing things. This is the general reliability and assumption of the visual experiences an object could receive from the object. The experience build depends on the independent things that a subject sees. However, this explanation does not give us reason for thinking any causal transaction that to subject’s eyes must be responsible for causing bad or good common factors to that subject.
According to Snowdon, he argues that the intrinsic nature is independent of the kinds of objects perceived. In this statement, he meant that the objects and subject’s experience are independent. The hallucinations that the subject perceives concerning the object is not true and will not give him or her real experience on that object. This means that the subject need to see the object in such a way that the object builds experience on him or her and should not have prior experience as such kind of experience deceives him or her. This will not give him true picture about the object. He further explains that having experience about environment is sufficient reason for one to see objects in the environment.
The causal theory perceives Illusion in terms of experience. Perception and experience are interlinked such that when someone perceives an object, the object gives him or her experience. On the other hand, illusions and hallucinations are also grouped together. This is because illusions and hallucinations give same perceptions about an object. Twin argues that an individual may see things near to him but in the real sense hallucinates other things away from him. For example, is given where a person perceives a table and hallucinates a pink rat on top of it.
William Child argues that for the causation experiences to be accommodated, individuals need to differentiate between sub personal and personal explanation levels. He argues that the explanation of subject experience on the object vary according to the levels of explanation. It depends on personal levels of brains and thinking. He says that if people are able to differentiate these levels of explanation, they will be able to understand and build real causal experience of an object.
Bibliography
Fish, William. Philosophy of perception: A contemporary introduction. Routledge, 2010.
Willaschek, Marcus, ed. Disjunctivism: Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception. Routledge, 2013.
