Philosophy
Happiness is a state of positive mind reflecting hope, peacefulness, as well as pleasantness about one self and the immediate environment. Happiness is more internal and is not impacted by any kind of material possession or financial well-being. May be, in certain cases, financial well-being and material possessions could possibly help achieving happiness, but the same may not be the true source of happiness. Happiness is essentially the frame of mind characterized by contentment and even intense joy. Many religious and philosophical approaches have defined happiness variedly and try to pinpoint its source. Happiness is relative and can be attained by different means by different people; for some, it is oneness with God; for a few, it is success in certain events; for some, it is some kind of an achievement, and there is no universal source of happiness that is applicable to all.
More often, people identify happiness with living a good life or even flourishing, rather than being an emotion. There is no clear definition of happiness and it can mean different things to different people. This is exactly the part of challenge to science that tries to identify different concepts associated with happiness, and even drill down to their components. Most often, concepts like quality of life, material prosperity, well-being, among others are the few common things that are associated with happiness, and some of them even have identified it as contentment.
A few thinkers have tried to define happiness as avoiding unpleasant experiences in life. Many of researchers have tried to define happiness and have caused to have created many different views of happiness and on factors contributing to happiness. However, despite intense research, there is no single universally validated method to improve long-term happiness in a way that is applicable and meaningful to many people. As a matter of fact, one researcher even went on to say that half of what determines human happiness is genetically determined and only 10% of it by current life circumstances and situations.
There was a study undertaken by the Harvard graduates, which showed a strong correlation of loving relationships in early life, especially with parents that indicated almost conclusively of later life well-being. Another school of thought feels that “encountering unexpected positive events” leads to happiness.
Very often, people say that happiness cannot be bought. However, money, when applied in certain fashions, and having more money than to cover comfortably the basic essentials of life, makes people a little happier. Another Harvard Business school study, actually reported that spending money on others actually makes people feel happy. Companies like Coca-Cola ride on a definition which states that ‘Happiness is a Positive Range of Emotions experienced when an individual is content or full of joy.’ Coca-Cola further simplifies this definition by saying happiness is something that can bring a smile on an individual’s space.
Christine Marion Korsgaard, an American Philosopher and academician specializes in moral philosophy and history. She has published a book titles ‘Sources of Normativity,’ and has extensively worked on metaphysics, philosophy of mind, personal identity, theory of relationships and normativity. She extensively talks about self-interests, morality, and pleasure. Chris Korsgaard speaks of beneficence, moral psychology, and happiness, and clearly identifies numerous possibilities of happiness and morality. She speaks of doing things that are essential to keep an individual alive and well, doing things that make others happy, and doing things for one’s own great happiness. She also goes ahead to give two specific examples of beneficence and moral philosophy.
A sympathetic person according to her, does things for the sake of his own pleasure, and clearly says that a sympathetic person is like a prudent merchant, who does things to as a means to selfish interest. This is the psychological hedonist interpretation. This interpretation clearly removes the distinction between direct and indirect inclination. It is a directly contradiction of Kant’s stance that a sympathetic person acts without a motive of self-interest. However, the correct interpretation seems to be that duty and love need not be different purposes, despite having different grounds and an individual could choose actions with purposes. A naturally sympathetic person does not help people because it pleases person, he rather chooses to do it because, and he wants to help people.
Philippa Foot is globally well-known original ethicist. She is a contemporary philosopher and has recently published the book ‘Natural Goodness,’ where she expresses that vice is a form of natural defect. These defects in human beings also are exactly akin to defects in plants and animals. She feels that there are a complete set of concepts that are applicable to all living beings, and only to living beings. Dimensions like function, flourishing, interests, welfare, goodness, etc., are a broad set that are applicable to all living things, and she feels that these are a cluster that belong together.
Foot expresses that good is something that should be good, and defects are species relevant. Things are not generally good or bad, but they are in relation to the manner of life, either specific to an individual or species in general, and that moral defects are also the kind of defects in this general sense. She defines what is called as ‘unquantified prepositions,’ which is the centre of her entire philosophy, and that her prepositions apply only to living things. Besides, the prepositions are standards defining how things should be, and hence, natural goodness is also a preposition. She differentiates between what should be and what usually is, and goes on to identify that both are not the same. For example, rivers should have water. However, it is normally – rivers usually have water, and there is a lot of different between these two prepositions.
