Introduction
There is no denying that Aristotle holds the distinction of being one the greatest philosophers during the ancient Greek world, but his ideals transcends into popularity even to today’s modern age. The tenets of virtue are among the prominent subjects of Aristotle’s philosophical views. However, it is apparent that the philosopher has a rather different treatment of virtues as perceived from his arguments reiterating ethical values as personal dispositions. The focus of this discussion is to argue on the subject of whether or not Aristotle’s treatment of the virtues is in fact satisfactory. Examining the philosopher’s approach to virtues encompasses the need to determining the positive and the negative points of the argument including excess and deficiency. It was evident that Aristotle treat virtues as means, which constitutes an idea that the degree of feeling or emotion is influenced by the degree of the situation.
Aristotle and the Treatment of Virtue
Aristotle and the philosophy exerted into the concept of ethics and virtue puts emphasis on the role of personal habits in relation to personal conduct. On the other hand, the philosopher perceives virtues as habits and the encompassing good life due to habits is a mindless routine form of life. Such perception about virtues reflects the philosopher’s interpretation of ethics, which suggests that one’s virtue is defined by the actions (Kraut). In addition, one’s action defines the virtues, therefore, suggests that virtue is the same as means. In retrospect, it appears that Aristotle treats virtues as a mean, which in several ways is satisfactory.
Treating virtues as means is reasonable on the grounds that the mean constitutes a state of apprehension and clarification amidst the pains and pleasure. Moreover, means enable people to see through things and realize what is really painful or pleasant. Means is a state of soul that creates the conditions where everything comes in complete harmony. Similarly, upholding a good character requires that an individual should undergo a process of eliminating the challenges that creates the inhibitions in achieving the soul’s full efficacy (Curzer). In retrospect, Aristotle believes that virtue is practically a way towards the upheaval of morally acceptable and effective actions. Therefore, it is safe to assume satisfaction in Aristotle’s argument in terms of treating virtues as means. For example, a person may get angry and act accordingly to the level of anger that the person is feeling. In some cases, more critical circumstances result to higher angrier response. The measurement does not conform to the numerical rules of being zero to the highest possible range, but the intensity of emotional response is proportionate to the severity of the situation.
What Aristotle is trying to say in his analogy of anger versus the seriousness of the circumstances is that emotional response such as anger should not cross beyond the point of undermining reason. Furthermore, Aristotle argues that passion should not supersede extreme points where losing control becomes imminent. However, the concept of means as treatment for virtue faces several objections on the grounds that the doctrine of means encompasses two theses. The first one is that virtue constitutes a state between excess and deficiency while the second theses states that an act of virtue is a person’s aim to act either to emphasize objective or to defy intermediate alternatives. The second thesis appears to be objectionable because virtuous acts can be defined according to Aristotle’s definition that a person may act on accordingly between deficiency and excess. For example, a person invited to a birthday party, but the act attending the occasion depends on whether the invited individual would be able to provide a gift to the celebrant or not, and that attending without any gift is an act of excessiveness.
On the other hand, when a person’s decision for attending the birthday party was drawn from the choice between respect to the invitation and the obligation to provide a gift, the situation demonstrates a search for a mean within the extremes. However, looking closely at the two theses, it is evident that regardless of extremes, a person’s action is still within the conceptual elements of the means rather than the virtue. Furthermore, it can also be assumed that virtue is no less than the means itself. Means imply reason for action while virtue is acting under the thresholds of what is extreme. If virtue means following a principled life, one that is within the path of moral ethics, then virtuosity does not simply imply aiming at the means (Sachs). This is because the means has a particular objective while virtuosity is to ensure control. For instance, a Court Judge does not simply arrive at a decision even if the accused crossed beyond the borders of what can be considered as extreme. Instead, Court Judges arrive at a decision based on the degree of concern to all the people involved in the case. It cannot also be stressed enough that virtue does not provide a decision framework, which the doctrine of means easily gives away by aiming at an objective. Furthermore, the doctrine of means help shape the live of the people and influence their future direction. For example, a politician is likely to be influenced by his concept of means because the past experiences might have helped him to learn from politics.
Conclusion
Aristotle’s treatment of virtue as means is satisfactory because acting in accordance to moral virtue encompasses an aim to meet the means. The treatment of virtue coincides with the concept of means because people tend to act according to his environment in order to achieve a purpose, which defines the mean. The habits of acting between the two principles ascertain the state of moral virtue that each person upholds in his life.
Works Cited
Curzer, Howard J. "A Great Philosopher's Not So Great Account of Great Virtue: Aristotlds reatment of Greatness of Soul." Canadian Journal of Philosophy20.4 (1990): 517-538. JStor. Web. 24 Oct. 2014.
Kraut, Richard. "Aristotle's Ethics." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 21 Apr. 2014. Web. 25 Oct. 2014. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/#HumGooFunArg>.
Sachs, Joe. "Aristotle: Ethics." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | An encyclopedia of philosophy articles written by professional philosophers. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 22 July 2005. Web. 25 Oct. 2014. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-eth/#H2>.
