Introduction 2
The Impact of Insurgency Efforts During the Vietnam War 3
External Sponsors of Insurgency Movements 6
Conclusion 10
Works Cited 13
Introduction
Among the many lessons to be learned from the Vietnam War is that counterinsurgency efforts must be stopped, but it is growing increasingly difficult to do so. Fanatical individuals who are deeply devoted to their cause often head insurgent movements. Unless an equally fanatical force on the other side exists, the necessary division of labor between external sponsors and clients states in the prosecution of counterinsurgency simply cannot be met. The issue of insurgency is not unique to the United States, nor it is a new issue that must be tackled. Learning to better bridge the divide between external sponsors and client states in this regard in a lesson that can certainly be drawn from the Vietnam War. Moving back even further, we know that America built its on insurgency during the Revolutionary War that was fought with England. It was not until the Vietnam War, however, that the United States began to face an insurgent effort that it seemingly could not defeat. This is viewed as remarkable by many scholars because of the sheer force of the American military and the support that it received from neighboring countries throughout Southeast Asia. This highlights the nature of insurgent movements, however, in that they often operate in the shadows and are difficult to defeat. This brief paper aims to analyze both sides of this important issue.
The Impact of Insurgency Efforts During the Vietnam War
It is important to note from the outset “An insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increase insurgent control” (Hosmer 82). This was obviously the case in Vietnam, where one organized group within the country sought to overthrow the government and install their own leaders as the legitimate and supreme leaders of the land. In many cases, Vietnam no exception, insurgents resort to guerilla warfare out of necessity. In order to tilt the balance of power in their favor, insurgents aim to take authority away from the government and put it squarely into their hands.
Scholars contend that insurgency movements gain traction primarily by employing a four-pronged approach to accomplishing their goals. The first of these revolves around instigating some type of provocation, which is an underhanded and focused attempt at forcing the government to take certain evasive actions that it would not normally desire to do. After succeeding in this primary goal, insurgents begin a focused campaign of intimidation throughout broad sectors of society. This is a targeted move against the government and against any member of the citizenry that aligns itself with governmental ideology and interests. In essence, many insurgent efforts are effective because of the group’s ability to literally terrify any person who works with or is affiliated with the government in any fashion. In order to overcome this, counterinsurgency efforts must be equally effective at calming these fears and leading the people to believe that they are going to be protected. This is often a tough task to accomplish, as is reflected at times throughout the Vietnam region.
In a logical progression, once an insurgency effort has succeeded in intimidating the government and the citizenry, the insurgents will move into a third stage of protraction. It is at this time that the insurgents will move to prolong the conflict, inflicting loss on the other side, while working to minimize losses of their own. The reason they are often so successful in this particular endeavor is that they hard to locate and capture. In the case of Vietnam, it is notes that the insurgents resided in jungle areas where members knew the terrain intimately. They knew where to hide and where to strike, making it nearly impossible for outsiders to gain much traction at all. In addition, insurgents gain the trust of the population endemic to the region, which provides them a place of refuge and also eyes and ears that have proven to be invaluable in many a conflict. As such, it proved difficult to launch a strong counterinsurgency effort in the facing of such mounting obstacles. It is even more difficult to uncover the best balance of power and where to focus forces and manpower.
If an insurgency is permitted to grow in a relatively unchecked fashion, then it will eventually to a fourth stage, which is commonly referred to as exhaustion. Eventually, government forces and its supporters will simply tire of the fight, resulting in a situation that is quite dire in so far as the counterinsurgency is concerned. In essence, the balance of power during the Vietnam War shifted when the insurgents were able to use up many of the resources and occupy a great deal of time of the counterinsurgency to aid in their overall purposes of grasping control of the government within the nation. While insurgency movements have been around since society began to evolve, it was not until recently that the threat from such groups rose to sufficient levels to be able to result in significant military structure.
