To date, in the fourteen Latin American countries, those in power are leftist politics (the issue what kind of leftism and the degree of radicalism it is about) will be discussed later. Regardless of all the uniqueness of the moment and the apparent dissimilarity of modern Latin American lefts with their predecessors, there is a clear tendency, which is characteristic for the Latin American model of development as a whole – a tradition of powerful leftist movements, the struggle for social transformation. Facing deep structural crisis, the continent came into a long strip of the struggle against the dictatorship, local oligarchs and foreign capital. It seems that the main thing is that not new problems faced by today Latin America, acquired in the era of globalization a new sound and extreme urgency. The new forms of the leftist movements and their leaders have reflected the reaction of Latin American societies to the enormous social costs of neoliberalism and curtailment of social programs. This, in turn, resulted in a not new but aggravated current environment processes like the growth of marginalization of the masses and their pushing out of the civil society ("social exclusion").
It is important, however, to find out which lefties these are. There is no doubt that the forces, which now “turn” the continent to left are the "modern lefties", looking forward, not backward. Latin American and other foreign politicians grouped lefties into three conventional categories. Firstly, the so-called "left-wing fundamentalists" (associating globalization with imperialism, they advanced the slogan of "frontal collision"). Secondly, the "left-wing populists", who support clientelistic relationship with the electorate and "neo-patrimonialism" of the power, conquered by them. Examples are the "radical nationalist populistic" regimes like the ones built by Hugo Chavez and now Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador (Wiesehomeier and Doyle 212).
As the main focus of their policy, the lefties proclaim the fight against poverty. Their main postulate says that the market is not able to solve the problem of poverty and deep social inequality. To the forefront comes the state, whose main task is to come to the social sphere, to carry out reforms, aimed at reducing poverty. Unity of views and ideological platforms of all the fundamental problems discussed above does not exclude, however, the leftist pluralism and their enigma. Left regimes can be clearly divided into two "extreme" poles and an "intermediate group". At one extreme there are Venezuela, Bolivia, perhaps Ecuador as the embodiment of radical regimes (with the invisible presence and influence of Cuba), while on the other hand there are Chile as the embodiment of the social-democratic regime of the European type with no appeal against a market economy, based on the middle class . Between them (of course, with a certain degree of conditionality) there are placed Brazil (some analysts include it in the same group with Chile), Argentina and Uruguay. According to various indicators, they include there Peru and Nicaragua. With varying degrees, they make an effort to reform the social sphere, holding market but in fact neo-liberal policies.
Brazil
Let us investigate the Brazilian version of the "left turn", which is rather representative because it embodies many of the features of this Latin American phenomenon. It is important to mention that in the case of Brazil, it is not radical but a moderate form of change. On the "scale" of contemporary Latin American left regimes, "Lula's Brazil" (the former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva) takes a middle position. It should be noted that in Brazil, the tendency to the left turn of the political regime began not with Lula. It has been observed since the period of the presidents named Itamar Franco, Fernando Collor and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who tried to implement social democratic recipes. However, during the 2002 elections, society demonstrated rejection of neo-liberalism, and advocated a change. The leader of the Labour Party, syndicalist, a former worker, who came from the very bottom of society, became the President. It was "the most left president in Brazil's history" (Young Chul 630).
Unconditional victory of Lula gave birth to the extraordinary euphoria in 2002, especially among the poorest segments of society. Immediately after taking office, Lula and his colleagues made some pretty radical statements about a pronounced social orientation course of the new government. Nevertheless, the members of the Party expected more "tough" decisions and a sharp change in economic policy. This was not followed: the government's economic strategy was becoming more moderate, "economic block" cabinet did not go to change of the previous administration monetarist policies, seeking to reassure foreign investors and the local business community. In the world of political science, in its conditional "Table of Ranks", Lula has increasingly gained the definition of "moderate" rather center-left (and even a centrist), than a "pure leftist" leader.
