Since September 11, there has been a proliferation of programs to fight terrorism, accompanied by a tremendous increase in the resources allocated for the same purpose. However, not much effort has been directed towards determining the effectiveness of the programs. The question of effectiveness must be raised because if the programs are ineffective, the massive resources that have been allocated have been going down the drain. It is only recently that serious attention has been paid to this question (Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2009). The paucity of research in the area is testament to this.
Measuring effectiveness of terrorism strategies is complex and there is no unanimity as to how to go about it (Pisoiu & Van Um, 2011). Is effectiveness the complete destruction of a terror group like Al Qaeda? If a terror group is defeated but the defeat does nothing to prevent other groups from coming up and growing, or the defeat leads to a proliferation of terror groups, the strategy applied cannot be considered effective. Can effectiveness be correctly measured by looking at the number of terror attacks against the U.S. and its interests before and after the application of the strategy? Possibly. Is the successful killing of terrorists alone effective in combatting terrorism? Definitely not.
A correct measure of effectiveness is necessary for study of, or debate on, the concept to be methodologically grounded. This work adopts the measure applied in the Campbell research, that is, asking the question: do the programs put in place “reduce the likelihood of, or damage from, terrorism events or discourage individuals from acquiring motivations to carry out political violence?” (Lum et al., 2009, p. 4). It takes into account the outcomes that are expected of an effective strategy. Using this measure, it is safe to say that the strategies applied to fight terrorism have not been effective. Whereas the likelihood of terrorism events in the U.S. is lower than it was around September 11, the strategies have done nothing to diminish the motivation of individuals to become terrorists. The U.S. had fair success against Al Qaeda but the end of Al Qaeda as a strong global terror organization marked the beginning of an even more brutal organization; Islamic State in Iran and Levant (ISIL).
The fact that the tactics applied so far have been ineffective does not mean that they all need to be abandoned. However, they need to be re-examined and changes made. Terrorism requires to be tackled using a multipronged approach. President Obama acknowledged that the U.S. strategy against ISIL is not complete. One critical component that has all along been missing is a successful narrative strategy. U.S. has been losing the narrative war. A strategic narrative is a central component of a winning strategy. A narrative makes arguments very easy for people to understand and internalize. Terror organizations like Al Qaeda and ISIL attract recruits from all over the world because of their appreciation of the centrality of a strategic narrative, which they advance then reinforce it with activities on the ground. This is in contrast to the U.S. which carries out attacks then follows them up with information. The U.S. views a narrative as a mere gloss on the rest of the strategy. (Maan, 2015)
Maan (2015) proposes a two component narrative strategy. The first is a military narrative. This narrative, directed at the domestic audience, explains why military action is necessary. It must appeal to the morals and emotions of the people. The audience will relate with the parts of the message that are consistent with their story. Human suffering needs to be a part of the narrative. Though initially directed at the domestic audience, the story will spread and be heard even by would be recruits of terror organizations. The second is a counter narrative to the one being advanced by terrorists. The main purpose is to attacks the enemy’s narrative making it complicated for those who hear it. This takes away the appeal of the enemy’s narrative and reduces chances of conversion. The counter narrative must be channelled through appropriate messengers. The appropriate messengers are people in the communities in which terrorists operate. The U.S. must identify stakeholders in these communities who are unsympathetic or opposed to the terrorists’ message and empower them to spread the message.
Both narratives must pay particular attention to the suffering of innocent civilians in the hands of terrorists, be categorical that military and aid efforts are directed to all people irrespective of their religion or ethnicity, lay emphasis on the international collaboration in our endeavours and be transparent. They must not seek to impose or sell American values like democracy or have religious overtones. (Maan, 2015)
The U.S. must continue to support the establishment of stable systems of government. It must be ready and willing to expend resources to support countries that are serious about tackling terrorism but lack sufficient capacity to do so effectively. It is impossible for the U.S. to singularly fight terrorism all over the world and win the war. However, it can support countries that also want to fight the vice but find themselves constrained by financial and other resources. Relatedly, the U.S. must support the establishment of modern and progressive Islamic states. These governments supported in these states must have popular support for people to own the policies of these governments and so that it does not appear that the U.S. is indirectly ruling these countries. Iraq and Afghanistan must be a top priority for this mission. Otherwise, the common narrative advanced by terrorists that Islam is under attack from the “Crusaders” will easily gain credibility. (Ramakrishna, 2005).