One of the surprising stances adopted by Philippa Foot is that she states that all moral philosophy starts with plants and that any form of vice is a natural defect as mentioned earlier in this essay. And her description of defects in human behaviour as akin to defects in plants and animals actually surprised many observers. Primary reason for askance is the feeling that human beings are far more complex than human beings. The primary difference seems to be that human beings are the only living organisms that have the ability to question own motives and behaviours. Some absolutely normal human beings make an effort to talk to plants to induce better growth and development, even such people might find talking to plants on moral dilemmas a little strange!
One of the strong analogy Foot adopts is that for good growth plants need strong roots. Similarly she extrapolates that good human beings need courage in many life situations. It is a natural proposition according to her like an owl being able to see in darkness and such is assumed to be occurring naturally. Then she goes on to describe the fact that there could be a gap between “description of fact and its evaluation,” she makes a point by continuing her owl analogy that if owl is unable to see in the dark – it is a defect and if a man lacks courage so it is according to her deductions. And all these she says are not common to all living beings and are species specific. And she says these interesting life observations made her to start her philosophical viewpoints starting from plants.
Foot takes a very logical and rational stance on what “should” should be! According to her should is the reason for behaviours and actions. This according to her is practical rationality. Which she further says is the reason for goodness that embraces in respect of beliefs and conclusions from a variety of premises. Foot strongly argues that there is absolutely no need for any form of reconciliation between morality and rationality. Her premise for this is that they are not different at all hence, there is no need for any form of reconciliation. She further states that it is morality that propels humans towards rationality and not the other way around and that we as human beings go in for that we need with prudence which in turn is human virtue according to her.
Happiness is often used as a synonym for well-being. Scanlon discovered the implication of this concept, as well all as the moral utility and significance. Scanlon takes a sceptical stance whether if there could be on single notion of well-being that could be applied universally to all people. The fundamental task of the normative theory is to prepare for natural and moral contractualism. He argues against the popular concept of desire being an independent motivator and also against teleological concept of value. His two fundamental claims seem to be that there is a notion of reason of ableness and sufficiency to explain and justify all actions as well as the virtue of being valuable can also be explained in terms of reasons.
Scanlon’s argument proceed through setting out insufficiencies of both desire and teleological concept of value. As per Scanlon, both rejections do not lead to any form of explanatory gaps. The way Scanlon conceives reasons has accounted for everything, and also introduced another motivational concept as the buck passing philosophy related to value and is far more comprehensive than the teleological concept of value. As per the buck-passing theory, there are no gaps left. This is possibly the central claim of Scanlon’s argument.
Another not so obvious argument is that, in rejection of both the idea of desires as motivators for inducing action and comprehensive well-being, Scanlon is able to clearly undermine utilitarianism at a meta-ethical level. The most obvious concept of meta-ethical utilitarianism is to develop an informed desire theory on well-being that should later substantiate for well-being as a master value and a supplier of all other values with teleological structures.
A utilitarian thinker would then transcend to a higher realm of ethics and position of aggregate well-being also regarded as a master value. Informed desire accounts, are therefore defective in essence regarding their approach to notions of desire as well as framework of values and well-being. Scanlon has two-fold concern. His supposition is that it is a mistake to have a single supposition of well-being that plays comprehensive roles, and further, that there is a need for a theory that could explain this concept. His fundamental argument sets out three aspects of well-being, which any theory of well-being must be able explain. In that, these three fixed issues are the basis for any comparative concepts of well-being, and per se, it is not the theory of well-being. He goes on to argue that any theory must provide a far more unified notion of what well-being must be and also an account of the boundaries for an individual’s well-being and the reasons to pursue for other reasons or a standard or framework for comparing other theories of well-being.
This is rather a huge expectation from a theory of defining well-being that should be fulfilled. Therefore, the hypothesis that Scanlon makes is that such a theory is possible and how we must rank things that make up well-being. This looks almost impossible coming from a totalitarian perspective.
Despite his scepticism that there could be a possibility of a comprehensive theory of well-being, he argues further that it is not possible for any one single theory to cover the concept of well-being comprehensively. His argument that the factors contributing to one’s own well-being are naturally important, but the very concept of well-being has no explanation as to why these are important.