An example of Brazil confirms that the main content of the "left turn" was based on the priority of the social factor. Eradication of poverty, narrowing the scope of poverty – these were the main strong points of Lula's policies, which provided him the support of his traditional electorate of the poorest. How compatible within a single course are the economic neo-liberalism on the one hand, and a large social component – on the other hand? We are talking about the most serious challenges, faced by modern Latin American politicians, including the Brazilian lefties, the phenomenon of "lefties’ drama in power": the objective impossibility in the modern market economy to abandon neo-liberal instruments of economic policy and responsibilities to carry out deep and tangible social reforms in the interests of the majority of society. Lula has repeatedly made the paradoxical statement that he "does not belong to the lefties", but "shall be left to fight for equality, for the fact that everyone can enjoy the fruits of development." He emphasized that "the most important definition of the left is the fight for equality". Also, he noticed: "In Brazil, where throughout its history, there was no one involved in social problems, where 54 million people live below the poverty line, it is impossible to overcome this situation in the short term".
Lula's policy was aimed at development of social infrastructure in such a "hot social and crime problem" as the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. A record figure was the creation of 1 million 617 392 jobs, which was a record in reducing unemployment all over the world and visibly decreased social inequality (only at the last stage 45 million came from the state of the poverty). The middle class currently constitutes 52% of the population. "Lula's Brazil has made a 180 degree turn", reaching "very positive lines of internal social development", has considerably strengthened its leading position in Latin America, becoming a state, without which cannot be solved any important issue.
While in other countries, "left turn" was limited to one political force or person, as the example of Kirchners in Argentina, after whose reign the rights, led by Mauricio Macri returned to power, the Brazilian leftist wave is still ongoing, as in power since 2010 remains the female President Dilma Ruseff, who proclaimed the policy of "Continuidade e pragmatismo", fully supporting, and continuing to implement the course of her predecessor and political mentor. She even returned him in politics in March this year, having appointed the former President to one of the key positions in her government.
Venezuela and Cuba
Another model of the left political and economic discourse in Latin America is represented by Cuba and Venezuela. As for Chavez, Venezuela with him, in contrast to Brazil, went out of the democratic way of development, becoming a "referendum democracy", where practically no elections were held, and instead of them there were referendums to extend the powers of the current President. However, unlike many of populists in Latin America, the Venezuelan president really made a radical change in the distribution of oil revenues. Under him, like Brazil, these funds were largely allocated on public expenditures, providing direct funding to low-income people in the country, which gained the majority of the electorate. Due to high world oil prices, Chavez managed to achieve considerable success, which he converted into his support in the election until the death (Eaton 1141).
For the implementation of his social policy, Chavez broke the resistance of the management and employees of the state oil company PdVSA. In 2002-2003, Chavez stepped in front of the strikes of PdVSA’s employees despite the attempt of a coup. On the contrary, he finally urged the state oil company to send a large part of the revenue to the budget. Thus, the state received funds for that wasteful social, defense and foreign policy, which is associated with the name of Hugo Chavez.
The flip side of this policy has been a progressive decline of the higher and middle strata of society that flourished before the start of the Bolivarian Revolution due to uneven distribution of oil revenues. Chavez’s reign appeared to have been a disaster for them. The poverty and unemployment benefits in the country reached the amount of approximately US $ 300 per month. Oil revenues have been directed not only at the support to the poor, but also on the development of public medicine, education, social housing, new schools and universities. Due to oil revenues, Chavez held an agrarian reform when large estates were divided among the peasants who have received loans from the state for the development of production. These funds have allowed to carry out the nationalization of many large companies, from the fields in the Orinoco River basin, where Chavez expelled the U.S. oil companies Exxon Mobil and Conoco Philips, ending with the production of cement (Eaton 1140).
However, a big redistribution of income was not accompanied by the same changes in the industrial sector. As before Chavez, the basis of the Venezuelan economy remained the oil exports to the US. In this respect, the Bolivarian revolution has not brought any changes: in fact, during the reign of Chavez, the oil production has not increased. The grace of Venezuela did not even manage to establish agricultural production in an amount sufficient to cover the country's food needs (Eaton 1140). The Bolivarian regime is based on the same economic basis as its neo-liberal predecessors. That made the legacy of Chavez and the Nicolas Maduro’s unstable after the fall in world oil prices and the start of political protests in the country. As a result, a very high rate of inflation remains (the largest in Latin America) and there are difficulties in the supply of basic food products as well as extremely high level of crime.
