Ordinary and extraordinary treatment has different meaning to different people. For those working in the medical profession, ordinary means standard treatment while extraordinary means non-standard treatment. When used by an ethicist, ordinary treatment will refer to those means of prolonging life which are morally acceptable by both the physician and patient preserving life and health. Extraordinarily relates to those means of treatment which are not morally acceptable. Standard treatment for a particular group of patients is more likely to be morally required than a non-standard treatment. In some cases, standard treatment may be not morally required for individual patients for certain reasons.
The intentional termination or mercy killing which is the termination of one’s life by another person is conflicting to the health occupation stand, and it is the strategy of all medical association based in the United States. The termination of patient’s life through euthanasia methods when there is indisputable indication that natural loss of life is about to happen is the patients and his direct family.
The termination of the utilization of ways of prolonging the life of the patient when there is indisputable evidence that natural death is pending lies in the hands of patients decision and his close relatives. The patient and his close relatives and family should seek guidance and decision in this case freely from a physician. Intentional termination or active euthanasia refers to direct taking or killing of life of an innocent patient. While the non-intentional cessation of life involves both withholdings or withdrawing treatment (preceding treatment) and then allowing the natural death of the patient to occur. It is also called passive euthanasia (Rachel & James 67).
Morally active euthanasia is forbidden while passive euthanasia may be morally allowable under certain conditions such as when death is unavoidable, treatment is extraordinary, the patient is terminal, and there are no direct intentions to kill or cause death, but it is merely foreseen.
As Sullivan disagrees with Rachel interpretation of euthanasia AMA policy about the putting to death of someone with the incurable disease. Although, he AMA policy agrees with Rachel arguments of its policy. Most of his arguments revolve around AMA policy support to his arguments (Sullivan & Thomas 42).
According to Sullivan argues that withdrawing extraordinary means of supporting patient’s life should not be prompted by an intention to bring about the loss of life. He says that international termination of life is offensive. He argues that it may be prompted by the doctor’s disinclination to succumb a patient to further treatment that offers more hope of recovering and is agonizing. He states that AMA traditional position policy is not a doctrine that rests on supposed difference between intentional and non-intentional termination of life. This position is simply against intentional killing which involves directs acts and omissions (Rachel & James 68).
As stated by Sullivan criticizes Rachel arguments feeling that Rachel has misinterpreted the AMA policy. Rachel believes AMA acceptance of passive euthanasia and not active euthanasia as a hypocrite of the highest degree. Sullivan’s feels that AMA policy does not make this distinction as he argues that this policy requires ordinary treatment but not extraordinary treatments. He argues that ordinary involves accessible, priced and painless while extraordinary involves pain, high costs, and inconvenience when there is little hope for patient recovery. He believes that his ideas are supported by AMA policy and Paul Ramsey.
According to Rachael responds to challenge Sullivan’s views by putting forward a non-relevance point of the moral relationship between intentions and act. He argues that intention does not have a role to play in the moral analysis of action. He suggests that Sullivan position claims that there is a definite relation between relevant intention and equality of moral action. He says Sullivan bases his argument on the traditional position where permissible acts become unallowable if evil intentions accompany them. It is the intentions that make the act wrong (Sullivan & Thomas. 47).
As indicated by Rachel says that there is a significant moral alteration between non-intentional and intentional termination of life. He claims that termination of life is allowable in some cases by withholding treatment and allowing the patient to lose his life. He says it is not allowable to take the direct act to terminate one’s life. He contracts on the conventional position in that Sullivan traditional doctrine of life termination. He says that there is a moral difference between letting the patient die and killing someone. He argues by considering two different acts; where Smith kills his six-year-old cousin to gain inheritance by sneaking into the bathroom and drowning him, and Jones sneaks into the bathroom drowning the kid for the same, but the kid’s slips and face falls into the water. Jones becomes delighted. He lets the child die instead of saving him. Rachel claims that the two men act were equally morally reprehensible. He says that if Jones pleaded he did not kill the child, but he let him die, such a plea would not be morally accepted. He shows that letting them die and killing are equally the same. It follows that intentional termination is morally the same as non-intentional termination of life. He says that the AMA policy is flawed immensely. Sullivan is against Rachel interpretation of AMA policy and argues that Rachel explanation and understanding of euthanasia is disputable.
No-relevance point obliges Rachel about the intentional termination of life making him make improbable rulings regarding engagements in some cases. By giving his two cases of killing to differentiate active and passive euthanasia, he characterizes by two features. There is a bare difference between the two cases. The case of Smith is the same as that of Jones, saving the bare difference act of killing the cousin and letting the cousin die. The other feature is about moral responses. It is hard to pinpoint that Rachel expects people to accept that Smith action was atrocious to Jones actions. He argues that what Smith did was as good as what Jones did. The two cases are combined such that the moral difference between the two cases is morally insignificant.
