A Case Brief of Jakubowicz v Dittemore (2006)
Chester Jakubowicz, Dianna Wallen and Glenda Werley v. Ron Dittemore, Director of Missouri Department of Mental Health, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68639 (W.D. Mo. September 12, 2006)
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Procedural History
This is a case before a District court of first instance.
Facts
The plaintiffs were employees of the defendant, a Missouri state agency providing mental healthcare services to residents of Missouri. The first plaintiff was a Psychiatric Assistant at the center while the other two were office Support Assistants with the Missouri Department of Mental Health (DMH). The defendant came up with a drug testing policy that required all employees to undergo a random drug test on the belief that some of its employees were using illicit drugs and also due to the need for them to act as role models to their patients as being drug free. The plaintiffs then applied to the Missouri District court, seeking a permanent injunction against the DMH and the defendant as the director in particular, from continuing with any such test against them in random fashion. They claimed that to allow the DMH to continue with the drug test on them would be a gross violation of their Fourth Amendment US Constitutional rights against unreasonable searches. They also urged the court to declare the purported drug test as being prima facie unconstitutional The defendant claimed that the drug test policy for all the employees at the hospital was justified as being a “special need” test.
Issues
Was the random drug test policy adopted by the defendant qualified under the special needs doctrine case and hence justified by public interest and policy?
Would the drug test on the plaintiffs constitute a Fourth Amendment violation of expectations of privacy and did it require a search warrant based on probable cause?
Holding/Decision
The court went on to hold, after considering a number of case laws, that the decision by the DMH to subject the plaintiffs o random drug test was nothing more than a “gesture or symbol” that it did not approve of illegal drug use. It did not therefore qualify under the special needs doctrine that would warrant a random testing of all DMH’s employees including the plaintiffs.
Rule
The court elide heavily on the rule enunciated in Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997); that for a cause of action based on the special needs doctrine for drug testing to succeed, its necessity must be substantial or significant enough to override the acknowledged privacy interests or reasonable expectations of privacy and also sufficient to warrant the suppression of the requirement of individualized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. Courts must also do a careful balancing act between the competing public and private interest that both p[arties to a case advance.
Reasoning
The defendant had failed to prove on preponderance of evidence, that the random drug testing of its employees was a case of special need or a safety sensitive measure that would be justified under the Fourth Amendment. It was therefore in breach of the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights against unwarranted and unreasonable search and respect for their privacy.
Disposition
The court granted and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction against the defendant.
Dissent/Concurrence
Being a case before a court of first instance, there was no dissent or concurrence as it was decided by one US District Court judge, Nanette Laughrey.
Comments
I think the court in this case gave a very liberal and purposive interpretation of the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals against invasion of privacy without a justifiable cause. This is very important if a right or freedom enshrined in the US constitution is to be enjoyed to the highest level possible. The ruling is consistent with that of other cases I have come across and read like Neumeyer v. Beard, 421 F.3d 210, 214 (3rd Cir. 2005) and Int’l Union v. Winters, 385 F.3d 1003 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, as Harasym (2012) observes, most US courts including the Supreme Court have tended to uphold individual’s rights and afforded them protection to their reasonable expectations of privacy rom unreasonable intrusions (p. 1). However, the author argues that there remains uncertainty concerning drug test cases due to the sometimes conflicting decisions of US courts on the same.
References
Harasym, L. A. (2012). Drug testing and the Fourth Amendment. Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development, 2(1). Retrieved March 3, 2016, from http://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1616&context=jcred