It is a widely accepted fact of that technology, especially information technology, has impacted almost every aspect of modern life, including counterintelligence. Generally, the advancement of modern technology has most notably affected counterintelligence by adding yet another layer of complexity to a “wilderness of mirrors” where “truth, lies, and deception commingle in perhaps the most sophisticated manner” (Moravej & Diaz, 2007). To be sure, technology has made counterintelligence both easier and harder. On the one hand, technology makes counterintelligence easier as a result of the fact that nowadays almost everyone, including foreign intelligence personnel, must make use of or have access to information technology in some form or another, to complete even the most basic of tasks. Our reliance on information technology, therefor gives counterintelligence authorities greater opportunity to find and access foreign intelligence information, better understand an enemies capabilities and activities, and eliminate potential threats. For example, it would be much more effective to “hack” into an adversary’s central personnel database to learn of the identities of its foreign intelligence officers than to convince a foreign intelligence officer to spy for us. On the other hand, information technology has made counterintelligence activities harder in that it has increased or upgraded an adversary’s ability to access information about us. That is to say, technology has forced increasingly and continuously pay attention to our own security and asset protection.
One of the benefits, however, of technology for counterintelligence, is that more often than not, it has provided the government with a “significantly greater ability to probe into” the lives of people than the people can probe into the workings of the government (Solove et al., 2006). An easy illustration of this is found in the unprecedented ability of the National Security Agency (NSA) to gain access to multiple streams of data from a broad range of sources. In essence, when necessary and when directed, counterintelligence authorities have tremendous resources, resources few can match, to employ in resolving issues of national security.
Conversely, one of the disadvantages of technology is that it is that government does not have a monopoly over it. That is to say, adversaries may, can, and have also make use of its advantages to frustrate our counterintelligence efforts. One of the most recent examples of this is the increasingly common use of encryption (Berkman, 2016). Encryption, in essence, scrambles data in such a way that unless counterintelligence authorities have the correct keys or access to decrypt or see the data in its original form, it will be unreadable or otherwise useless as a source of intelligence. If encryption becomes that standard, technology will have created a major problem for further counterintelligence efforts going forward.
Naturally, as it has developed in other areas, there are number of legal consideration that the advancement of modern technology has brought to counterintelligence efforts. Perhaps the most important of these legal considerations is where the line is between a reasonable and unreasonable search. This consideration is based on the fact that, as mentioned above, technology has developed in such a way that a foreign intelligence threat does not necessarily have to be a foreign national operating abroad, but can just as easily or likely be an American citizen operating domestically. Accordingly, the counterintelligence authorities cannot ignore the potential of a domestic threat or that a citizen may pose. While the law provides flexibility in how counterintelligence authorities can interact with foreign nationals, under the Constitution, citizens are afforded specific protections against unreasonable government acts (Solove et al., 2006). Under the Fourth Amendment, reasonable is defined as a showing of probable cause that an illegal act has or is about to occur and a warrant authorizing the action. Accordingly, counterintelligence authorities must be careful to ensure that their actions, in regards to citizens, are within the boundaries of the law. Failure to do so, will result in the exclusion of any evidence found against the target of the government actions.
In addition to the legal restrictions on counterintelligence that technology has created there are also a number of ethical considerations. One of the most important ethical consideration is just how far can counterintelligence authorities probe into the life or activities of a target? This is an important ethical consideration because under the counterintelligence provisions of the Patriotic Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and the recently passed USA Freedom Act, the government has significant authority to access the electronic communications of citizens without the need to inform them, the courts, or their supervisors. Accordingly, without some ethical guidelines to regulate both the personnel with the power to takes these actions and the processes that allow for these actions to be taken; there are few barriers that work to eliminate or limit abuse. That is to say that, the absence of ethical standards to control these actions will more than likely lead to unethical behavior by counterintelligence authorities.
References
Berkman Center for Internet and Society (Berkman). (2016, Feb. 1). Don’t panic: making progress on the ‘going dark’ debate. Retrieved from https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-panic/Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate.pdf
Moravej, K. & Diaz, G. (2007, Jan.). Critical issues in contemporary counter-intelligence. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwj__L6w2MnLAhVBvpQKHaBRAloQFggpMAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Frevistas.ucm.es%2Findex.php%2FUNIS%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2FUNIS0707130053A%2F27985&usg=AFQjCNFdE8c4Jr4ccIUuwUzU8zvLtTkH0A
Solove, Daniel J., Marc Rotenberg, and Paul M. Schwartz. (2006). Information Privacy Law, 2nd ed. New York, NY: Aspen Publishers.