It is also found that the insurgency during the Vietnam War era was so effective because the organization really began from the ground up, gradually growing in strength and stature until they were able to effectively combat a counterinsurgency that began strong but gradually weakened over time. As scholars have noted, insurgent movements in the post-World War II modern era have grown largely as a rise in nationalistic ideals has become apparent. It is also believed that a decline in imperialistic power throughout the various regions of the world sufficiently weakened the governments of such countries to the point that overthrow was possible. This lead to a surplus in weaponry, along with easier access, that enabled the insurgents to grow in military strength on their own. Finally, it can be argued that insurgents, such as was the case in Vietnam, benefitted from an increase media presences. This permitted a flow of information nationwide on a scale never before possible, which greatly assisted the cause of the insurgents by enabling their message to be transmitted more openly and across broad sectors of society.
Insurgencies are often difficult to handle because they lack the conventional methods associated with war. Because of this, a counterinsurgency that relies of traditional training and techniques often finds itself at a disadvantage from the start. This is partly due to the realty that human nature conditions us to resist change, yet insurgents go against the grain and embrace rapid changes in environmental conditions to thwart the advances of even the strongest and best trained of counterinsurgencies. This, in turn, affects the militaries ability to be effective, even when implementing a plan that appears to be well designed and based on tactics that have proven successful in past conflicts. Von Clausewitz (128) contends that, “Friction is the only conception which, in a general way, corresponds to that which distinguishes real war from war on paper. The military machine, the army and all belonging to it, is on the face, simple; and appears, on this account, easy to manage.” And herein lies the likely problem with the American led counterinsurgency. Even with similar efforts having failed in the past, the movement relied on tactics that looked great on paper, but were far from effective when put into practice against an enemy that was entrenched in violent and inhumane warfare that anything but conventional.
External Sponsors of Insurgency Movements
The difficulty with determining the focal of power in relation to client states rests in their uniqueness. Basically, no insurgency is exactly like another, as each one is unique. As such, there is no field manual designed to deal with them. To compound the difficult is the reality that not all national governments are firmly in grip of power, and many more are considered worthy of enabling an insurgency to rise up to overthrow a corrupt and illegitimate regime. From the outside looking in, it is often difficult to determine which group should be supported and which should be fought against. As such, there is simply no set international doctrine that has been developed to deal with a general insurgency in any given region of the world. This is one of the lessons learned from Vietnam, and it continues to bear witness today. In order to successfully launch a counterinsurgency, the government and the supporters of the client state must engage in a military and political fight at the same time (Bergerud 277). This is often extremely difficult to do, particularly in cases where the national government is already sufficiently weakened, has lost support in large pockets of the country, and where external support is slow in coming.
Over time, the insurgency led by Diem became even stronger and support grew, largely because of fear. Even as violence increased, supporters of the insurgency increased, which made it difficult for any type of counterinsurgency to succeed. In a never ending cycle, the leader of the insurgency simply became emboldened with the increasing support, and the ferocity of his actions increased accordingly, effectively resulting in even more insurgents joining the cause over time (Pike 248). Even when the Americans joined the counterinsurgency, bringing with them superior firepower and military might, the insurgents were still highly effective because of their ability to adapt quickly to changing situations. An example of this can be drawn from the manner in which they engaged in close combat operations that effectively diminished the ability that the Americans had in providing needed air support. In this regard, the air power that the counterinsurgency relied upon in the plans that had been drawn up had its limits, and this became painfully clear as the conflict progressed (Clodfelter 89). While strategies such as Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I, and Linebacker were solid and may have worked almost anywhere else, they faltered in the face of a growing and committed insurgency.
