Speech Analysis: Peace in our Time
“Peace in our Time” is a famous speech delivered by the prime minister of the United Kingdom, Neville Chamberlain, on the 30th of September, 1938. The announcement, which was read to the public from the steps of 10 Downing Street, was meant to address several key issues related to the Anglo-German Declaration and the Munich Agreement. The actual title of the speech happens to be the phrase “peace for our time” which is commonly misquoted as “peace in our time”. The latter speech was developed from the variation of a 7th century hymn found in The Book of Common Prayer – “Give peace in our time, O Lord”. It is possible that Chamberlain chose the words to his speech deliberately to echo the same sentiment. The phrase bears resemblance to the words of Benjamin Disraeli who in 1878 proclaimed “I have returned from Germany with peace in our time” after returning from the Congress of Berlin (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2013).
Neville Chamberlain met with Adolf Hitler at his residence in Berchtesgadenduring the period immediately preceding World War II. Hitler’s proposal was simple – Germany would invade Czechoslovakia unless the British government offered full support to Hitler’s plans to take over Sudetenland. Chamberlain consulted with Eduard Benes and Edouard Daladier regarding the issue and then informed the German dictator that his terms were unacceptable. Hitler was in a difficult spot but he was also aware of France and Britain’s reluctance to go to war. Moreover, the contemporary political system made it highly unlikely for these two nations to join forces with the Soviet Union. It is Benito Mussolini, the Italian fascist dictator, who came up with a solution to the problem. He suggested that Hitler convene a conference with the four major powers in attendance – Britain, France, Germany and Italy. This would successfully alienate both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia and undermine the germinating solidarity against Germany. In the meeting, held in Munich on the 29th of September, 1938, Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier permitted Germany to take over Sudetenland since they were against an alliance with Germany and desperate to prevent war. In return, Hitler promised that no further territorial demands would be made in Europe. The Munich Agreement was signed on the same day which effectively transferred Sudetenland to Germany. Chamberlain returned as a popular hero to England and he devised the “Peace in our time” speech to allay the fears of the public while he focused on the acceleration of the rearmament program carried out by the United Kingdom (The Guardian, 1938). In spite of the optimistic nature of his speech which clearly exposed his desire to avert conflict, it is remembered mainly for its ironic value since the occupation of Sudetenland by the Germans started on the following day.
The main purpose of the “Peace in our time” speech by Chamberlain was to defend his stance on the Munich Agreement of 1938 (Murphy,2011). The first thing that captures the attention of the readers is the overtly defensive tone of the essay. Instead of concentrating on the actual Agreement, Chamberlain attempts to divert attention to the conditions of the treaty. He actively tries to distance himself from criticism of the “House” by highlighting the terms – the decision to hand over the predominantly German regions of Sudetenland to the German Reich was not theirs to take; it had already been established when Czechoslovakia accepted the proposals from both the English and the French. Chamberlain reveals the inability of the British government to stand in the face of strong opposition when he states that they just had the power to influence the conditions, the time and the method of transfer of the territory. Chamberlain even lamented about the state of the contemporary period when the slightest wrong move might have resulted in the outbreak of warfare. The population of Britain had become inflamed to a great extent and large quantities of arms had been distributed outside organized troops. He, therefore, stated that they had to reach a final decision fast in order to ensure that their efforts to come to a peaceful solution were not in vain. What becomes clear from the context is Chamberlain and the British government’s inability to claim responsibility for their own faults and blame the outcome on external factors.
Chamberlain actively tries to manipulate the opinion of the public with subliminal hints scattered throughout his speech (The Guardian, 2009). He refrains from describing it as a national or personal triumph and urges the people of the U.K. to do the same when; in fact, Hitler considered it be a clear win for the domination of the Third Reich. On the other hand, the sheer sense of pride in Chamberlain’s speech is noticeable when he calls attention to the fact that four great Powers were able to set aside their differences and sort out issues between them without resorting to armed warfare. He distinctly fails to mention the implications of the “discussion”.
The decision to cede Sudetenland to Germany led to Germany sparing Britain. Chamberlain considers this to be a cause for great relief in the nation; he raises himself to the position of a sympathetic saviour who helped protect his troubled people from the perils of war. In retrospect, Britain left Czechoslovakia defenceless and provided the enemy with additional leverage in exchange for its own security (Hoffman, 1986).
Some of the members of the House had questioned Chamberlain about any regrets he had regarding his decision. From their perspective, the Munich Agreement was a compromise and they were not ready to pay the price for Chamberlain’s folly. But Chamberlain vehemently protects his position and declares that he has no reason to be ashamed. In fact, he turns the tables on his attackers when he states that those who feel ashamed with the choice can hang their heads if they wish. He portrays Czechoslovakia as a “small and gallant nation” facing national crisis when he was the one who sold them out to the enemy. Few House members found the speech insulting to the plight of Czechoslovakia but Chamberlain countered them by maintaining that the nation had earned the respect and admiration of Britain for the dignity and restraint it had demonstrated against the harsh trial. He neglects to mention that the country was left with no other option when both Britain and France accepted the terms of the proposal from Hitler. Chamberlain hopes that Czechoslovakia, under new governance, would find greater security than in the past. In the speech, Chamberlain proceeds to praise Hitler since he recognises the difficulty that a “man in that position” has to contend with when he withdraws declarations that had officially been made in front of supporters. He exercises diplomacy when speaking about “Signor Mussolini” but there is a hint of sarcasm in his tone when he talks about the leader’s contribution to a peaceful solution.
Works Cited
Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2013). Neville Chamberlain. Available: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/104904/Neville-Chamberlain. Last accessed 20th Aug 2013.
Hoffman, Peter. (1986). Peace through Coup D'État: The Foreign Contacts of the German Resistance 1933–1944. Central European History. 19 (1), 3-44.
Murphy, Jonathan. (2011). ‘Peace in Our Time’: Constructing parallels between Britain’s failure to appease Hitler and British policy towards Republican dissidents in Northern Ireland . ERAS. 12 (2), 1-21
The Guardian. (1938). 1 October 1938: Chamberlain returns from Munich and declares "Peace for our time". Available: http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2011/may/25/guardian-190-chamberlain-returns-from-munich. Last accessed 20th Aug 2013.
The Guardian. (2009). Neville Chamberlain and appeasement. Available: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/05/chamberlain-munich-appeasement-second-world-war. Last accessed 20th Aug 2013.
