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(College/Institute)
The historical connection of a photograph and its contribution to deterring criminality has its roots to the beginnings of the development of the photograph itself. With the first “technologically viable photographic technique” developed in 1839, the following year saw the potential for this technology to fight criminality was recognized. By the mid-1850s, police in the United Kingdom and in France were taking pictures of convicts to avert any possible escapes of these individuals as well as record instances of reoffending. In the late 1940s, an enterprising police superintendent proffered the possibility of allowing the police to examine the viability of using the live BBC coverage recordings to equip future police Metropolitan police officers.
The footage would be used to train and develop policies on deployment strategies; the request was rejected on the basis that it would prove too costly. Nevertheless, this is where the possibility of using live visual imaging of certain areas to help in general police and investigation work. A decade later, police agencies were starting to use CCTV systems to help in the operation of traffic stops manned by a single officer, and still a decade later, police in the UK built two “pan-tilt and zoom cameras” to help secure Trafalgar Square in the course of a state visit, and later still to monitor the festivities at a Guy Fawkes event (Norris, McCahill, and Wood 110-111).
Flaherty (2015) states that the prevalence of CCTV systems in urban areas ground majority of current operating security, policing and defense, anticrime and counter terrorism and criminally deviant behavior deterrence mechanisms. The objective in determining the presence of these mechanisms is not deducing the effectiveness of these mechanisms; rather, it is the query whether the operation of these mechanisms serve as a potent deterrent against the operation of terrorists from initiating or executing their deviant plans. It has been documented that actual attacks have been recorded with the use of CCTV systems, with cameras part of the damage in the campaign waged by these extremists. In one instance, terrorist allies tried to remove as many of these systems as possible in the immediate period before a possible attack. Here, the strategy lies in the attempt to deny the target of their movements to be able to launch their attack and maximize their advantage against their target.
However, there are cases wherein the suspects in a terrorist attack want to be filmed. Here, as in the case of Mohammad Sidique Khan and his organization, the reason for these people in looking to have themselves identified is to prove the legitimateness of their actions. The approach in looking to have themselves recorded can be regarded as part and parcel of the total plan of attack, wherein the point is to demonstrate the “indomitable will and resolve” of these extremists; there are also elements, such as the forces of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) who follow protocols aimed at engendering an environment of anonymity to maintain the secrecy attached to the terrorist network.
Stutzer and Zehnder (2010) aver that extremist attacks pose a significant vulnerability for civilian communities. In addition, possible fundamentalist threats pose serious challenges for the private sector as well as government stakeholders and actors. In recent times, counterterrorist activities have been given a boost with the use of CCTV cameras; in fact, a significant number of police and security agencies intend to allocate large sums of money to strengthen the factor of CCTVs as an effective counterterrorist tool. Fenwick (2013, 93) avers that the UK Home Office conducted a study on the feasibility of using CCTV systems as an effective anti-criminality tool within the time frame of 1995-2005.
Initial research evaluated the engagement of the police of the systems within the context of a major urban center location and then collated the data to evince the effect of the technology on the overall crime rate. The research data showed that the use of CCTVs produce short term rather than long term deterrence; however, the use of these mechanisms allowed the police and other emergency services to respond faster to crisis locations. Given this data, Grant (2007) states that UK security policy makers were still willing to allocate approximately £ 1.75 billion for video storage facilities up to five years old; the police department is expected to foot the massive bill wherein the Home Office allowed the police to gain real-time access to the 1,500 CCTV cameras to monitor the movement of possible terrorists’ vehicles and gain their itineraries as these navigate the city’s streets (2).
The use of cameras in the area of security monitoring and crime prevention is one of the rapidly growing areas in the area of security, as well as one of its most controversial. Law enforcement agents benefit from its operation by way of its improved tracking and monitoring capabilities (Stutzer and Zehnder 4). However, Singh (2008) proffers the question if the use of CCTV systems will truly be an effective mechanism in impeding actions by extremists. Singh proffers that in the light of bombings in small locations compared to high profile areas is that terrorists can raise their media exposure even attacking a relatively “small” target and reduce the expenses in relation to executing the planned attack.
According to Singh, the sole method for addressing and countering possible extremist attacks in large or small target areas is to increase the possibility of getting caught by cameras. The cameras exponentially raise the needed finances to execute the attacks facilitating the possibility that the extremists, rather than having to plan a single attack to gain the needed media exposure, will be forced to coordinate their resources for another attack, raising the costs for attacking their intended target (See figure 1).
However, in the report of the United States General Accounting Office (1992), officials in possible target areas such as transport facilities, particularly high value and high traffic areas, are not adequately covered in terms of security surveillance and monitoring. This is possibly due to the general sentiment among transit sector officials that their systems do not provide an “attractive enough” target for these extremists, hence the halfhearted approach to the need for increasing and strengthening the security infrastructure in these areas. In addition, transit sector officials state that even if the threats to the system were to escalate, any monitoring system that would be proposed to be installed at these areas would be either too expensive, impractical and even economically unfeasible to maintain.