Among the many lessons to be learned from the Vietnam War is that counterinsurgency efforts must be stopped, but it is growing increasingly difficult to do so. Fanatical individuals who are deeply devoted to their cause often head insurgent movements. Unless an equally fanatical force on the other side exists, the necessary division of labor between external sponsors and clients states in the prosecution of counterinsurgency simply cannot be met. The issue of insurgency is not unique to the United States, nor it is a new issue that must be tackled. Learning to better bridge the divide between external sponsors and client states in this regard in a lesson that can certainly be drawn from the Vietnam War. Moving back even further, we know that America built its on insurgency during the Revolutionary War that was fought with England. Since that time, America has been strong at sea as well (Baer 386). It was not until the Vietnam War, however, that the United States began to face an insurgent effort that it seemingly could not defeat. This is viewed as remarkable by many scholars because of the sheer force of the American military and the support that it received from neighboring countries throughout Southeast Asia (Willbanks 124). This highlights the nature of insurgent movements, however, in that they often operate in the shadows and are difficult to defeat. This brief paper aims to analyze both sides of this important issue.
Conclusion
Scholars contend that insurgency movements gain traction primarily by employing a four-pronged approach to accomplishing their goals. The first of these revolves around instigating some type of provocation, which is an underhanded and focused attempt at forcing the government to take certain evasive actions that it would not normally desire to do. After succeeding in this primary goal, insurgents begin a focused campaign of intimidation throughout broad sectors of society. This is a targeted move against the government and against any member of the citizenry that aligns itself with governmental ideology and interests. In essence, many insurgent efforts are effective because of the group’s ability to literally terrify any person who works with or is affiliated with the government in any fashion. In order to overcome this, counterinsurgency efforts must be equally effective at calming these fears and leading the people to believe that they are going to be protected. This is often a tough task to accomplish, as is reflected at times throughout the Vietnam region.
In a logical progression, once an insurgency effort has succeeded in intimidating the government and the citizenry, the insurgents will move into a third stage of protraction. It is at this time that the insurgents will move to prolong the conflict, inflicting loss on the other side, while working to minimize losses of their own. The reason they are often so successful in this particular endeavor is that they hard to locate and capture. In the case of Vietnam, it is notes that the insurgents resided in jungle areas where members knew the terrain intimately. They knew where to hide and where to strike, making it nearly impossible for outsiders to gain much traction at all. In addition, insurgents gain the trust of the population endemic to the region, which provides them a place of refuge and also eyes and ears that have proven to be invaluable in many a conflict. As such, it proved difficult to launch a strong counterinsurgency effort in the facing of such mounting obstacles. It is even more difficult to uncover the best balance of power and where to focus forces and manpower.
When America finally withdrew from the conflict in Vietnam in 1973, the counterinsurgency effectively ended. While it is certainly true that army headed by the North Vietnam had retreated to it own borders, resulting in a period of peace lasting for three years, it is widely known that the counterinsurgency was a failure. Many scholars have contended that a primary reason for this failure was due to failure on the part of the military to adapt (Willbanks 148). An example of this can be seen in the innovation that the Americans introduced during the Vietnam War. Such innovation was largely designed for conventional warfare, and fighting against an insurgency is anything but conventional. In fact, when Abram became commander of the army, he was not able to get any leverage of support in terms of following his strategy. As such, there was no unified front by which the insurgency could truly be beaten. This desire to apply convention doctrine into the context of the war in Vietnam would be an attempt that largely ended in much frustration and failure (Krepinevich 221).
Leaders of the counterinsurgency were given great bits of advice from other nations that had fought similar types of battles, but this advice largely went ignored. The lack of unity was noticeable, and this illustrates a fundamental flaw in the way in which the Vietnam War was fought. Counterinsurgency movements require focus and resolve (Hosmer 120). Often, it is difficult to achieve this because the very individuals that are fighting in the conflict have no personal stake in its success. This can be reflected as far back as the Revolutionary War where many British soldiers simply lost the will to fight a war so far from home. While the ideological argument to fight the Vietnam War may very well have been based on solid reasoning, the manner in which the conflict took shape was no match for an army and a people that had gained decades of support around the country.
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