Colombia
In Colombia, the war of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) guerrillas against the central government have been lasted for nearly half a century and remains the main obstacle to the country’s political and economic development. Moreover, the FARC through participation in the transit of drugs to the US and the establishment of military bases in Venezuela and Ecuador have long turned to the problem of regional scale. From 2012, the last third peace talks, this time between the President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC leader Commandant Tymoshenko, are taking place in Oslo and Havana (Gutiérrez 631).
Logically, the question arises why the talks after a 10-year pause started right now. Firstly, for almost half a century, the FARC significantly has weakened its human and economic resources. An eight-year reign of Alvaro Uribe and systematic implementation of his "Plan Colombia" with methods similar to those used by Alberto Fujimori in the fight against the "Sender Luminoso" in Peru, reduced the territory, controlled by the FARC, by 60% as well as their manpower from 30 to 9 thousand. Secondly, when in 1998 the then Colombian President Andres Pastrana initiated peace settlement, the Armed Forces were on the brink of disaster, which automatically preclude even minimal opposition of the generals (Gutiérrez 632). Now, the situation is on the verge balance, where none of the parties has received either victory or defeat: on the one hand, government troops in recent years destroyed five founders, who actually kept the movement itself, and consistently leading the attack on rebel-controlled territory, while on the other hand, the "revolutionaries" stably retain influence in rural areas and have a steady income from the tax on coca growing peasants. Thirdly, the tactics of the past President on the principle of "the end justifies the means", aimed at the physical destruction of the rebels, changed to a more flexible under the new US plan called "Honorary sword" that paved the way for concessions from the militants: the rejection of the forced recruitment of young people, abductions and attacks.
While not knowing outcome of negotiations, the government has an alternative: a war until the complete physical destruction by the Sri Lankan option or integration of the FARC into politics as a separate political party, as it happened in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The experience in those Central American countries is particularly relevant for the agricultural southern Colombia, given the effectiveness of regulation by the principle of "land for weapons". Santos, realizing the inevitability of unemployment of the militants after demilitarization, invited them in exchange to participate in the fight against drugs.
Similarly, the FARC have also a choice between legalization and a continuation of the struggle. The first scenario occurred in 1985 during the first negotiations, when Belisario Betancourt created a party, but the deputies elected by the FARC and its members were almost completely exterminated, by the paramilitary Armed Forces troops. However, if the militants are still not afraid, they are expected to join the established "Patriotic March". However, this option is complicated by the already established bipartisan monopoly of the liberals and conservatives, which was actually one of the reasons for creating the FARC in 1964. As for the second scenario, it is unlikely that the insurgents can "bargain" the second FARCland from Santos and restore power like 15 years ago, because now the most influencing militants under attack of the government troops are on separate enclaves in the country and not able to do too much to regular troops. Moreover, after the defeat of the drug "states" Medellin and Cali, the government eliminated the need to fight on two fronts, which facilitates the task of the Armed Forces.
Summing it up, it is worth saying that the left powers in Colombia, represented by FARC, are not a threat to the central government already. Now the point is whether they will be able to create their political party and integrate themselves into the Colombia’s political system.
Mexico
Like Colombia, Mexico for many years in spite of constant tenure of right-wing forces, the radical lefties occasionally come into the political arena, aggravating the centrifugal tendencies in a federal country. January 1, 1994, when NAFTA came in power, in the most backward state of Chiapas on the Guatemalan border, 500 thousand armed Indian Mayan peasants rose in rebellion, having announced the creation of Zapatista Army of National Liberation. The cause of the uprising was huge deforestation carried out under the FTA with the US, as well as the Government's intention to create on the rich oil and uranium Indian lands a huge industrial zone. The rebels have made Mexico consent to the disclosure of their claims from the rostrum of Parliament by four leaders, led by Subcomandante Marcos (his real name is Rafael Guillen). Guerrilla commanders have stated that their struggle was aimed at restoration and protection of the national sovereignty of Mexico and is a part of the global anti-liberal revolution.