The distinction between letting die and killing is an instance of general difference called the distinction between inaction and action. Ethical difference exist between doctors deliberately causing patients death and omitting to act resulting in death in both cases. His no-relevance point Mars Rachel rejection of moral distinction between intentional termination and non-intentional cessation of life on intention
Rachel argues that a doctor action is needed in both passive and active euthanasia. Sullivan argues against Rachel’s view by looking into the moral importance of euthanasia. Rachel denies that passive euthanasia is more ethically allowable as compared to active euthanasia as he says in both cases the doctor does something. He argues that if one type of euthanasia is right, then both must be correct and vice versa.
As Sullivan disagrees with Rachel’s interpretations of the policy of AMA on euthanasia; the causing of death of an individual who suffers from a disease that is incurable. Sullivan argued against Rachel arguments claiming that Rachel has misinterpreted the euthanasia AMA policy. The policy states that resisting the use of extraordinary means of supporting life is allowable though it forbids mercy killing. Rachel argues that AMA policy accepts passive euthanasia but prohibits active euthanasia. Sullivan claims that AMA policy does not differentiate between passive and active euthanasia. He says that normal means ordinary treatments have reasonable accessibility, price and are painless while extraordinary treatment is painful, costly and inconvenient if there is no hope for patient’s recovery in its application. Sullivan arguments are deontological and are concerned with doctor’s responsibilities and purposes. He argues that it is the responsibility of physicians to give patients ordinary treatment.
Sullivan criticizes Rachel by arguing that saying that action intentions are more significant compared to action outcome. He claims that termination of human life is unallowable regardless of whether the cause came up as a result of inaction or action. He argues that moral intention criteria of euthanasia by questioning if the move is intended at causing death, whether termination of life is sought or whether the act is wrong or right. He says that active euthanasia is not morally acceptable while passive euthanasia can be allowed if there are good intentions. Rachel uses the example of Jack and Jill to contradict Sullivan to show that the act plan determination does not make the action to be evil.
According to me, though medical decisions are based on individual needs, it is morally wrong to terminate someone’s life which is near death. It is ethically correct to allow the dying person to live even if his family wants to end his life through euthanasia. Physicians should be discouraged from practicing euthanasia whether active or passive. This act should be considered as murder.
Physicians and all medical experts should be concerned about the lethal results of what their actions during euthanasia, and should understand that the law forbids euthanasia. The law also forces these medical experts to be concerned about facts of euthanasia and to have a moral doctrine that is well vulnerable and considers effects of their actions. AMA policy endorses that this euthanasia doctrine is a central point of the medical ethics applied by physicians. They condemn active euthanasia referring to it as illegal and against what the medical experts are taught and should stand for. Passive euthanasia is approved in AMA policy
Doctors and physicians may differentiate between passive euthanasia and active euthanasia to content the rule of law. Specifically, these medical experts should not stretch the difference any additional power and load by scripting it into endorsed announcements of therapeutic morals.
The numerous viewpoints on the distinction between allowing one to die and killing are significant for the euthanasia discussion. However, those who confess that the distinction does not hold under all conditions, and so allow a qualified acceptance of a “unique case” of euthanasia under certain circumstances, do not have to accomplish that qualifying one act of euthanasia results to justifying a communal rule for the overall practice of euthanasia.
Conclusion
The above arguments cast serious doubts on objection to Rachel to the doctrine of act and omission. One may suggest that Rachel has the distinction between passive and active euthanasia is morally insignificant based on the claim that when an act or omission end up in harm does the killing and letting die doctrine have a role to play (Rachel & James., 79). Even after Rachel argues about equality of active and passive euthanasia, the facts remains that his views about killing and letting die doctrine are not convincing. This argument strengthens the type of objection to Rachel opinions that are accused of misinterpreting the AMA policy on euthanasia.
They pointed out that withdrawal of life-supporting treatment is prompted by an intention to hasten the health of the patient. The case on hand is then the unintentional letting die which AMA policy does not forbid. The moral difference between intentional termination and unintended cessation of life relevant to AMA policy. Rachel argues that such distinction between intentional and non-intentional cessation of life are irrelevant to the analysis of moral action since the intention is not considered ethical (Rachel & James 79).
The doctrine of intentional termination of life and non-intentional cessation of life is not real since it applies only to actions and omissions that outcomes to harm of a patient. Treatment cessation does not follow AMA policy as a form of unintentional termination of life is not justified. Rachel seems to agree that it is intuitively appealing if one kills with the intentions of good results. This is a substantive argument Rachel is providing.
It can be concluded that no legitimate distinction between active and passive euthanasia AMA policy has made. People are faced with ideas that if termination of life is allowable, it is then always allowable and if not, it is then never allowable.
Works Cited.
Rachels, James. "Active and passive euthanasia." Bioethics: An Introduction to the History, Methods, and Practice (2007): 64-69.
Rachels, James. "Active and passive euthanasia." New England journal of medicine 292.2 (1975): 78-80.
Sullivan, Thomas D. "Active and passive euthanasia: an impertinent distinction?." The Human life review 3.3 (1977): 40-56.
