The massacre of forty unarmed civilians in the village of Racak on the fifteenth day of January the year 1999 marked the climax of the armed Conflict of Kosovo. At this point, the international efforts aimed at establishing a diplomatic solution to the seemingly endless internal conflict had totally failed (Hosmer 2001). President Slobodan Milosevic was in constant breach of the internationally mediated agreements, exhibiting highest disregard for diplomacy. When the last endeavor to find a subtle solution to the otherwise unjustified killings failed, the American ambassador, Mr. Richard Holbrooke tried to convince Milosevic to embrace peaceful solutions. It was after Holbrooke’s efforts proved futile; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched an air strike whose main objective was to drive Milosevic’s military and paramilitary personnel out of Kosovo. This paper seeks to explain the effectiveness of the NATO air campaigns in Kosovo, 1999.
The efforts by President Slobodan to perform ethnic cleansing on the province of Kosovo caused international concern when the Yugoslav forces caused tension in the region. By 1998, more than 300000 people had fled their homes in search of peace. The offensive launched by the Yugoslav military, paramilitary and police forces intensified by day, causing more international concern. Talks, involving the parties to the conflict, were held twice in France and Britain (Mertus 1999). Neither of the meetings seemed to yield as president Slobodan displayed much disregard for diplomatic engagements. The NATO forces launched an air campaign with a number of objectives. Top on the agenda was the efforts to have the Yugoslav forces leave the region and provide an environment that could allow the return of refugees and provision of humanitarian aid. The campaign, which lasted for seventy eight days, was more effective than the commanders of the Allied forces had estimated. The major reasons behind the air campaigns are rooted in the military superiority of the allied forces.
The campaign proved to be effective all through the seventy eight days. Initially, the campaign was estimated to last for just a few days. However, the characteristics of the conflict and the way in which Slobodan resisted, prolonged the offensive. Primarily, the effectiveness of the campaign was seen in the fact that the NATO forces managed to compel president Slobodan into agreeing to the peaceful solutions to the armed conflict. Worth noting is the fact that all through the air strikes, no fatality was reported from the NATO side. The NATO forces however, managed to destroy a number of military equipment used by the Yugoslav forces (Lambeth 2001). The destroyed property included hundreds of military vehicles as well as a number of tanks. The NATO forces participating in the air strike were careful on the issue of handling civilians. They tried to minimize contact with the civilians the best they could. The objectives of the war targeted purely the military objects of Yugoslavia.
The Yugoslav troops in Kosovo were determined to resist the air strikes but the air campaign was planned out too well to fail. The allied forces had weapon superiority. This added a great deal to the efficiency of the campaign. Again, the effectiveness of the air strike has been associated with the cooperation among the allied powers. The allied countries were cooperated in such a way that landing bases were provided for the fighter jets. This facilitated the reinforcing and fueling of the military jets. The allied forces as well contributed resources that strengthened the campaign. For instance, the military surveillance called for heavy spending. The organization had adequate financial resource, which facilitated the military operations in the region. The acquisition of the jets and other military supplies was hassle free as the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are wealthy nations.
Various scholars have argued that the effectiveness of the air campaigns can as well be explained by the fact that the two sides were of unequal strength. The Yugoslav forces could not withstand the military pressure mounted by the Allied forces. This, somewhat, explains why president Slobodan had to agree to the provisions of the NATO campaigns in Kosovo. In line with protocol I, the allied forces had to minimize contact with the civilians, in such a way that not even the resources belonging to, or relied upon by the civilians were interfered with (Mertus 1999). Protocol I provided a reference point during the planning of the air strike. Much as the air campaigns caused loss of some civilian lives and destruction of scores of property, the losses were results of mistakes in targeting. The mistaken targeting, for instance, caused the bombing of a civilian train on the 12th day of April 1999. Such mistakes were minimal, and were associated with few fatalities.
The allied forces managed to stop all actions of the Yugoslav forces. This marked an end to the violence and repression in the province of Kosovo. The violence, leveled against the civilian population causing the murder of hundreds of innocent women and children came to an end when allied forces descended and kept vigil in the most affected areas. As the military personnel were driven out of the region, the NATO forces took over and made the environment peaceful. Many people that had fled their homes gained the confidence to come back home. The access to humanitarian aid was as well enhanced. Prior to the allied forces intervention, the civilians could hardly access humanitarian aid (Lambeth 2001). The Yugoslav forces had made the situation hostile enough for the providers of humanitarian aid. After Slobodan troops had been ejected from the region, the nongovernmental organizations gained the confidence to come back and provide support to the civilians that had fallen victim to the armed confrontation.
During the air campaign, the command of the allied force was united. The chain of command was observed in the making of every decision. The observance of such chain of command contributed to the effectiveness of the campaign. The target selection decisions were evaluated at all levels of command. The evaluation of the targets was made in such a way that civilian objectives were differentiated from military objects (Hosmer 2001). The careful planning enabled the commanders of the war to use sanctions as silent weapons. Such sanctions took the form of cutting down military supplies to the Yugoslav troops. The supplies were cut down through the destruction of such essentials as power supplies. The NATO forces, through carefully planned surveillance and military intelligence, managed to identify the power sources that served the military bases in Kosovo. The sanctions were done in such a way that the civilians remained unaffected. Even so, this tactic did impact of the civilians when some mutual military-civilian resources were destroyed.
