General background
The western supremacy which has persisted for the past two hundred years is slowly depreciating due to the shift of power towards the eastern region. The western states are losing the authority to sustain a multilateral order based on the set rules. In 2008 during the wake of great brash, the G20 leaders took initiative steps to reinforce the multilateral order, which included the reinforcement of the IMF and the World Bank governance. This was to reflect an increasing weight of the economy of the developing countries.
It will be shown that the reforms at the IMF and the World Bank did in substantial amounts fail to meet their alleged objectives. Firstly, both the organizations in the developing countries developed grew their voting share about the share of GDP between the year 2009 and 2014.Secondly, states vary broadly in their share of votes comparing with the world share of GDP, In both IMF and the World Bank some counties have up to more than six times votes with respect to the GDP of other countries. Analyst and scientist have the responsibility and task of paying greater attention to the accomplishing of a more equitable governance in the significant multilateral organizations. The main focus of the study will be based on the Turkish case with Turkey being the state of focus.
The study
This study has the aim of understanding the broad conceptual framework for the middle power activism concerning the Turkish case. The following questions will be addresses in the study: what are the type of roles have the possibility of emerging in the middle power play in a post-hegemonic global system? , What are the kind of dynamic, properties and the challenges encountered in with the emerging of middle power than can bring a significant contribution to both the global and regional governance. What is their ultimate impact? However, the impact is not unavoidable, but it will solely depend on the complementary conditions which are set will also be outlined in the study (Bremmer and Nouriel, 132).
The G20 is a segment of global governance, and its implementation is a spring board toward global governance reforms since it acknowledges the shift of global gravity towards the east and south (Akyüz and Korkut, 1562). Even though ,economic globalization has brought billions of people from the pans of poverty ,it has also amplified inter and intra state inequality .The national policies implemented have gone beyond borders of certain nations to affect the lives of the people living in the other nations, especially the poor and humble in the society. The World Bank, IMF WTO and other global bodies have remained answerable to the nations that are industrialized. Making the verdicts of a sample of international institution to remain opaque (Bremmer and Nouriel, 132).
This article objective is to dig and address the potential roles to be played by the “emerging middle powers” in the dynamic global and regional governance with specific references to Turkey (Drezner, 61). With the international system currently going through a major transformation that has the higher chances of altering the global hierarchy of the relationship of power in a more stable and permanent fashion. There is an emergence of a quasi-consensus in the International Relations together with the Global Political Economy Literature that will comprise of a dominant change in the coming years as power gradually shifts from the western state which is more advanced in comparison with other countries.
Developed economies have their share of world GDP decreasing from 54 to 43 percent during the 2004 and 2014 period. China, which is considered as the most astonishing status seeker emerging power, has already exceeded the United States by the year 2014, to take its place in the position of the world largest economy country with the highest purchasing power (Wade, 363). The international diffusion of power encompassed the rise of other emerging economies such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa) and other economies of the second generation where Turkey and other states fall such as Mexico, South Korea, and Indonesia (Samans et al., 111).
The emerging theme in this fresh multi-regional system of international relation anxieties the yet to come of liberal order (Karns and Karen, 254). There are two key perspectives that that dominate in this debate, the liberal institutionalist which presents a widely enthusiastic scene for the future of the liberal order. Their main argument pivot is that emerging powers are socialized in an institutional environment. The second perspective is the Leitmotif, which is still led by the western liberal economic order (Akyüz and Korkut, 1560).
It is a combination of efficacious models of capitalism which are associated with political regimes of high authority that pose a threat to the liberal democracy and the vision of order and prosperity associated with the western states. The western states deteriorated after the 2008 global financial crisis aftermath, without a vital reordering of its existing political regime which was authoritative, this further challenges and dilutes the principles and liberal norms (Drezner, 61).
The domestic political economy features semi-peripheral position which also falls in the hierarchy of international capitalism. Which clearly makes the middle powers which are emerging hesitant participants in the legitimization of the already existing liberal international order as compared with the already establishes middle powers (Wade, 370). From the study, it will be noted that emerging power can create a significant impact on the governance of both local and regional governance. Their ultimate impact is not unavoidable and mutually depends on the interacting set of conditions.
