One of the intellectual effects of the Third Reich has been to identify Germany in the mind of the world with the horrors of the Holocaust. To many in the outside world, the swastika is what people associate with Germany, meaning that the other aspects of German history, ranging from Charlemagne to Friedrich Barbarossa to Helmut Kohl, rarely if ever enter the popular consciousness. However, there is much to German history that has nothing to do with the insane painter who ended up murdering millions, including that curious period of history between the founding of the German nation in 1870 and the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. John Rohl’s The Kaiser and His Court: Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany provides a fascinating look at the newly minted nation and the way that its governance drove its destiny.
The main idea that Rohl propagates in this collection of essays was that Germany under Wilhelm II basically functioned as a working monarchy, with the balance of the power placed in the Kaiser – a man whom many considered to be insane. The result was a nation run by an intellectually incestuous network that involved the Kaiser himself, the royal family, his friends, and the rest of the entourage. The purpose of the Reich Chancellor, then, became more of a political expedient – someone to serve as the Kaiser’s executive mouthpiece, rather than a holder of any sort of power. As Rohl put it, Kaiser Wilhelm II attempted to turn the historical clock back by a century or two by laying claim to the tattered (and, in France, harshly beheaded) doctrine of the divine right of kings. Given the waste that had been laid to the institution of monarchy in the years since 1789 across Europe, the fact that Kaiser Wilhelm II basically claimed to be the new Sun King was seen as anachronistic at best, and grotesque at worst.
Rohl supports this thesis by providing a detailed analysis of the court as well as the military institution, the diplomatic service, and the civil service, as well as the leadership system that served as the glue for the whole enterprise. As with any sweeping change, Kaiser Wilhelm’s started early. In 1888, conflict began with Bismarck that would brew for two years, until a transition began in 1890 from a hastily conceived rule by the family to a formalized system of monarchy. In 1897, the relationship between the Kaiser and his yes-man Chancellor gave the appearance of political plurality that covered up the reality of a monarchy much the same as that which led Great Britain into the disastrous loss of her thirteen colonies in North America and that which led France into the Reign of Terror, one of the bloodiest periods throughout all of human history. While it seemed that there were several political leaders helping the Kaiser, providing checks and balances, Rohl establishes that the laws that brought change were, by and large, all ideas of the Kaiser. This began with the laws regarding education in 1890 and the Army Law of 1893 – as well as the trade treaties of the 1890’s which went sharply against the interests of much of the nobility of the country. The advent of socialism, the creation of a naval fleet, and the canal policy in Prussia are other examples of initiatives that were started by the Kaiser – and by no one else. Despite the fact that these initiatives had no popular support anywhere else in the government (or perhaps in the entire country), they were rammed through by the Kaiser. The ministers in the government did not dare to question the Kaiser, because they feared he might dismiss them altogether.
If it were not for the horrors that would descend upon Germany in the 1920’s and 1930’s, the oddities of the Kaiser would be a much larger part of the tapestry of history. His insanity, according to Rohl, made the changes in King George III of Britain seem quite mild: one of the counts in Germany had to parade before the Kaiser looking like a poodle; the Chief of the Military Cabinet was forced to dance for the Kaiser wearing just a tutu and a hat made of feathers. The series of discharges in his inner ear, as well as some disturbing mental growths, may have contributed to his growing mental instability. Indeed, if, as Rohl argues, the Great War had been so easy to avoid, one wonders if Kaiser Wilhelm II would not have developed into the lunatic who would follow him into power in Germany, and whom the Kaiser himself would praise for his victories in 1941.
All in all, these essays represent a solid portrait of the political realities at work in the years between 1890 and 1907. Rohl suggests that further research is needed to make the connections between 1907 and the Great War, but the analysis of the internal workings of Germany during that crucial growth between the waning of Bismarck’s power and the ensnaring alliances that led to the Great War are all intriguing, with solid research.