Operations geared to screen passengers using mass transit systems for explosives, dangerous chemicals or weapons would be deemed too intrusive and an obstruction to efficient operations of the system. Moreover, the resources required to monitor and deter a possible terrorist attack would simply overburden the resources of these mass transport infrastructures. Officials aver that the purpose of launching an attack on a mass transport facility would be to paralyze its operations; the implementation of measures designed to prevent the execution of a terrorist attack on such a system will have the same effect.
A study conducted in the US in 1997 discovered that a mere 13 urban centers in the country engaged the use of CCTV systems and were used mainly in the monitoring of pedestrian and vehicle traffic in a number of areas in the city. Five years later, this number increased to 20 cities, ranging from small monitoring units monitoring the events in a park to a massive system such as the one in Washington, DC linking hundreds of camera systems guarding mass transportation stations, public places as well as educational facilities stationed at critical locations within these areas.
As in the case of Europe, the main drivers for the expansion in the use of these systems by the members of the private sector; in the work of Hallberg, a poll of businesses in the United States allocated an estimated 75 percent of their expenditures on security surveillance systems. In 2001, the International Association of Police Chiefs stated that eight of 10 police agencies engaged CCTV systems in one application or another. Moreover, many police departments in the country deployed these systems in their patrol cars to record arrests and detention of suspects.
In addition, police and security policy makers have deployed these systems in “high crime incidence” areas; one quarter of these cameras were used on the streets of these cities, 15 percent of these systems were used in parks and 10 percent in public housing areas. Even before the 9/11 tragedy, the IACP projected that the use of CCTV security and monitoring systems would exponentially grow in the United States. In the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, many cities have opted for a massive deployment of these mechanisms in their respective jurisdictions. For example, in 2004, Chicago city officials announced the installation of more than 2,000 monitoring systems in a number of high pedestrian traffic within the city (Norris, McCahill, and Wood 114-115).
There is little speculation that the use of CCTV as well as “automatic number plate retrieval (ANPR) systems by the police and law enforcement agencies has been increasing; what is being proffered here is that with the rise in the use and deployment of these systems, the era of a “Big Brother” scenario is not far off. Advances in the technology being used in these systems is constantly progressing with the development of “face recognition” tools, audio connections, and having the ability to read and record license plates for crime control purposes.
However, there are debates in legal circles whether the increasing sophistication of these CCTV camera systems will usher society into Orwellian concepts of the state. In his work 1984, Orwell introduces society where a tyrannical regime actively monitors all the movements of its citizens. Though Orwell’s work has been characterized as fiction, many in legal circles are questioning whether the lines have been blurred between fact and fiction (Fenwick 95).
CCTV mechanisms evince the potential of a technological advancement that is either currently engaged or being evaluated for use to significantly intrude into the privacy of the people that these are supposed to protect. In addition, in terms of operational considerations, much of the concerns lay in the financial and maintenance side of the issue; not much was discussed on the subject on the intrusion of the technology in the area of civil liberties. In fact, the possibility of these technologies on civil and constitutional rights did not play a significant factor in the determination of the systems to deploy to secure the facilities (United States General Accounting Office).
With the threats of criminality and extremism ever present and looming over the international community, the use of CCTV mechanisms is seen to grow and even expand in the future. Police will claim that these mechanisms help in the development of a secure society and reduce criminality; civil libertarians will persistently challenge this assertion on the grounds that these will just look to invade on the privacy of people and expand the reach of the government into the lives of the citizenry (Fenwick 95).
Works Cited
Fenwick, Helen, Developments in counter-terrorist measures and uses of technology (New York: Routledge Publishing)
Flaherty, Christopher, “The role of CCTV in terrorist TTPs: camera system avoidance and targeting” Small Wars Journal (2015)
Grant, Ian “Anti-terror police CCTV could cost £ 1.75 billion” <http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240082113/Anti-terror-police-CCTV-could-cost-175bn
Norris, Clive, McCahill, Mike, and Wood, David “The growth of CCTV: a global perspective on the international diffusion of video surveillance in publicly accessible space” <http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles2(2)/editorial.pdf
Singh, Prakarsh, “Will CCTV technology deter terrorists?” <http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/WillCCTVTechnologyDeterTerrorists_PSingh_070808
Stutzer, Alois, and Zehnder, Michael, “Camera surveillance as a measure of counterterrorism?” < https://wwz.unibas.ch/fileadmin/wwz/redaktion/wipo/Alois_Stutzer/WP34_CCTVandTerrorism.pdf
United States General Accounting Office, How to prevent terrorism in courts and transit systems. Collingdale: Diane Publishing, 1992
Figure 1
Source: Singh (2008): Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (2008)
