One of the basic requirements of scientific objectivism is in the sense of the desire to base the judgment solely on the facts, guided by the generally binding laws of logic alone. Preconceptions and biases that distort the actual truth and does not take the logical conclusions from objective data should not have the place in science (Paul, Miller and Paul).
Meanwhile, in the social sciences this basic requirement of scientific is often broken under the influence of traditions and prejudices, preferences and interests, prevailing in individual nations, religions, countries, classes, as well as among the political parties or even in the scientific and philosophical directions, when scientists deliberately or unconsciously distort the truth and distort the actual logical methods of thought (Huemer).
The most common argument in favor of subjectivism begins with reference to the greatest diversity of moral convictions, peculiar to different eras and cultures. It is no secret that different cultures are characterized by quite dissimilar notions of morality. Taking into account such diversity of moral ideas, it's hard to believe that moral judgments are objective in the sense that the question of the truth or falsity of each of them can be answered by a single correct answer (Paul, Miller and Paul).
The second argument against the moral objectivism arises from the epistemological problem. Moral facts seem to be quite different from the non-moral facts with which we are familiar. Most of our knowledge we receive, apparently, from a certain kind of experience (usually - the sensible, although perhaps religious) or through the analysis of the content of our concepts. This means that those facts, which, it seems, the morality has to deal, are strange and incomprehensible and so incomprehensible that many philosophers is hard to believe that they exist.
The first and most popular argument, however, is the least convincing. The simple fact of differences in the views of morality itself does not bring us closer to solving the question of objectiveness or subjectiveness of the moral approval. To understand this, it is enough to remind, that all sorts of indisputable objective statements there were large difference thoughts. It is clear: even if in some cases the cause of controversy in fact is the subjectivity of the corresponding statement, however, in other cases they occur just because someone is wrong (Tan).
The second argument in favor of the conclusion of the subjectivity of moral statements is also questionable. It comes from the idea that moral facts are unique, i.e. quite similar to those of non-moral facts with which we are most familiar (Tan). And due to the fact that it is difficult to understand how we could have access to such facts, moral facts are declared to be strange and incomprehensible, and for this reason we are recommended to abandon the belief that they do exist. But this argument ignores the mass of all sorts of facts, perhaps, no less ‘strange’ than the moral facts - facts that are denied solely because of their strangeness by only a very few people.
Works Cited
Huemer, Michael. Ethical Intuitionism. Basingstoke [England]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Print.
Paul, Ellen Frankel, Fred D Miller, and Jeffrey Paul. Objectivism, Subjectivism, And Relativism In Ethics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Print.
Tan, Mark M.H. "AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ETHICAL SUBJECTIVISM". Think 14.41 (2015): 69-72. Web.
