Introduction
We are normally taught the phrase “knowledge is power;” in fact, it is better to know than not to know. Though in many cases this is true, we should admit the exceptions. For instance, the modern technology provides the genetic tests to determine if a person will eventually develop late-onset disorders like Huntington’s disease. The individuals who are positive for Huntington’s disease develop cognitive defects, involuntary spastic body movements, dementia, and depression starting in their fifties or forties because of the neurodegeneration. The effects worsen over the time until finally the affected individuals are left with serious cognitive impairment and unable to move. For this reason, this argumentative essay centers on whether parents should be allowed to have their kids tested for the adult- onset illnesses and maintains that parents should not be allowed to have their kids tested for the adult-onset diseases as discussed below.
Unfortunately, there is no cure for some adult- onset diseases and treatments, which can lessen, prevent, or delay their effects. With this in mind, should parents be allowed to have their kids tested for these diseases even when medical benefits does not exist like in the example of Huntington’s disease? This issue becomes framed in autonomy battle that is the freedom for mentally capable to resolve or make sound decisions free from external coercion or constraints (Malpas, 43). We should determine if the decision should be preserved until a child is old enough to decide on for himself/herself, or if is his/her parents to make. As with many questions, which concern the conflicting autonomy, we need to turn to consider the beneficence that is, the duty, which requires all to help in bringing about outcomes that are positive and desist from imposing harm. The big question that remains is that of the best outcome for the wellbeing of a child. The essay thus maintains that parents should not be allowed to have their kids tested for the adult-onset diseases.
The argument against the rights of the parents to their children test for adult-onset diseases is guided by a belief that each child is entitled to the right to an open future and that capacity to steer one’s personal momentous life decisions is essentially integral to the overall wellbeing. Protecting children’s rights to opens future means to preserve the ability of the children to make independent choices in future that essentially requires that parents do not in the period in-between act to limit their future options severely (Davis 83).
Davis (84) argues that it is immoral for the parents to act in a method that intentionally and substantively constraints their children future access to the momentous life choices since doing so would actually violate their children rights to open futures. In association with this opinion, the parents are energetically in charge of preserving their children’s rights in trust that is, rights, which children hold, but unable to exercise them until when they are old enough. The right to reproduce is a good example of a right in trust. Even though children might not be of developmental ages even to think through reproduction, they will have capability to make their personal reproductive choices in future, if not else prohibited from doing so.
Davis stresses that similar to this example, parents who want to test their children for the adult-onset illnesses such as Huntington’s disease infringes on the rights to open futures of their children by irreversibly eliminating their right in trust to make an independent decision for themselves on whether to get tested or not once they become adults.
It is actually accepted normal in the society for parents to decide on behalf of their children when consequences are obviously good that is, the decisions, which their children would possibly agree with given that they were mature or old enough to make informed choices for themselves, for instance, decisions to be vaccinated. Nonetheless, we must reconsider the parents’ powers to decide on their children when the consequences are significant, as well as resulting good appears uncertain. Children testing for the adult-onset diseases thus merit the close examination of parental autonomy role considering that knowing the results for the test will possibly change an individual’s entire life plus that only 15 percent of the adults who realize themselves to be at the risk make decisions to test (Malpas, 74). Consequently, children testing for the adult-onset illnesses violate the children rights to open futures as well as their future autonomy. Decision to test must be deferred for the kids for when they are mature enough to appreciate both the psychosocial and medical implications of results.
Moreover, if some parents are allowed to have their kids tested for the adult-onset diseases, they might refuse to educate them especially up to the higher institutions of learning if they test positive. These parents can argue that higher institutions education is actually not a basic need and that the resources, which would have else funded the education of their children could be assigned elsewhere for their families to use in the other ways. In this case, we see how conversant the wellbeing could directly limit the rights to open futures of their children by greatly hindering their capability to join higher institutions of learning; an opportunity they would really have if their parents were not allowed to test them for the adult-onset illnesses (Davies, 90). It is not correct to put the family well-being over individual children ability when considering adult-onset diseases testing.
On the other hand, some of those who oppose the above arguments argue that parents must be allowed to test their children for the adult-onset illnesses despite infringing on their rights to open futures since the well-being of children is not only one at stake. They oppositely claim that parental testing can essentially be most beneficent choice, but then in terms of the general family well-being. They believe that the parents are moral agents who are responsible and capable to consider what appears good to the whole family and that could include prior knowing a child adult-onset diseases status (Sevick et al, 50). These opponents propose that parents need to follow constrained parental autonomy control that claims that parents are permitted to make the “interfamilial offs” to exploit their whole family well-being so long as basic needs of every member of the family is being met. However, these opponents fail to show how an individual child and who tests positive benefits if parents are allowed to have their kids tested for the adult-onset ailments.
Furthermore, the challengers of the views of prohibition of childhood testing argue that we must recognize that considering individual welfare of children does not directly point toward childhood testing for adult-onset diseases. They argue that there exist possible psychosocial benefits for children who mature knowing their adult-onset diseases status since this would instead lead us to offer our support towards it. They go on and argue that psychological benefits from a timely diagnosis of adult-onset diseases are more than benefits that are related to preserving children rights to open futures, hence testing would be in interest of children welfare. According to them frankness and openness about a certain disease while growing up appears less stressful than maturing with the denial or anxiety linked to their risk (Sevick et al, 51). However, their arguments fail to consider the situation where there are no medical benefits. Additionally, the psychosocial benefits they present are uncertain.
Works cited
Davis, Dena S. Genetic Dilemmas: Reproductive Technology, Parental Choices, and Children's Futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2010.
Sevick, M. A., Nativio, D.G., & Mcconnell, T. Genetic testing of children for late onset disease. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 14: 47-56., 2005.
Malpas, Phillipa J. Children in the Moral Community: Predictive Genetic Testing of Children for Adult Onset Diseases: Some Ethical Implications. , 2006
