Introduction
Counterinsurgency refers to any efforts initiated by either civilians or governments; that are geared towards quelling or thwarting an uprising or a guerilla insurgency within a given jurisdiction. Since many insurgencies present very novel circumstances; it is imperative that the counterinsurgents are appraised with these situations and that they adjust to the given situation accordingly. The process of seeking a thorough understanding of the processes of the adverse party and conforming to the newly tailored measures of countering these processes is what is prominently referred to as learning and adaptability. Here is a concise analysis of the importance of learning and adaptation in maintaining a viable campaign against insurgents with specific reference to the US counterinsurgency in Iraq.
Background Information
Many organizations and institutions tasked with Counterinsurgency operations in many jurisdictions often have to contend with issues of diversity of identities and varied routines and norms in the country of mission. There is an overriding requirement to align their cultures and modus operandi to those of the community within which they have to operate. The need for such adjustments can be imposed by either the environment of the organizational setting or the general extrinsic conception of the whole community about the operations of the counterinsurgency campaign. Each military establishment has in itself an inherent organization culture. These are often beliefs and attitudes embedded within the military organization in a manner that they can dictate the preference of the institution regarding how the military instrument ought to be used. With the case of counterinsurgency operations especially in a foreign country, such organizational culture may not augur well with the conception of the community about military operations. It is this state of affairs that makes it necessary to employ learning and adaptability mechanisms so as to ensure that the efficacy of the mission is maintained.
The US Counterinsurgency in Iraq
The Counterinsurgency operation conducted by the United States within Iraq presents a concise illustration of the manner in which learning and adaptation can be of great help for any military force. In a bid to understand the sense in which the US military used learning and adaptation in Iraq, it would be prudent to first understand the traditional organizational culture of this institution. The US army's organization culture is based on two major principles; combat as a core activity and the role of a warrior. With this in mind, the Army is fond of high intensity military combat on one hand and in equal measure; it despises low intensity combats as well as asymmetrical warfare. Following this revelation, the army had not studied in depth the challenges of low intensity conflicts and thus challenges posed by such warfare were overlooked or addressed nominally.
Following this ineptitude in the analysis of the situation, by 2006, the probability of securing Anbar province were very slim. In fact, within Anbar, the City of Ramadi exhibited notoriety as regards the number of weekly attacks witnessed against the US marines. The whole City was within the control of Al Qaeda save for the Government Center, which was inhabited by a company of Marines. The belligerent force dictated the normative law in this area. For instance, they insisted on utmost purity of all people. Men were not allowed to shave while girls were not to access any formal education. There was no listening to music and all beauty parlors in the province were closed. It was imperative that urgent intervention was to be offered by the Marines so as to liberate the people from this type of cruelty.
The situation in Iraq was dire by the time the US troops entered the country. Anbar alone witnessed over 400 incidents of violence within one week in 2004. It is noteworthy that this situation dragged on, and two years later, the City's status was labeled by pundits to be irreparable. However, it took only two years to bring this region to almost normalcy whereby the incidences of violence were reduced to around fifty in one week. This is reflective of a paradigm shift in the approach that had been adopted by the forces in the country. This paper proceeds to discuss the learning and adaptive features that were manifested at that point and how this development turned the whole situation around.
It is not unusual for any kind of military force, especially Marines undertaking a Counterinsurgency mission to be engaged in battle without having understood the context of the region in which they are fighting. This occasionally happens during the very first phases of the mission because the troops will not have had sufficient time to learn and draw their work plan. This state of affairs is always summarized by the annotation that the war one prepares for is not the one which is ultimately fought. This was the case with US troops and they, therefore, had to start learning the environment and adapting new strategies of combating their half mute enemies.
The region most affected Sunni insurgency as intimated above was Anbar Province. By 2003, when the US started its mission in Iraq, unknown to the soldiers, Anbar was still that conservative region whose norms were highly informed by Bedouin traditions, Islam, and the general Arab culture. The most salient underpinnings of this culture were solidarity loyalty and honor. Thus, anyone who violates this ethos is brought to justice in the instant. In that case, violence and readiness to embrace war so as to protect their honor are two important factors that are prevalent in this instant. In addition to this, the region exhibited diverse interpretations of the Sunni law, and it was always hard to reach a consensus in most of the nut cracking issues. There are four schools of thought in this context; Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali, and Hanafi, and it is hard to discern the one that supersedes the other. However, the Hanbali interpretation is the strictest of all, and it seemed to dictate most of the discourse in the region. Also, ever since the state was founded, the mood in Iraq was a sense of independence from the west and mounting all types of resistance against interference from outside quarters. The US troops were oblivious of these facts, and this haunted their operations in the first days greatly.
The US engagement in Iraq portrayed significant goofs which did not take into account the nature of conflicts and cultures prevalent in the region. To start with, not knowing the nature of politics in the Country, there was no precise plan by the US government about what would happen after ousting Saddam Hussein. Therefore, rules were laid haphazardly in oblivion of the situation at hand. The first hasty and retrogressive decision was to ban the Ba'athist movement which had been heralded by Saddam and to prevent it from participating in national politics. This decision alone led to the loss of almost 800,000 jobs, and many youths became idler. That is how hard it was to subsequently govern the country. The Sunni felt targeted across the country, and they would do anything to reclaim their lost glory.
Another irrational decision that was made in the early days was the disbanding of the Iraqi Army. This decree sent home around 300 armed soldiers, most of them Sunni. The disgruntlement of these soldiers alone was well enough to wreak havoc in the whole country. Also, the US turned down the offer and allegiance of tribes and sheiks who had accepted to further the mission of the army through facilitating government tasks. Instead, the approach that was adopted could well go down as suppressing the factions in the ultimate. Furthermore, the new US regime adopted a retributive strategy in which they were more inclined towards oppressing the hardline Sunni regions which were mostly favored by Saddam Hussein on one hand and the other sought to elevate the areas which had been previously oppressed by the dictator. This was another mistake because it further escalated the division in the region instead of making amends.
Realizing how important all these factors had been regarding the war in Iraq, the heads of operation decided to adapt to the new knowledge and slightly change their strategy. To start with, the put first the security plight of the population. This move was aimed at gaining confidence in the public eye and appealing for cooperation from the people. They, therefore, recruited and trained a larger police force and army to counter the deficit inflicted by the sacking of many soldiers. This commitment and relentless battles in Ramadi; the most dangerous province; laid an assurance to Sheikhs, who started supporting US operations in their country after brief negotiations. Having gained the trust of Sheikhs and bringing them on board was also a positive move because it signified acceptance of their cultures and traditions. Therefore, this motivated the clergymen to mobilize more youth into joining the police force. All these adaptive measures were essential in restoring peace in the region, and they evidently made up for the lost time and efforts.
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated how hard it is for a counterinsurgency mission to succeed without first having prior knowledge about many aspects of the country. It has also highlighted the importance of learning and adapting to the new concepts learned so as to achieve the best results. Essentially, such a mission is worn by the initial investigative knowledge. Lack of this paves the way for a chain of losses before a winning formula is redefined.
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