Does all of the creation have equal rights? Or are some of the Earthlings more valuable than the others? This question has become a deep issue nowadays. While in the past, the moral status of animals was not strongly debated as there were more acute issues at the time, now this issue is rather actual. When the racism and sexism were defeated, and all humans gained equal rights, have not the time come for animals to get these rights? Should animals be given equal considerations of interests with humans? Peter Singer answers with a strong “yes.” He calls the discrimination of animals - speciesism and puts it in one row with racism and sexism. In this work, I will present Singer's view and supporting arguments regarding the matter. Also, I will present an objection to his view and give my arguments to support it. In the last section, I will respond to the objection presented in the second section.
Section 1
Peter Singer approaches the issue of animal rights from different angles. First of all, his term speciesism should be defined. Speciesism is a form of discrimination where the interests of members of certain species are given greater consideration than the interests of members of other species. When applying this concept to us, humans, it implies that we, humans, give preference to our interests over the interests of other animals relying solely on the fact that we are of different species. This, Singer claims, is akin to racism and sexism – the form of discrimination that should be avoided and eradicated. He supports his claim with an argument consisting of two main parts. The first is that if the speciesism as a form of discrimination is justified, then the racism and sexism are also justified. The second part stands that the equal consideration of interests is not a claim of the actual equality but the moral ideal. I will next explain both of them.
First of all, it is important to understand what Singer means when he uses the term "interests." He explains that interests come from the capacity of the creatures to suffer and feel happiness. For example, our interests come in the form of the desire to live, our strive for happiness, our tendency to avoid pain and suffering. The same is true about animals; they also have their needs, wishes, and desires. The equal consideration of interests, however, does not imply that the animals and humans will have equal rights. Many of the rights which human possess are simply beyond reach of the animals. For example, a cat should not be given equal consideration when applying for a job, simply because the cats neither apply for any jobs nor have the interest to do so. Also, this does not imply that the lives of animals and humans should have equal value. Singer claims that human life is more valuable than the life of an animal, a butterfly for example. Humans have greater capacities of feeling happiness and suffering, have greater rational capabilities and can plan their future and attain their goals, which animals aren't capable of.
Singer asserts that the justifications of speciesism are very much the same as the justifications of the racism and sexism were. He points out that any argument in favor of speciesism can be easily worked out to support racism and sexism. For example, consider the statement that human interests should be given greater consideration than the interests of animals because the rational capacities of former are greater than of the latter. If we substitute the word humans for whites, and animals for blacks, we will obtain the claim justifying racism. Indeed, during the time of the struggle for equal rights for all races, such arguments often emerged. It is true that there are black individuals who are better than some white individuals in every thinkable aspect. This, however, does not deny the fact that on average, blacks have lower rational capacities than whites. Although this difference may be due to not biological or genetic but environmental factors, this can hardly be determined. The same argument can be applied for sexism if “blacks” and “whites” are replaced with “females” and “males.” The characteristic can also be changed to moral capacity, physical strength, or anything else. While these arguments state that there are strong differences between the members of different races and sexes, it is clear that they do not grant justification to discrimination of any sort. All humans are different but still we claim them to have equal rights. Ultimately, equal rights do not come from the actual equality of the individuals; it is rather the moral ideal that the interests and needs of everyone should be considered equally. This implies that there should not be given greater consideration to the interests of a human than to that of an animal only because of their species. The equal rights may, however, be assigned due to the principal differences between their capacities to act, moral and rational capacities and capacity to feel happiness and suffer. Singer concludes with the claim that we should give equal moral consideration to humans with severe disabilities and animals whose intelligence and level of development are the same. It means that when eating animals or making them the subjects for our experiments, we should with equal moral consideration be able to do the same to the infants or severely disabled individuals.
Section 2
In this section, I will present the objections to Singer's view. I will object to his claim that equal consideration should be given to animals and disabled individuals with severe brain damage, as well as infants because of their potential capacities. Singer briefly mentions the potential capacities that a creature might develop as one of the objections to his view, however when answering it, he misses the point. What makes the severely disabled individuals and infants different from animals is their potential to develop moral and rational capacities characteristic of a normal human being. This is what makes humans totally different from all animals – the moral capacity. None of the animals have morality as this is the form of the highest mental activity. Compared to the difference between moral and non-moral creatures, the differences between human individuals are insignificant. This, however, does not imply that infants and disabled individuals should be given greater consideration as they do not possess any moral capacity. However, they possess potential to develop it. While the application is clearer for the case of infants, the disabled also qualify for it. It is possible that if some kind of treatment is applied to the individuals with severe brain damage, they will start to recover and will eventually regain their normal moral and intellectual capacities. This kind of treatment might not yet exist, but it is possible that it will be created since the disabled have the theoretical potential to be normal. At the same time, animals having the same capacities as these disabled individuals are already at their top. They have normal characteristics pertinent to their species and are theoretically unable to progress any further. This is the point where nature itself has put constraints and limitations. The potentials that humans and animals have in their moral capacities are clearly different. This means that animals with any treatment possible will not be able to reach the heights that humans can. The individuals with brain damage can be on the same conscience level that the animals are, but they have much greater potential in regaining and developing their capacities. This argument, as opposed to Singer, does not imply that abortion should be claimed morally impermissible. Fetuses have potential to develop moral capacities, but the potential capacities are always inferior to the actual capacities. This means that while the infants and disabled individuals should be given greater moral consideration than the animals, their moral consideration is still inferior to the one of the fully developed adults.
Section 3
In this section, I will present a response to the objection in the second section. It is stated in the objection that humans and animals have different potential moral capacities. It is asserted that with some kind of treatment, the disabled individuals can regain their moral capacities. This whole concept of potential is highly dubious and controversial. While in the case of infants, everything is rather clear – if left alone they will eventually grow up by themselves and develop moral capacities. In the case of individuals with severe brain damage, some kind of treatment is required to get them back to normal. However, here is where the ambiguities lie. First of all, we do not know whether such treatment will be created, or whether it is possible. It is only an assumption for which we do not have any proof or support. It may even be impossible. Second of all, if we assume that such treatment is feasible, then we may possibly assume that there will be created some treatment which will allow animals to break the limits set by nature. We can claim it possible that with some kind of treatment, animals will be able develop beyond their natural level of conscience and will gain moral capacity similar to the one, that humans possess. It this case, they should have equal moral consideration. This means that the argument presented in the second section does prove that animals should be given lower moral consideration than humans.