Emerging middle powers in the global and regional governance
The middle powers are main players with self-conscious material capability with comparison with the great powers in the political world. This results in their ability to single-handedly have an impact in influencing the international policy agendas. This, however, does not mean that world politics participants are the great powers only (Bremmer and Nouriel, 132). In a post-hegemonic world order, the middle powers have the power to go through a variety of policies. The emerging middle powers are becoming more influential on the world affairs, most importantly in a post-crisis political setting of the economy.
Middle powers can act overweight under a set if certain conditions, these conditions include the capability of serving as role models concerning sources of soft power. The capacity of governance based recognition of the limitations of the middle powers, the capacity of building effective coalitions with emerging and established powers based on normative principles and finally on the capacity to identify areas of niche in global and regional governance (Samans et al, 111).
Emerging power activism building blocks
The emerging middle powers are related their ability to serve as a role model both on the global and regional basis. This capability is based on the eminence of their various democratic performance and development of the economy (Wade, 373). The significant idea for this study is that middle powers which are emerging through their role that contribute to the economic development of states. Mostly is usually within but sometimes also beyond their neighborhood increasing their international and regional stand (Karns and Karen, 266).
The ability of middle power states to form coalitions which encompass the use of a set normative principles is the second building block. This is a vital variable that informs their respective foreign strategy success. In the current context, middle powers are vulnerable to multilateralism, and they are determined to come up with operative coalitions at emerging international platforms like the G20 with states that share the same objective, this makes them influential in their own (Akyüz and Korkut, 1562).
Turkey has a deep institutional and historical links to the West .however this country is ambitious and assertive to becoming the most influential in the emerging regional shape of the world politics. Emerging middle powers are now more eager than ever to strengthen out the agreements within the various groups (Bremmer and Nouriel, 132).
Another building block of middle power activism to achieve a state of balance between the abilities and d on the other side expectations and ambitions are clearly related to a more wide governance capacity of the states (Drezner, 61). The expectations gaps are the looming fears that looms large over middle powers. The final building block element relates to the capability of emerging middle powers to identify areas of niche in global and regional governance.
The paradoxical case of Turkey
Concentrating on the Turkish example as a middle power activism. This country has demonstrated the capacity for other middle power countries which are emerging through its foreign policy which reflects both the primary potential and looming constraints of the emerging middle powers (Karns and Karen, 204).
Three strands to this arguments exist. Firstly, Turkey is a special case of an emerging middle power with accelerating growth in the economy, powerful democratization knowledge and avowedly proactive foreign policy in the recent years (Samans et al., 111). Turkish policy markers at the time of Justice and Development Party (AKP) era endeavored to place the country as a regional power that demonstrates vigorous forms of leadership at both the global and regional platforms.
Secondly, Turkey role conception progressively shifted from to a benign regional power from a forcible power (Bremmer and Nouriel, 132). Consequently, Turkish elites of politics during the AKP era have become very keen in taking responsibilities at the global and regional forums to promote the country's status through situating it in the immediate neighborhood as a role model.
Thirdly, Turkey as a country is a valued because of its increasing capacity and the willingness by the political group to participate and play an emerging middle power per se, this was a result of dramatic setbacks and failures it got involved in lately. The increasing differences between the capabilities and the ambitions in the pro-activism of Turkey. Followed by the unexpected consequences emanating from policy miscalculations enables one to derive vital lessons as of regard to potentials, nature and limits of the middle power states pro-activism (Vestergaard et al., 271).
Turkey as a promising emerging middle power
Turkey’s story of emergence is broadly categorized into three main phases which demonstrate the plenty of potential and the related risks that are connected to middle power activism in world politics. The first phase that provides demonstrated examples concerning the way middle power can push their weight up was between the periodical spans from 2002 to 2011.in this period the initial AKP term proved to of significance under the strong membership foundation of the EU that was between 2002 to 2007.Then during 2007 to 2011 the AKP consolidated political power firmly in the regional political sphere with the depreciation of the influence of the Turkish military (Karns and Karen, 101).
