History
United States Military Strategy and Policy
1. Describe Washington’s strategy in the American Revolution.
George Washington wore the British and their Hessian mercenaries down small battle by small battle with his Strategy of Attrition. There were practical reasons for using this strategy. The Continental Army had 220,000 but only about half of those soldiers had militia training while on the other hand the British had 162,000 well trained British troops and German mercenaries. The odds against the American revolutionaries were frightening because the New England soldiers were not an army yet when Washington arrived in Boston on July 2, 1775. They had almost no discipline so Washington turned into positives the characteristics they had like Yankee Individualism, knowledge of the countryside, and their strong desire to overthrow British rule. The British and the German Hessian troops were trained to follow orders and stay rigidly in formations. This ended up working against them because of Washington choosing small battles to wear them down and taking advantage of his soldier’s ability to think on their feet.
Washington had to focus on strategic battles that would give the Continental Army tactical victories. For example in December1776 Washington only had 2400 soldiers left but they were able to capture the Trenton, New Jersey British outpost. The Yankees overcame 1000 German Hessian mercenaries because the Yankees could fight better at this kind of battle without rigid rules. Then in January 1777 Washington and his soldiers capture the Princeton outpost which only had 1200 guards.
Washington did not have the resources to fight big battles so he chose small battles that could be won. This is the way the Continental Army chased the British back to New York City, slowly but surely.
2. Explain why and how General Winfield Scott’s campaign in the Mexican-American War reflected 18th century European warfare.
General Scott was a student of the European wars. France was looked to as a role model in its military training and organization. The French military had been positively impacted by the Age of Reason; scientific method and the use of study and reasoning was introduced into the military structure. (Johnson, 1998, 70) Bonura (2012) noted that Scott supported the 18th century French “way of warfare” enthusiastically; his support allowed it to become accepted as a role model for improvements in the American military (1-2). Johnson (1998) explained that Scott made a serious study of tactical and strategic histories and theories of warfare plus Scott visited France and collected books on military science. (69) Scott wrote a manual of army regulations and he “sought to bring regimentation to the officer’s life” (Johnson, 1998, 71).
The main strategy was not one of head on attack but of flanking the enemy to attack. His strategy was like the Europeans in the 18th century because he used small professional military units to gain tactically important cities and regions. Also keeping focused on the primary goal of military missions was important with the least amount of disturbance to the civilian population. For example in the Mexican-American war Scott’s focus was to get his troops to Mexico City. He had entered the army as an artillery man and had paid particular attention to the use of artillery units in the French army. An example of a small professional military unit was the use and success of General James Wolfe Ripley’s very well trained artillery unit under Scott. Together with the new introduction of the revolver his troops could overcome larger numbers of enemy troops than Scott had under his command.
An example of success using flanking the enemy was the strategy used for the success as Cerro Gordo (April 17-18, 1847). General Santa Anna’s Mexican army was hit from the back and from the side under Scott’s orders. During the Battle of Chapultepec (Sept. 12-13, 1847 artillery was used as well as three different flanking positions to attack Santa Anna’s army. (Sweeney, 2006, 60) The battle was won. Sweeney (et al. 2006) noted that Scott’s “campaign to capture Mexico City serves as a model of limited warfare” (77).
3. What could have General Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia done differently to win at Gettysburg if anything? If nothing, explain why.
The second in command under General Lee, Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, was blamed for losing Gettysburg because he did not follow orders. Supposedly he was given an order from General to attack the Union at Gettysburg on July 2, 1983. But this has turned out to be a fantasy and a way to scapegoat Longstreet rather than to blame the highly admired General Robert E. Lee for losing. Maybe the Battle of Gettysburg could have been won if Lee had ordered an attack by Lt. Gen. James Longstreet and his troops at sunrise on the second day of the battle. It does seem possible but critics of Lee make other observations. His critics say that Lee took an aggressive stance and was on the attack against the Union troops far more than was useful. (Bruce as cited in Nolan, 1991, 195) Plus the Confederates under Lee were hit with large casualty numbers over and over again. (Connelly as cited in Nolan, 1991, 195) Nolan writes that “In the defeat at Gettysburg, according to a conservative estimate, 21,000 men, one-third of Lee’s army, went down, again a higher percentage than the Federal losses”(Nolan, 1991, 80-81) For example, on the third day of fighting Pickett’s Charge was a terrible fiasco and his unit was wiped out. Overall Lee was in charge of the army that lost the Civil War so his perfection as a military leader could not have been true.