Another seldom talked about solution to terrorism, especially Islamic terrorism, is the establishment of a Palestinian state that coexists with Israel. Islamic terrorism is the strongest and most widespread brand of terrorism. The story of the suffering of the Palestinian people buttresses Islamic terrorists’ narrative and even if the U.S. were to adopt the first recommended strategy of a strategy counter narrative, it is difficult to see how the U.S. would justify its tilting towards Israel while ignoring the great suffering of the Palestinian people. (Ramakrishna, 2005)
Each terrorist group must be studied and different tactics developed to deal with it. The one-size-fits-all approach to fighting terrorism cannot succeed because there are different brands of terrorism developed by different terrorist organizations. For instance, sheer force will succeed in defeating some terrorist organizations but not others. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and Chechnya terrorists in Russia were dealt with using brute force. The same strategy worsened the situation with Palestinian terrorist groups in the last decade. Attacks against Israel increased with continued targeted killings of leaders of Palestinian terrorist organizations and destruction of Palestinian homes (Tridico, 2001). The difference in ideology and goals of the terrorist organizations partly accounts for the difference in the outcomes of the same strategy.
Conclusion
The military action that has been the core component of the U.S. strategy to combat terrorism is crucial but it is not sufficient alone. It can only produce short term results. To achieve a lasting victory against terrorism, the U.S. must develop a complete strategy that includes other critical elements. Apart from military action, the U.S. cooperation arrangements with other countries and protection of homeland security to combat terrorism. The complete strategy should also include a strategic narrative that makes the case for military attacks, aid and development in areas plagued by terrorism and counters the terrorists’ narrative; the actualization of the message contained in the narrative through aid and supporting the establishment of progressive states, especially Islamic states where terrorist groups are likely to be established and anchored; the resolution of the Israel Palestine Conflict through the establishment of a Palestinian state; and the tailoring of counter terrorism strategies to terrorist groups.
At the same time, the U.S. must refrain from doing things that reinforce the terrorists’ narrative. It must not violate the law or its values in dealing with terrorists. For instance, it must adhere to the law in the way it treats terror suspects. In particular, it must refrain from torture and unlawful detention of terror suspects. It must adhere to both the law and morality.
It is difficult to implement certain proposals. The establishment of a Palestinian state has always been a controversial matter. Efforts have been made for several years to resolve the Israel/Palestine conflict without success. Consensus must be built and Americans need to appreciate that the resolution of the conflict is critical for the war on terror to be won. The terrorists will always convince their followers that Islam is under attack by the “Zionists” and their allies including the U.S. for as long as the conflict remains unresolved.
The other very important proposal that will crucial to the war on terror, besides resolving the Israel/Palestine conflict, is the development and communication of a strategic narrative. This one is fairly easy. There is no reason why it should pose a challenge. The rest of the proposals should also not be difficult to implement. Providing support to other states will require the involvement of U.S. developed allies as it is a momentous task and other countries also have to be involved because terrorism is a global problem. The first three address themselves to the root of terrorism and would likely lead to an almost complete defeat of terrorism.
It is not possible to completely defeat terrorism. Even with the best efforts the vice cannot be completely eliminated. However, it can be contained. It is impossible to completely eliminate other crimes but their prevalence can be reduced. Similarly, the though terrorism cannot be defeated it can be contained so that it does not affect life the way it presently does.
Bibliography
Lum, C., Kennedy, L. W., & Sherley, A. J. (2009). The Effectiveness of Counter Terrorism Strategies. Campbel Systematic Reviews, 2006(2).
Maan, A. (2015). Narrative: The Critical Component of Counter Terrorism Strategy. Small Wars Journal.
Pisoiu, D., & Van Um, E. (2011). Effective Counter Terrorism: What Have We Learned so Far. Economics of Security Working Paper Series, 55.
Ramakrishna, K. (2005). “The Southeast Asian Approach” to Counter Terrorism: Learing from Indonesia and Malasya. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 25(1).
Tridico, D. (2001). On the Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Measures-A Political Economy Perspective. University of Zurich.
