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As it is known from history, the German Empire was among four Central Powers that fought the Entente during World War I. This war eventually led to a revolution in Germany that caused the demolition of the monarchy and installment of a democratic republican regime. The regime change that immediately followed the armistice of 11 November 1918 was in fact the main reason for a dissonance during peace talks. Entente powers, first of all the United Kingdom, desired to weaken Germany — then the most powerful state in continental Europe — permanently, especially in the matters of its High Sea Fleet .
While the United States were presumably a leading power of negotiations on the new post-World War I world order, the new German republican regime was more or less corresponding with American ideals of democracy . Still, Western powers imposed a $33 billion reparation obligation in 1921, while between 1919 and 1921 Germany had to pay another $5 billion .
Considering the probable economic effects of the peace regulations, German delegates first mention that German rivers would be placed under the control of an international body, while the winning powers were allowed to build canals and railroads on German territory — those regulations logically deprive Germany of full control of its transportation links . German abroad citizen’s properties were confiscated during the war and were then used as reparation reimbursement, practically restricting German share in the world trade . Practically concluding these regulations, German delegates consider that winning powers will use German workforce for their benefit after the treaty conclusion, most probably referring to the occupations of coal-rich and highly industrialized Saarland and Rhein-Ruhr regions .
Financial and economic restrictions imposed were considered a “foreign, dictatorial powers”, which is incompatible with the declarations of Western leaders about the world of freedom, democracy, and self-determination. In fact, we are able to trace what did Germany expected the post-war peace look like by imagining negatives from what do German delegates state in their comment: regions with predominantly German inhabitants would not be occupied or separated from the German state, German citizens abroad would get their properties back, and Germany would become a full democratic member of the League of Nations with the same rights as winners. The correction of initial post-wart peace decision was not completely in place before Nazis with their policy of unilateral risky moves took power in 1933.
The “fundamental laws” German delegates appeal to most probably means the underlying Western documents concerning human rights, i. e. the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which both acknowledge freedom of human beings and principle of sovereignty of nations (U.S. Declaration of Independence, 1776, Preamble, Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789). The international framework of human rights, except for laws of war, were not effectively in place back then.
Although the imposition of huge reparations on revolution-torn Germany was probably even higher price than all the destruction Germany made, defendants of the peace treaty may find a comfortable ground in underscoring the high number of atrocities caused by new warfare technologies used by Germany, including poisonous gas, aerial bombings, and U-boat torpedoing. Also, the profit lost due to high investments in war technologies before and during World War I may be the argument, even though winning powers had to deal with already democratic German republic during peace negotiations, and not with the Empire itself.
References
Comments of the German Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference on the Conditions of Peace, Oct., 1919. (1919, October). International Conciliation(143). Retrieved January 13, 2017, from http://college.cengage.com/history/primary_sources/world/conditions_of_peace.htm
Kissinger, H. (1994). Diplomacy. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