The third phase, which fell between 2011 and 2015, AKP experienced a major decline compared with the previous periods. The cause was the interrelated terms of economic development, foreign policy performance and democratization with significant complications for Turkey to act as an effective emerging middle power. Following the economic crisis in 2001 Turkey embarked on a series of reforms than strict bridged regulations in the finance sector to the setting of a broad-based macroeconomics discipline with a specific focus on the balance of the state finances (Vestergaard et al., 266).
Considering niche diplomacy, Turkey targeted main areas to enlarge its influence and power over the global governance. Turkey invested heavily in humanitarian diplomacy within the past decade, which indeed became the most explanatory and significant principle in the Turkish foreign policy (Bremmer and Nouriel, 132). Turkey later came up with public institutions and strengthened the already existing one so that they can cope with the humanitarian activities all over the world. Consequently, the following institutions gained the reputation in the foreign policy catalog Turkish Airlines, TOKI (Housing development Administration of Turkey), AFAD (Emergency Disaster Management Presidency), Kizilay (Turkish Red Crescent) alongside other humanitarian NGOs like TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency).
In summary, based on the key indicators, Turkey managed to successfully improve its position in the regional ranking and politics of the world during 2002 to 2011.This resulted to Turkey emerging as a promising nation that has influence beyond its material power capacity. Turkey went on with being firmly attached to the Western security structures which include NATO, US, and NATO bilateral security ties continues to be more significant. The stereotype by the western states at that time was that it is a progressive country that was no longer a basic part of the identity of the western states (Samans et al, 111).
In the ability to serve as role model Turkey had strengths ranging from economic development with an important improvement in the early years of AKP era. It was the only democratic country in an authoritative neighborhood (Vestergaard et al, 266).Even though it had weaknesses such as the weakening of the economic performance which was encompassed by an evident authoritarian turn in regional politics. This was during the final era of APK.
In the capacity of coalition building Turkey had the strengths from the enjoyment of traditional connectivity to established democracy of the west, through candidacy for EU membership and NATO membership (Drezner, 61). Though, it had a weakness of oscillating towards inconsistency and unilateralism instead of multilateralism in the practices of the building practices. The merging of unilateralism with authorities at home lead to isolation. The assessment and outcome of the above-stated strengths and weakness were an uneasy mixture of both multilateralism and unilateralism.
In governance and capabilities –expectation balance, Turkey’s role was in line with the efficient regional power thus rediscovering its neighborhood and came up with economic and diplomatic linkages which were utilized broadly in the Middle East. However, the weakness was that there was a major mismatch in the capabilities and ambitions (Wade, 361).Countries’ like Syria and Egypt involved in conflicts due to the over-activism this contributed to regional instability.The results of the stated strength and weaknesses were the deterioration of Turkeys role to matching expectations-capabilities and failure in the governance of Turkeys foreign policy.
In identifying niche areas in global governance Turkey projecting itself as a main donor and actor with consideration to humanitarian activities created a conception that it was a mediator for regional and global conflicts. However, this topic has weaknesses such as Turkey was undermined by its policy of choosing which side to support. This policy was costly regarding the population of the refugees who were involved and the regional insecurity, hence generating instability (Bremmer and Nouriel, 132). The outcome of this policy was a mixed picture with elements of success featured with the elements of failure.
Larger and more powerful countries have a very significant role to play. These countries are playing the role of increasing G20 role in a global context. There is an argument about the duties of these near BRICS or emerging middle powers in the global trend framework. With the most cynical perspective view being what is talked about concerning the broadening of global governance (Karns and Karen, 192). The optimistic view point is that these emerging power countries could play a very significant part in changing the global context.G20 as an entity of governance has not just been operative, but it has the potential and capability of improved performance to create a rapid growth of the economic agenda.
Conclusion
This article had its emphasis on the potential, properties and the limits of activism by the middle power in the trending global order. This study brought about the filling of the gap between regional and global governance by offering a wide abstract framework for the activism of middle power and testing it with a case study of the Turkish example. This Turkish case had remarkable results which act as a benchmark for discussion of the emerging middle power activism. The findings from the case study came up with suggestions that despite the emerging middle powers having the desires to establishing themselves as role models and sources of motivation in their respective regions. Their economic and political development still grieves from impending insubstantialities.
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