An Appealing Answer Defeated by Assumptions
In his book, Think, Blackburn summarizes the major approaches to justifying the existence of God (1999, pp. 152-185). In each case, major weaknesses are identified in the thinking process that makes the final proof elusive. However, the next approach to this problem he presents is appealing. If philosophy cannot develop an approach to convincingly justify the existence of God and support belief in God in that way, perhaps it can formulate reasons for why it is logical to believe in God by examining the various outcomes of believing or not believing. This logic would be useful even without absolute proof of God’s existence. This approach was first proposed by Blaise Pascal, a French mathematician and theologian who lived from 1632 to 1662, and is called Pascal’s wager (Blackburn, 1999, p. 185). This essay will begin by examining Pascal’s wager as logical support for believing in God and explore the decision-making ideas within the proposal. Then it will address some issues that arise with this method of analyzing the belief in God problem and discuss the impact of these issues. Finally, it will be conclude that although Pascal’s wager is an appealing answer to the question of whether belief in God is logical, as a philosophical approach it is defeated by the underlying assumptions necessary to keeping its logic intact.
Pascal’s wager was expressed in a group of papers found after his death entitled Pensees, or “Thinkings” (Pascal, 1660). In his writings, Pascal sets up his approach by stating that a wager on religious belief must be made through action. One choice is a wager that God does exist and one acts accordingly. Under the Christian tradition this would involve going to church, praying, and doing all that is involved in religious belief. If taking such actions is a challenge to reason, Pascal observes that taking these actions could “deaden your acuteness” such that one could even become a true believer (Blackburn, 1999, p. 187). The second possible decision is to bet that God does not exist and therefore one does not go to church, pray, or do the other actions supporting religious belief. Next, the outcomes of the possible decisions are weighed, depending on whether or not God exists, with the goal of determining what is the logical wager to make.
The results of the Pascal’s wager are as follows. If one decided to take the belief route, and God does exist, the rewards are enormous. The investment of belief provides an infinite afterlife in complete bliss. This wager win has no downsides, other than the necessity of taking all the actions surrounding belief, which could even result in true belief. It is a win of infinite upsides. In stark contrast, if God exists, the no belief decision has huge downsides, including infinite afterlife in a horrible Hell, with unending tortures and punishments. That wager position can be expressed as infinite downsides. Next, the results of the wager are analyzed according to the possibility that God does not exist. In that case, neither belief decision provides a benefit. Also, if God does not exist, the only loss is the actions of belief that were performed, which is considered minor, especially if it is the only way to the possible infinite upside if God did exist. Therefore, Pascal’s conclusion is that with everything to win, and very little to lose, it is logical to take the actions that support belief in order to provide even the possibility of the infinite reward (Blackburn, 1999, p. 187). This remains the case whether or not God actually does exist. Because of the possibility of achieving the infinite upsides result, commentators have said that wagering for God “super-dominates” wagering against God (Hajek, 2012).
The primary appeal of Pascal’s wager is that it provides an argument in support of believing in God without the necessity of actually proving that God does or does not exist. Given the inability of earlier philosophers to formulate an approach that did show that God exists, at least one that survived criticism, the addition of this argument to the intellectual consideration of whether God exists is helpful. It also has a secular appeal in that it does not rely upon value-bound considerations of the rightfulness, goodness, or necessity of abstract faith or belief. Instead, it relies on the idea that logically, given the outcomes of belief in God or the outcomes of non-belief in God, the only way to get the outcome that is most valuable is to wager on God. Not only that, but the possible downsides of the wager are relatively small, in comparison to the enormity of the possible reward. Therefore, it is only logical to believe in God.
In order for the super-dominance approach to be valid a number of assumptions have been made by Pascal related to the ability of asserted end results to actually occur. The first central assumption to the wager argument is that an infinite afterlife of bliss is the reward that will be provided to believers if God exists. This type of reward is promised within the Bible and has a long tradition in Christian religious belief. However, it should be noted that Pascal began the section describing the wager argument with the assertion that God is infinitely incomprehensible (Blackburn, 1999, p. 186), thus there is the beginning assertion that it is impossible for Christians (or perhaps, humans) to understand God. Yet, it is clear within the discussion of the wager and its possible outcomes that during the argument God is understood. Pascal understands God at least to the extent that if God exists there will be the provision to believers of an infinite afterlife of bliss. This is true despite the inability to understand the nature or even the existence of God. This is a difficult assumption to get over for the wager if it were not the case, for the necessary existence of this super-dominant reward is the basis for the logic of wagering for God in the first place.
