There was once a time when countries went to war for one of two reasons: to grow through conquest, or to defend one’s territory from incursion. If a country was having internal troubles, its neighbors would only provide military intervention if it wanted to take advantage of those troubles and add that country to their own holdings. All of that changed, though, after the Second World War. Because colonies were now too expensive (and too unruly), the major superpowers at the time (the United States and the U.S.S.R.) sought to maintain spheres of influence, and they would intervene militarily, as in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and other smaller conflicts to push events in their desired direction. Other situations, such as the actions of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, and the brutal warlords in the Sudan, were met with military might from the United States and other nations. In an era of budgetary constraints, and with the view that war is a moral wrong, it is worth asking whether or not the United States should continue those sorts of interventions.
Carlo Filice and John Arthur have written on the topic of a nation’s duty to remain aware of events on the far side of the globe and to intervene when necessary. Filice asserts that people are obligated to follow news about atrocities taking place in distant lands. He connects this duty to our moral imperative to keep death and suffering from happening, when those atrocities are avoidable – especially when rendering assistance does not require much from us in the way of sacrifice. However, for the help that we render to be truly useful, we must put ourselves in a situation where we can aid the suffering, and hopefully keep the suffering from even taking place. Living in a developed nation, he argues, provides people with the information that they need to decide whether or not they can provide the necessary assistance – and they can make that decision without making significant sacrifices. With this in mind, Filice concludes that it is immoral to refuse to stay informed about these atrocities, and it is also immoral to refuse to help with the prevention of any harm that is significant – and avoidable.
John Arthur has a similar viewpoint to that which Filice has held, although he approaches the topic somewhat differently. Arthur disagrees with the view of Peter Singer, who argues that the affluent of the world are morally obligated to bring help to suffering people if that help does not end up costing the affluent something of analogous importance. Instead, Arthur focuses on the individual rights that people have, arguing that those who are not affected by the suffering have individual rights to the personal satisfaction of their own desires and interests, and those rights should not be taken away just because there are other people in the world who may be suffering at a given point in time. However, the right to individual satisfaction, Arthur argues, does not completely override a duty of “benevolence” that obligates the affluent to share resources with others by foregoing consumption.
Filice and Arthur both assert that people have a responsibility to remain aware of and provide assistance to people who are suffering at other points on the planet. However, Filice seems to feel that the duty is a little more invasive in the lives of the affluent than does Arthur, going so far as to say that action to prevent the suffering is a moral necessity. There are two strengths to their viewpoints: an acknowledgment of the commonality of humanity, and of the cohesiveness that must exist for the species to prosper; and a recognition that there are limits to what people can do for the suffering on distant parts of the planet. They recognize that it is an essential part of the human condition to empathize with others, and to identify that problems such as starvation or political repression could end tragically for anyone; as a result, there is an obligation to remain informed, and to act when necessary. However, there are limits on what people can do for those who are suffering under another regime, a continent or two away. It is not practicable to expect individuals to uproot their own lives to take on the actions of a violent dictator, or of a corrupt leadership that steals the resources of its citizens. In cases like that, the individual may only be able to advocate for the suffering by contacting government representatives to urge action.
Two weaknesses that appear in these arguments are the lack of a specific mention of possible social action and, in the case of Arthur, the notion that briefly halting consumption could be enough when it comes to addressing suffering. It is not enough for there to be a general obligation to act; while philosophy generally remains in the realm of the hypothetical, in the case of social action, such rumination is useless without specific recommendations. In this case, people have an obligation to urge their governments to pursue such action as is realistic, depending on that government’s relative power and resources.
Works Cited
Arthur, J. (2002). Rights and the duty to bring aid. May, L., Collins-Chobanian, S. and Wong, K.,
eds. Applied ethics: A multicultural approach. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 234-
243.
Filice, C. (2002). On the obligation to keep informed about distant atrocities. May, L., Collins-
Chobanian, S. and Wong, K.,
eds. Applied ethics: A multicultural approach. Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 244-255.
