[Full Name of the Student]
Two main ways in which States in the Middle East are formed. Examples from three countries.
One of the first and main ways in which Middle Eastern states were formed was by revolts from local conservative tribal leaders and Ottoman feudatories. The examples of Saudi Arabia and Jordan are worthwhile in this regard. Both States currently occupy territories that were a part of the Ottoman Empire. They are ruled by royal dynasties that have their origins in tribal chieftaincies that originally owed allegiance to the Ottoman Empire. After the First World War, as part of the Sykes-Picot Plan, they were promised their own independent States by the British. The initial basis for this was Arab Nationalism and Arab Self-Determination against Ottoman Turkish hegemony. The other example is of the States directly under colonial rule for a long time, and not strictly successor States of the Ottoman Empire. Algeria and Morocco fall under this category, and much of their state institutions and traditions are derived from French colonial institutions. The basis of these States is Arab Nationalism as an independence movement against the French colonialism (Ahmari and Weddady, 76).
Goldberg asserts that a lot of the present States in the Middle East have artificially drawn borders and are not ethnically and religiously homogenous and sustainable, like most European States are. Thus, there are many multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-racial and multilingual States such as Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Unlike similar multi-identity states such as the US or Canada, these Middle Eastern States have not managed to share power equitably and ensure a wide stakeholder participation in governance. This makes these States unsustainable and creates extremism and instability. The conflict between the Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs in Iraq is a case in point (Dabashi, 48).
Dispute and weaknesses in Goldberg’s argument.
Goldberg argues that while Iraq and the Levantine States were mostly created and borders drawn as part of the secret Sykes-Picot agreement between the UK and France, he does not offer a solution that instills a consensus-based political culture in these countries. While sectarianism has indeed been a factor in that region since the 19th century Goldberg fails to mention or argue that the leaders of those countries have only accentuated the sectarian hatred by their clannish patronage politics. The organizational structure of these States is designed in such a manner that it further encourages sectarianism and divisive patronage politics. Goldberg does not mention that the leaders of countries such as Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are partly to blame for failing to change the artisan structure of governance (Dabashi, 52).
Other factors
Other factors that add to the violence include the wide proliferation of weapons and ammunition through illegal black markets that are exploited by Non-State actors such as ISIS. State support for Non-State actors, using them as proxies, is also a major problem. Iran is known to sponsor, arm and train several non-state armed groups in Iraq and the Levant, Lebanese Hezbollah being the most prominent. It also is known to support several sectarian armed Shiite militias in Iraq which have contributed to the violence in the conflict. Saudi Arabia supports non-state actors from the Sunni sect as well, and so does Turkey in Syria (Lesch and Haas, 156).
2. Are Monarchies more resilient than other types of regimes in the Middle East?
For quite a long time, Saudi Arabia has been depicted as a preservationist power, trying to protect business as usual in the Middle East: maintaining the arrangement of sovereign states and respecting the US vicinity in the district; and for as far back as three decades obviously supporting a two-state answer for the Israeli-Palestinian strife. By difference, Iran has been seen subsequent to the unrest as a revisionist performer, supporting progressive non-state developments, while looking for a conclusion to the US vicinity in the locale and a conclusion to Israel's presence. In any case, these ideal models are moving; the territorial framework is in flux.
In Saudi Arabia's neighborhood, the state is giving way in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya. These are wars for control of the state, as well as clashes that will figure out if the state itself will keep on existing in its twentieth century fringes. The discernment that the US is pulling back from the district is sufficiently convincing to have urged Russia to increase its military part there. Also, Iran's atomic arrangement might forecast a more extensive rapprochement with the US, finishing over three many years of hostility and regulation. In Syria and Iraq – however not in Lebanon or Yemen – Iran is presently the political preservationist, battling for troubled administrations, but through a blend of non-state performing artists that further debilitate the power of those nations. In the interim, Iranian negotiators are progressively attempting to pitch their nation toward the West as an associate against terrorism. Once seen as a nation trading upset, Iran is currently attempting to recast itself as a shield of request.
Globally, Saudi policymakers are quick to accentuate that their point in Yemen is to restore the universally perceived president, in this way maintaining worldwide standards; locally and territorially, their account concentrates on pushing Iranian impact out of the Arabian Peninsula, in this way keeping up a generally Arab circle. Yet the war in Yemen can't restore the present state of affairs risk. Rather it is introducing so as to fuel the nation's current radial propensities a perilous new component of partisan governmental issues that might prompt the separation of the state. In the interim, feedback is unobtrusively developing inside Saudi Arabia too. What is clear by and large is that the customary suspicions about Saudi Arabia's conduct – for occurrence, that it would depend on arms just for prevention, while constructing its remote strategy in light of tact and monetary impact – can never again be depended upon.
References
Ahmari, S. and N. Weddady. Arab Spring Dreams: The Next Society Speaks Out. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
Ajami, Fouad. "The End of Arab Nationalism." The New Republic (1991): 48-52.
Dabashi, H. The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism. Pittsburgh: Zed Books, 2014.
Lesch, D. and M. Haas. The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance. New York: Westview Press, 2013.
Pollock, David. "The Arab Street? Public Opinion in the Arab World." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (1992): 29-41.
