Deepwater Horizon
Synopsis
The Deepwater Horizon was an offshore oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico owned by Transocean, a U.S owned company that specializes in deep water drilling equipment (Ingersoll, Locke, & Reavis, 2012). The $560 million rig was operated by a crew of 126 people (Ingersoll et al., 2012) roughly 45 miles off the Louisiana coast (Mullins, 2010). On April 20, 2010, the exploratory Macondo well experienced an explosion that not only created one of the most catastrophic environmental disasters in U.S. history but killed 11 people (Barstow, Rohde & Saul, 2010). The environmental effects were devastating. It took 87 days to cap the British Petroleum (BP) owned well after it deployed 171 million gallons of oil into the Gulf amounting in immense ecological and economic disaster (Adams, 2015). This paper will focus on the blowout of the well, its destruction and the death of 11 people (Adams, 2015) associated with the rig as compiled from interviews and testimony from the crew members (Barstow et al., 2010).
During the spring of 2010, the Horizon was preparing to temporarily cap the well and move on to two other high priority BP projects (Barstow et al., 2010). It can not be stressed enough the role money plays in this industry and this incident in particular. The crew was pushing to finish this project and move on. On March 8th the Horizon was faced with a large ‘kick’ of gas up the well that forced it to shut-down for 9 days (Barstow et al., 2010). Instead of taking this as a wake-up call the crew started again in the following weeks to test the well to ensure it was secure enough to cap it for the time being and move on. In preparation for this test, BP had Halliburton cement the well on the seafloor to seal it. Halliburton not only had made it known that the cement should be given at least 48 hours to harden and seal, but had also issued statements regarding its belief that the Macondo well could leak (Final Report, 2011). The test was a negative pressure test to essentially force the well to leak to prove that it would not (Barstow et al., 2010). On the evening of the 20th despite disagreements over the test results, it was given a positive outcome (Final Report, 2011 42) and the crew continued with the steps to plug the well. The pressure to plug the well had the crew moving a little faster than usual. Joseph Keith a 7 year veteran of Horizon, who was to monitor the blowout detection gauges, doubted he could monitor the well correctly because of the simultaneous activities on the drilling floor (Barstow et al., 2010).
Shortly thereafter as the drilling crew was pumping mud from the well sending it to the supply ship at the side of the rig and replacing it with seawater to relieve pressure on the hydrocarbons, rather than lower pressure the pressure readings were increasing (Barstow et al., 2010). This was a sign of hydrocarbons seeping into the well (Barstow et al., 2010). Mud began to spray out of the top pipe almost uncontrollably. What they did not realize but should have was that about this time oil and gas had begun to rush up the pipe 5000’ below the rig. In the 9 minutes from the time the mud flew out of the top of the well until the actual blowout, there were multi chances to prevent the outcome. The blowout preventer on the ocean floor should have stopped the flow and capped the well. The safety manual referred to using it as a drastic step. Not only did the crew not want to believe that this was a worst case scenario but they were not mentally prepared since they never practiced for a worst-case blowout. At the same time the preventer which should have automatically separated the rig from the well or cut the pipe and sealed the well did not interact. As gas began to engulf the rig’s floor there were multiple failures by the crew of alarm and safety systems. The general master alarm, which should have automatically sounded when the gas levels were detected, had been set to operate manually so as to not wake the sleeping crew with false alarms, was never turned on. Additionally, the crew never engaged the emergency shutdown which allowed the 2 engines to keep running and once the gas hit those engines, there were two major explosions (Barstow et al., 2010). Even after the explosions the crew exemplified their blind loyalty to the rig but not hitting the button to separate the rig from the blowout preventer until given proper authority (Barstow et al., 2010).
What followed was pure chaos, the explosions had ripped apart the rig, cutting power and spreading fire and smoke. Most of the crew abandoned their evacuation training, attempting to save themselves. Half of whom should have used the two rescue boats actually did, others jumped the 60 feet into a burning ocean (Barstow et al., 2010). A handful used the life raft but they did not realize when they were in the water that it was tied to the rig. The supply ship which had moved away from the rig, sent a rescue craft which picked up those in the water as well as cutting the life raft free. Eleven of the 126 crew members were killed and 17 of the 115 who had evacuated were injured (Final Report, 2011, pp. 47, 48).