After that, federal troops were withdrawn from the state, and parliament passed the law on guarantees of the rights and cultural needs to the Indians and autonomy of their communities, but the struggle continued. 1 January 1996 the Zapatista National Liberation Front became legal nationwide public organization, which not only protects the rights of the Indians, but also acts against globalization and neo-liberalism (Marcos called globalization the fourth world war of "golden billion" against the rest of humanity). In April 2001, Subcomandante organized and led a peace march to Mexico City, which was attended by the symbol of the anti-globalization movement – the leader of the Peasant Confederation of France, José Bové, the Nobel laureate writer Joseph Samar, widow of French President Danielle Mitterrand, the companion of Che Guevara and leading leftist theorist Régis Debray. In 300,000-people meeting Marcos said that he had not intend to make weapons and offered to settle for compromises.
Mexico faces from time to time the threat of left turn because of the powerful radical left opposition in the country. In 2006, a new president became a native of Morelia and the state attorney Felipe Calderon, who represented the National Action Party. It seemed that the electoral race nearly won the mayor of Mexico City and the Party of Democratic Revolution, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, who became famous in office, repairing the historic center of the capital program of targeted assistance to the poor and the creation of "Metrobus" as well as his campaign under the slogan "The poor in the first place!". However, a few weeks before the elections, his opponents were able to portray him as a Mexican Hugo Chavez and a unrestrained radical. Since the difference between the both candidates was only 233 000 votes in favor of Calderon, Obrador decided that it gave him the right to demand full terms of election results. However, the Central Election Commission, referring to the conclusions of international observers, found no evidence to support this and September 5, 2006 announced the victory of Calderon. In response, radical left challenger announced the actions of civil disobedience, which paralyzed life in the center of Mexico City. This significantly undermined his popularity, because the capital's residents are not accustomed to such political turmoil, and Obrador eventually found himself defeated.
However, the program of Obrador had an impact on social and economic policy of the new president, who began to pay considerable attention to social transformation, in order to knock the weapons of the popularity among the poor from hands of Lopez Obrador. He launched the program "Oportunidades", covering 6 million families. The Secretariat of Social Development oversees its implementation in each of the 31 states. Even the New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg decided to explore the Mexican experience, and in 2007 visited Mexico City. Even today 52 million Mexicans still live in poverty, because the state has no money to make payments of significant amounts. Calderon also decided to introduce state regulation on the prices for tortillas (8.5 pesos per kilogram), after in 2007 white corn, which this "Mexican bread" is made of, had twice increased in price,
Before the 2012 elections, the radical left candidate Lopez Obrador managed to travel all over 2438 municipalities, claiming the electorate that he sees himself as the new champion in the war against poverty like Lula da Silva and the redistribution of wealth of oligarchs in favor of representatives of the common people, but this was not enough for the general victory. However, the election results on July 1, in which Nieto won 38 percent of votes, and Obrador only 31.5, showed a significant advantage of the new center-right candidate ("PENPIX-Mexico's Leftist Hope Struggles To Recapture Old Form").
Thus, despite the existence of traditions of guerrilla movement (as in Colombia) and the powerful radical left forces, in Mexico economic stability and right-wing politicians’ borrowing of some elements of socialist reforms minimizes the likelihood of the left turn.
Works cited
Eaton, K. "Recentralization And The Left Turn In Latin America: Diverging Outcomes In Bolivia, Ecuador, And Venezuela". Comparative Political Studies 47.8 (2013): 1130-1157. Web.
Gutiérrez, José. "FARC, The Longest Insurgency (Rebels Series)". Social Movement Studies14.5 (2014): 630-632. Web.
Kim, Young Chul. "Changes Of Political Formula And Lula Government In Brazil". jlas 33.1 (2014): 301. Web.
"PENPIX-Mexico's Leftist Hope Struggles To Recapture Old Form". Reuters. N.p., 2012. Web. 4 Apr. 2016.
Wiesehomeier, Nina, and David Doyle. "Discontent And The Left Turn In Latin America".PSRM 1.02 (2013): 201-221. Web.