At Gettysburg the Confederates were in a very bad position to attack. They were worn out charging at the enemy before the enemy was in shooting distance and they were out in the open with no cover. Pickett’s Charge is the common name for a charge on July 3, 1863 at Gettysburg by the Division of Pickett and other Divisions. The losses from Picket’s Division were devastating: “He (Pickett) lost 15 regimental commanders,” almost 3000 soldiers” (Day 3, MilitaryHistoryOnline.com)
In Gettysburg the Confederates could have situated themselves on more even ground with the Union troops. The Confederate advance was from only one spot while the Union used a three pronged strategy to meet the enemy. It seems that the two main mistakes of Lee were those of underestimating both (a) the tactical capabilities and (b) the staying power of the Union troops. He also did not plan strong tactical strategies.
4. Describe the military strategy of the Union under U.S. Grant in 1864 and 1865.
General Grant of the Union army was in a position to win the war after the Confederate loss at Gettysburg. Even Lee had said that the Confederates were not going to win. Grant had soldiers with higher morale on his side, better resources, and a larger supply of resources. Instead of using his advantages to plan a strategic win though Grant uses his attitude of “War is Hell” known as “War of Annihilation” as a tactical strategy for the war. He wanted to stop the Confederacy in a three pronged attack putting as much pressure on Confederate troops as possible. The three places were Virginia, Georgia and Shenandoah Valley. He told his troops to never stop fighting until the other side stopped when they were too exhausted to fight any longer.
The casualties Grant piled up were in larger numbers even than General Lee’s. At Petersburg Grant used trench warfare for a siege strategy which was terrible for both sides. He wanted anything that could possibly be considered as a war resource to be destroyed. As part of his tactical strategy Grant wanted everything destroyed. He ordered the burning of fields and destruction of houses and barns. Unfortunately Grant’s strategy was to harm the civilians, too. He theorized that they would call for a stop to the war if they were hurt. Instead of crying for surrender though Grant just made Southerners outraged. He called for the ruin of everyone and everything in front of the Union troops. A 60 mile corridor of fires and destruction were used by the northern army from Atlanta to Savannah. And still Grant called for more destruction as the Union troops headed north to destroy South Carolina. What ended up happening was a cruel and violent destruction of the South that caused a terrible resentment. The purpose of Grant was to punish the people of the South indiscriminately for the creation of the Confederacy and the Confederate Army. Looking back Grant’s terrible orders seem like punishment for the South’s secession from the national union. Grant won the war but it was a “war of annihilation” so was it really an honorable victory?
References
Bonura, Major US Army M. A. (2012 May). “A French Army in America: The US Army’s Adoption of a French Way of Warfare from 1814 through 1835.” Society for Military History Annual History, Presentation, http://smh2012.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/A-French-Army-in-America-Session-8-Panel-5.pdf
Brooks, V. & Hohwald, R. (1999). How America Fought Its Wars: Military Strategy from the American Revolution to the Civil War. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing. Retrieved from www.questia.com
Brownfield, P. E. (1999 July 10) “Longstreet Blameless for Gettysburg Loss.” The Washington Times. p. 3. Retrieved from www.questia.com
Johnson, Timothy D. (1998). Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory. Lawrence, Kansas. Print.
Day 3: July 3, 1863 – Pickett’s Charge. (n.d.) MilitaryHistoryOnline.com On a March Through the Past. Webzine. www.militaryhistoryonline.com/gettysburg/getty32.aspx
Nolan, A. T. (1991). Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Retrieved from www.questia.com
Notes from the Power Point presentations in class were also used.
Sweeney, Jerry K. (Ed.) (2006). A Handbook of American Military History: From the Revolutionary War to the Present. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