Causes:
There were 3 areas that led directly to the disaster. At the core would be the importance of making money over safety. The crew was hesitant to take actions that would have set their timetable back or possibly ruin equipment. The day of the explosion the crew was multi-tasking chores that would have helped them to cap the well and move on to their next projects. They misread information. They disregarded Halliburton’s comments on the timetable for the cement to settle properly and the possible leakage problems as Halliburton saw it (Final Report, 2011, pp. 31, 33). The pursuit of a profit also influenced Transocean to not spend the money or the time to perform an industry and federally mandated maintenance on the blowout preventer. There were physical failures on the preventer including a dead battery and failed switch which had a direct cause on the device not working when and as needed (Barstow et al., 2010). Investigations found that both Transocean and BP had instituted working procedures that rewarded cost effective methodology (Smith, 2011).
The failure of the crew to be prepared for the most extreme scenario would be among the most important causes. This would be the hardest to overcome because of the difficulty in duplicating a full bore blowout with gas leakage and explosions that would result in life or death decisions. This crew was in part the victim of its own success. Having gone years without a safety issue they had become almost complacent in the mundane chores they had done countless of times before. It did not help that the safety manual was full of overriding steps that demanded specific authority from a specific individual before they could be enacted.
Regulations
The U.S. Coast Guard Joint Investigation Team found that BP and subcontractors had violated 6 specific federal regulations, most revolving around safety issues. The broadest of these were violations of 30 CFR § 250.107, the failure to perform its operations in a safe and workmanlike manner and not maintaining its equipment in safe conditions; and violation of 30 CFR §250.401 by BP, Transocean and Halliburton (Sperry Sun) to not take necessary precautions to maintain control of the well. Specifically was the failure of BP and Transocean to adhere to 30 CFR §250.446(a) to maintain the blowout preventer. It was found the cement work provided by BP and Halliburton lacked the ability to control and prevent the release of fluids through the wellbore into the surrounding waters in accordance with 30 CFR §250.420(a)(1) and (2). Lastly was the failure of BP in drilling procedures according to 30 CFR §250.427(a) (Smith, 2011).
Possible Corrective Actions:
It would seem the most obvious would have been the correct maintenance of the blowout preventer. Even with everything else, had the preventer been maintained and would have acted as it was designed to, the actual blowout would never have taken place. Aside from that, I would think some type of consistent observance and evaluation of the crew and its ability to perform daily chores up to standards that would be clearly stated and instituted would have helped some of the complacency. I would also suggest a worst case scenario simulation that would be conducted at the least twice and maybe three times a year. It could be enacted much like fire departments train working hand in hand with the fire-fighting units of the Coast Guard to simulate conditions.
References
Adams, A. (2015, June). Summary of Information concerning the Ecological and Economic Impacts of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Disaster. NRDC Issue Paper.
Retrieved from https://www.nrdc.org/file/4218/download?token=M2Bxrq5m.
Barstow, D., Rohde, D., & Saul, S. (2010, Dec 25). Deepwater Horizon’s Final Hours.
New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/us/26spill.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print.
Final Report on the Investigation of the Macondo Well Blowout. (2011, March 1). Deepwater Horizon Study Group. 1-50. Retrieved from http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/pdfs_papers/bea_pdfs/dhsgfinalreport-march2011-tag.pdf.
Ingersoll, C, Locke, R M. & Reavis, C. (Rev. 2012, April 3). BP and the Deepwater Horizon Disaster of 2010. MITSLOAN MANAGEMENT. Retrieved from https://mitsloan.mit.edu/LearningEdge/CaseDocs/10%20110%20BP%20Deepwater%20 Horizon%20Locke.Review.pdf.
Mullins, J. (2010, Sept 8). The Eight Failures that Caused the Gulf Oil Spill, New Scientist
Daily News. Retrieved from https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn19425-the-eight- failures-that-caused-the-gulf-oil-spill/.
Smith, S. (2011 Oct. 10). Deepwater Horizon: Production Rewarded, Safety Ignored. ESHToday.
Retrieved from http://ehstoday.com/safety/deepwater-production-rewarded-safety- ignored-102011.