Operation allied forces has been described as the most effective undertakings of the NATO air force. The effectiveness of the campaigns has been linked with the support of the offensive from the United Nations Security Council. The International Council supported the offensive through providing a military presence in the region towards the end of the air attacks. The decision to keep the military personnel on the ground was based on the postulation that was the only way the United Nations could reassure the civilians that fled the region that peace had been restored. Having a military presence in Kosovo towards the end of the offensive enabled the NATO forces to identify the bases that the military and paramilitary forces of president Slobodan used. As such the Allied forces had an easy time laying the targets and striking. This weakened the forces and compelled them to withdraw from Kosovo. As such, the operation allied forces had achieved two of its main objectives. First, it had driven the violent forces out of the region and taken over. Secondly, it had managed to have refugees return to their homes by stopping the violence and civilian killings.
The effectiveness of the air campaigns has been associated with the efficient leadership within the allied forces. The NATO forces endeavored to eliminate all wrangles in the chain of command. The centralization of the commanding powers ensured that the issuance of orders and execution of operations was carried out effectively (Mertus 1999). The leadership of the NATO forces was as well linked to the Security Council. This enhanced consultation and collective planning. The combined efforts of the Security Council and the allied forces drove Slobodan out of Kosovo and maintained presence in the region. Such presence made the making of the peaceful agreement possible. The reforms were effective and were implemented soon after the air campaign. This qualified the air strikes as the most effective campaigns by the military wing of the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Another major factor behind the effectiveness of the campaign was the fact that the allied force weakened the Yugoslav forces both physically and economically. Such economic sanctions resulted from the destruction of major industries and military controlled corporations. The NATO air campaigners destroyed the military infrastructure a great deal. Arguably, the destruction of such infrastructure as bridges and roads was the biggest blow against the Yugoslav military (Hosmer 2001). The breaking of the bridges paralyzed the transport and communication efforts of the Yugoslav army. These made reinforcement difficult and the refurbishment of military equipment, practically impossible. Additionally, the air campaigners destroyed the water supply to the strategic military bases. This caused the military personnel in the bases make attempts to move in search of necessities. This was on the seventh day of the war. During this time, the region had seen the Yugoslav personnel weakened considerably. Even so, the Slobodan forces maintained the assault on the Kosovo liberation army.
The effectiveness of the air campaign can as well be linked with the cooperation between the NATO forces and the Kosovo liberation army. The cooperation between the two forces caused effective surveillance and intelligence. The Liberation army, which was in fact weaker compared to the Yugoslav army, acted as the ground intelligence network for the allied powers. As such, the NATO forces carried out their strikes with much precision and accuracy. This worked for the allied forces in the sense that it weakened them greatly creating a big inequality as far as weaponry and strategy were concerned (Lambeth 2001). This was yet another reason as to why the campaign became effective. The disparity in military superiority was a great factor behind the NATO success. In simpler words, the success can be associated with the superior technology employed by the NATO forces. Given that the Allied forces had no ground bases and military units, its air force wing was superior and employed the use of best war technology. The jet fighter planes used effectively bombed the targets without such bombardment affecting the neighboring civil residences and property. The fact that the technology used was capable of singling out a target made the campaign effective through minimizing unforeseen injuries and destructions of property.
In line with the 1907 Hague Regulation, the allied forces gave sufficient warning to the region prior to launching the offensive. This endeavored to have the civilians vacate the region so as to have less causalities and civilian injuries. The regulation forms part of the laws of armed conflict. The allied forces observed the laws of war from beginning to the end (Mertus 1999). This enabled them to minimize illegitimate injuries and targets. The targets that contained civilian presence were excluded from the plan of attacks. This way less criticism was associated with the war. Collateral damage was minimized. Even so, critics have argued that the allied powers used force on destroying the state owned the broadcasting corporation. Such an act impacted negatively on the entire population.
Another primary factor behind the effectiveness of the air campaigns was the fact that the allied forces adopted superior strategy. The strategy used did not involve the use of ground units. This is to say that they invested heavily on the air force wing and equipment. The use of air attacks and surveillance was indeed a better arrangement compared to the use of ground units (Hosmer 2001). In other words, the inequality in strength and technology placed the allied powers at an advantage over the Yugoslav army. It is for this reason that the Yugoslav army had to retreat and vacate the region. The strategy adopted by the Slobodan troops did not cater for the possibility of air attacks. They were taken by surprise and overpowered in less than three days. By the fourth day, the Yugoslav army had been greatly reduced.
In conclusion, it is quite apparent that the campaign against the Yugoslav forces and the Slobodan regime was sufficiently effective. The effectiveness can be attributed to the use of superior strategy, better war equipment and technology as well as good leadership. The fact that the Yugoslav army was attacked by the allied forces disrupted their efforts to combat the Kosovo liberation army. The support and consultation provided by the Kosovo liberation army as well as the United Nations Security Council gave the operation allied forces a definite advantage. The use of excellent surveillance and intelligence enabled the allied forces to distinguish civilian objects from the targeted military objects. The observance of the international laws on armed conflict, such as the issuance of sufficient warning reduced criticisms leveled against the military operations carried out by the NATO air force. The effectiveness of the campaign was rather obvious when all the objectives of the campaign had been achieved.
Reference list
Hosmer, S. T. 2001. The conflict over Kosovo: why Milosevic decided to settle when he did. RAND. Santa Monica
Lambeth, B. S. 2001. NATO's air war for Kosovo: a strategic and operational assessment. Rand. Santa Monica.
Mertus, J. 1999. Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war. University of California Press. Berkeley