A second assumption that is necessary for Pascal’s wager to be logical, given the infinite reward discussed above is attainable, is that one must be able to gain this reward through the belief activities that are being practiced. That is to say, Pascal has assumed that going to church, praying, and other church-related religious activities of the Christian tradition are truly how God separates the believers from the non-believers and doing the activities will necessarily result in the sought-for super-dominant reward. It is possible to imagine a God that does not particularly appreciate such Christian activities and other activities or characteristics are actually the manner that separates those rewarded from those that are not rewarded, or punished. In particular, it is possible that the practice of Buddhism or Islam or Judaism rather than Christianity is the key. If that were the case, then Pascal’s wager fails even if the wager for God is taken as described, as the reward of an infinite afterlife of bliss would not be available to those practicing or holding the wrong beliefs. Again, it appears that Pascal’s assumptions about the nature of God (despite the incomprehensibility of it) have put into place a large stumbling block to the logic.
An even more fundamental problematic assumption within Pascal’s wager is that a belief in God, if God exists, forms the basis for receiving the reward of an infinite blissful afterlife. As pointed out by Blackburn, it is possible that God does not reward those that believe in God, but instead those that follow reason and therefore avoid religious convictions (1999, p. 187). This situation would obviously be fatal to the logic of Pascal’s wager, as it flips the resulting outcomes. If non-belief were rewarded then it would be the wager against God that would be the path to gaining an infinite afterlife of bliss and it would be the path of non-belief that would be the logical course of action. This is true even if, ironically, God does exist. But it is interesting to note that in this way, the approach of Pascal’s wager and what actions logically follow can be brought into line with the results of other attempts to philosophically support the existence of God.
In contrast, one assumption that Pascal makes in the discussion of his wager that does not necessarily have to be true is the presence of the infinite downside or punishment for nonbelievers (Blackburn, 1999, p. 187). In that case, the loss of this assumption would not alter the key underlying foundation of the wager’s logic, that by practicing a particular belief in God, the infinite reward will be provided. Instead, if Hell or some other similar afterlife of unpleasantness did not exist within the wager construct, it would simply reduce the downside of not believing. This makes being a non-believer much more appealing than otherwise by reducing the risk of taking the wager against God. But it remains with or without that punishment that it is still most logical to wager on God, as the infinite upside reward remains a possibility to be rationally pursued. Therefore, unlike the other three assumptions discussed, the assumption of the existence of Hell or an infinite afterlife of punishment is not fatal to the logic Pascal’s wager, but it does make the choice required by the wager appear less stark.
Pascal’s wager is an interesting philosophical approach to the existence of God that does not rest on the assumption that God does or does not exist. Instead, it urges that belief in God is the logical thing to do, given the incredible possible upside of attaining an infinite afterlife of bliss with that belief. This reward is super-dominant when compared with the asserted relative small downside of believing in a God that does not exist, namely, maintaining the status quo, and the horrific downside of an infinite afterlife of punishment resulting from not believing in a God that does exist. However, three assumptions made by Pascal are fatal to the logic of his approach. To be sensible, there must be an infinite afterlife of bliss available to believers, the belief system that is adopted must result in the promised reward, and belief in God must trigger the reward. If even one of these assumptions is not true, the logic of Pascal’s wager falls. Given that Pascal begins with the assertion that God is unknowable, it is not so far-fetched that one or more of these assumptions is not correct. Because of the fragility of the underlying assumptions, it must be concluded that Pascal’s wager does not answer the question of even whether belief in God is justified, let alone whether or not God exists.
Works Cited
Blackburn, Simon. Think. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Hajak, Alan. “Pascal’s Wager.” Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 6 November 2012. Web. 25 August 2013.
Pascal, B. Pensees. Trans. W. F. Trotter. Oregon State University. 1660. Web. 25 August 2013.