On examination of perspectives from a benevolent third party, well-being, despite being significant, does not have definitions of all the concerns that any third party must have for well-being and this is where Scanlon brings in a moral perspective and identifies three methods in which a moral theory must depend on the notion of well-being namely,
- The content of moral requirements
- Role in justification of moral principles
- Provision of justification of morality from a holistic perspective.
It is obvious that well-being figures in all the three dimensions to some degree the other, in the above three requirements.
It is this particular problem that is at the core of Sir Bernard William’s idea of utilitarianism that it cannot describe the relationship between a person’s projects and his actions. Bernard William’s argument is in the traditional form of utilitarian consequentialism as propagated by J.J.C. Smart that it shows in its very articulation of moral standards, an account of practical reason and deliberation. Smart demonstrates that his thoughts on practical reason and deliberation can possibly give rankings of better and worse state of affairs, and such rational agents have reasons to promote such states of affairs. The very purpose of articulation of such impersonal involvement reasons that they are at most few reasons among many others.
In several precise cases, many consequentialists as well as their critics tend to intensely examine cases of conformity of consequentialist morality standards, which actually seem to appear alienating of rational agents from their most fundamental plans and projects. As such, agents have decisive reasons to act against consequentialist moral standard models and to perform those actions identified by consequentialists as wrong. If determinants of better and worse state of affairs seem to set standards for right and wrong, can only provide very few reasons for an agent to act. Reasons that fail to be decisive while acting would result in alienation.
There are several resources in the discussions of Sir William Bernard that explain why consequentialist tend to conflate their view of moral standards. These, when properly understood, are merely articulation of some reasons among others. Such an account of standards will ultimately provide reasons that are supposed to encompass all others. Bernard William, at times, seems to identify himself and act similar to consequentialists like Smart and Singer, simply because of practical reason and deliberation of an agent’s practical reasons that are controlled by willing desires that seem to be part of core projects and commitments, that actions and decisions flow from projects and attitudes that an individual is closely identified with. It is through an appeal to these attitudes and commitments that an agent chooses the most plausible course of action available from the wise spectrum of choices.
Reasons and decisions, which are consequential to such actions are seen to be rational and flowing from attitudes and commitments, while such attitudes and commitments are also having their roots in beliefs and judgement systems and paradigms.
Conclusion
In conclusion of this consequentialist and hedonist interpretation, it is very apparent that morality of a person and the belief that an individual’s projects, thoughts, attitudes, and actions seem to have a direct impact on the well-being of an individual, and specifically that of being happy. More often than not, in many philosophical explanations of happiness, there seems to be synonymy in usage with wellbeing. Almost all approaches and explanations of well-being and happiness seem to converge and agree on one specific school of thought that there is general standard of well-being or happiness and that there is no one general prescription that can be universally applied for the well-being as well as happiness of human beings. Most approaches and explanations seem to be approaching a specific point of convergence, however, the same seems to be not to have happened, and there still is enough room for developing the philosophy that will take a root closer to a universal applicability of happiness. However, there seems to be a lot more work that apparently needs to be done before any specific and universally accepted mechanism and approach to happiness is created and applied in all situations for all living beings and specifically the human beings. Happiness and well-being are not elusive to human beings. The root and approach to it are varied and myriad, however, there are different schools of thoughts that approach happiness and well-being and even seem to be offering contrary viewpoints. However, finally, whatever approach one takes to happiness and morality, it is undoubtedly that being moral is a definitive root to being happy.
Works Cited
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E.W. Dunn, L.B. Aknin & M.I. Norton. “Spending Money on Others Promotes Happiness.” Science, Vol. 319 (2008): 1687-1688.
Foot, Phillipa. Natural Goodness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Print.
—. Virtues and Vices and Other Essays on Moral Philosophy. California: University of California Press, 1978. Print.
Graham, Michael. Facts of Life: Ten Issues of Contentment. Outskirts Press, 2014. Print.
Krosgaard, Christine. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Print.
Lewis, Micahel. Handbook of Emotions. Guilford Press, 2008. Print.
Lyubomirsky, Sonja. The How of Happiness. The Penguin Press HC, 2008. Print.
Scanlong, T.M. Preferenceand Urgency. 2003. Print.
William, By Bernard. Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002. Print.
