In December 2010, Tarek Mohammed Bouazizi, a street vendor in Tunisia set himself on fire to protest the humiliation he suffered at the hands of a police patrol officer who assaulted him in the street and police officials who refused to hear his complaint. Bouazizi’s death would not only be the catalyst for the overthrow of Tunisian President Zine Ben Ali but would also be the spark to the overthrow of governments in Libya, Egypt and Yemen as well as civil war, protests and popular agitation in over ten countries across North Africa and the Middle East. While the nations and circumstances differed they were connected in that they all were sustained by the same popular frustrations with government corruption, oppression and systemic poverty. As the largest and closest group of democratic powers to the region the European Union (EU) who was not only looked to by protestors for support but also considered itself the best placed to provide support in “its neighborhood” (HREUFASP, 2011).
The speed and intensity of the events, which came to be known as the “Arab Spring,” caught many in and outside of the region off-guard. To be sure, in 2010 and 2011 the EU was consumed by internal issues of how it should respond to the effects of the world economic crisis that began in 2008. Moreover, the EU’s foreign policy institution, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was just getting starting. It was therefore more focused on figuring out it power and position in the EU framework (Behr, 2012). Accordingly, prior to the Arab Spring, the EU did not really have a coherent policy towards the region. Instead, policy points were left up to individual EU countries such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany. One consequence of the Arab Spring events was that they forcefully made the region an important and ongoing area concern for EU policy. Indeed, they reignited the EU “ambitions to foster change in its southern neighborhood” that had been pushed from the spotlight or forgotten by the union’s focus of economic matters (HREUFASP, 2011).
During and in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, the overall European response to the events was one that could be described as marked by denial and division among member states (Behr, 2012). However, as the EEAS became more comfortable in its position as the voice of EU policy, it was able to achieve a level of stabilization. Eventually by the summer of 2011, EU policy towards the region consisted of three basic goals, namely stop the violence; provide economic assistance; and support the establishment and sustainability of democracy and democratic institutions. While each goal, if accomplished on its own, would be of tremendous assistance to the region, the EU rather considered them as three parts to a whole (Ashton, 2011). Under this consideration, stopping the violence allows a return to stability and normalcy of life. Once that is achieved the establishment of democratic institutions such as political parties, civil society and open elections would go a long way to increasing the people’s confidence in the government thereby eliminating many of the underlying problems of society that caused the Arab Spring to occur in the first place. Lastly, economic prosperity not only provides the funds to allow the development of democratic institution but also the ability to change their own personal circumstances. Since the focus of these policies was, more often than not, the protesters or reformers in government, there was broad support for them in many of the nations of the region (Ashton, 2011).
In the years following the Arab Spring, EU policy has changed somewhat on the edges but at its core it remains the same. Changes in policy were brought about by changes in the circumstances on the ground in the region (EU, 2013). For example, while initial Arab Spring events led to wide-spread outbreaks of violence; that violence, with the exception of Syria and Libya, now has now decreased substantially or ended. Accordingly, the previous EU policy goal of stopping the violence has become less important. Alternatively, the need for economic assistance has remained if not increased. As mentioned, poor economic conditions was one of the major factors in the outbreak of the Arab Spring and continue as a major threat to stability. Accordingly, one of the key ongoing policy goas of the EU remains supporting sustainable economic growth (EU, 2013). Many of the initial events of the Arab Spring suggested that there would be political transition in many nations of the region, and that the transition that would occur would most likely be democratic in nature. The truth of the matter is that many of the regimes under protest have either: succeeded in retaining power; reformed just enough to satisfy the protests but basically remain as before; or transitioned into a form much worse than the original. Consequently, support for the establishment and development of democracy and democratic institutions remains a fundamental part of EU policy towards the region. Naturally, because the focus of EU policy remains heavily reformed minded and targeted to the idea of the original protests, the support they have received has decreased somewhat. While a country may hesitate to oppose economic assistance they are more likely to push back against any assistance that would most likely result in a decrease of their authority or political power (EU, 2013).
Works Cited
Ashton, C. (2012, Jul. 12). Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on “The EU Response to the Arab Spring” Retrieved on December 8, 2014, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/123726.pdf
Behr, T. (2012). The European Union’s Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Spring: Can the Leopard change its Spots. Amsterdam Law Forum, 4(2), 76-88.
High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – HREUFASP. (2011, May 25). A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood. Retrieved on December 8, 2014, from http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf
European Commission – EU. (2013, Feb. 8). EU’s response to the “Arab Spring”: The State-of-Play after Two Years. Retrieved on December 8, 2014, from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-81_en.htm
Kaye, D.D. & Wehrey, F. (2011). Arab Spring, Persian Winter. Retrieved on December 8, 2014, from http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67942/dalia-dassa-kaye-and-frederic-wehrey-michael-scott-doran/arab-spring-persian-winter
Witney, N., Leonard, M., Godement, F., Levy, D., Liik, K. & Tcherneva, V. (2014, Sep.). Rebooting EU Foreign Policy. Retrieved on December 8, 2014, from http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR114_EU_BRIEF_SinglePages_%281%29.pdf
