The numerous counts of torture by members of the the United States (US) Army committed against prisoners of Abu Ghraib in Iraq in 2003 transpired from a series of policy changes that created conditions allowing such acts to occur. A closer look at the history of policy changes reveals that officials starting from the topmost position held by President George W. Bush have set forth a chain of actions committed by lower officials in a descending manner based on their positions. From cabinet secretaries down to the Army generals and other officers directly responsible for handling Abu Ghraib, policy changes have influenced the thinking of members of the 372nd Military Police Company, the ones who committed torture against prisoners. The manifested pattern of policy changes that led to the torture of prisoners in Abu Ghraib duly reflects the importance of the concept of administrative responsibility (Stillman, 2009).
The efficiency and effectiveness of public administration lies on the observation of administrative responsibility by public administrators. Yet, the nature of administrative responsibility itself has become questionable. Where does administrative responsibility lie? The foregoing question has become the subject of a long-standing debate between two public administration experts – Carl Joachim Friedrich and Herman Finer. Friedrich emphasized the importance of professionalism among public administrators, saying that prompt concern and action towards fulfilling the needs of the people characterize administrative responsibility. Finer, on the other hand, contended that administrative responsibility comes from political authority legitimated by elective institutions that control the bureaucracy, which in turn ensures democracy. Without observing legitimate political authority, Finer noted, public administrators cannot claim to be administratively responsible. The aforementioned views on administrative responsibility presented by Friedrich and Finer bears great relevance to the Abu Ghraib torture case, which could have been avoided, had the officials involved became more responsible in their administration of policy changes (Stillman, 2009).
President Bush himself established that preventing acts of torture from happening is of great public interest, despite seemingly contradicting himself by saying that the Geneva Conventions do not apply for Al-Qaeda. Taking the stand of Friedrich, due observation of administrative responsibility could have prevented torture in Abu Ghraib if only the personalities that committed policy changes have imbued a greater sense of foresight. Policy changes should have gone through deeper assessments of possible implications so that the personalities from the top down could have prevented the idea on the permissibility of torture from reaching and influencing members of the 372nd Military Police Company. The perspective of Finer also finds due relevance in the Abu Ghraib torture case. President Bush failed to fulfill the mandate of his legitimate political authority in excluding the coverage of Geneva Conventions from the case of Al-Qaeda, which set forth a chain reaction of policy changes that led to torture of prisoners, despite his clear assertion of the position of the United Nations (UN) that torture is unacceptable in any setting (Stillman, 2009).
Applicability of the Views of Friedrich and Finer on the Abu Ghraib Torture
Both the views of Friedrich and Finer on administrative responsibility duly apply to the Abu Ghraib torture case. However, a perusal of the proximate causes reveals that the perspective of Finer provides a robust would-have-been solution to the controversy at Abu Ghraib. The pattern of policy changes leading to torture shows that President Bush himself has rejected the application of the Geneva Conventions in the fight of the US against Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Interestingly, Bush has encountered dissent from his very own State Secretary, Colin Powell, who recognized that the resultant torture would serve as a drawback for them before the international community. Secretary Powell feared that a heavy backlash against the US from the international community would result from the intent of President Bush to treat US attacks against Al-Qaeda as cases beyond the coverage of the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, had President Bush gave greater regard to the mandate coming from his legitimate political authority as the most powerful elected personality of the US responsible for sparing it from international humiliation, he could have avoided the subsequent chain of policy changes that led to the devastatingly controversial outcomes at Abu Ghraib. Although it is also correct to treat the position of Friedrich as amenable, given the perceivably lack of foresight exhibited by the officials who initiated policy changes leading to the torture, the sheer ambiguity of the statement President Bush released on the non-applicability of the Geneva Conventions against Al-Qaeda served as the root of the problem. President Bush is in a position wherein he has the responsibility to protect the overall well-being of the US through his wisdom. The fact that President Bush did not fully clarify his stand against the Geneva Conventions to the extent that it would affect tortures against prisoners of war has resulted to an untenable sequence of events that placed the US in a deeply humiliating position antithetical to its usual assertion favoring democracy and human rights. Therefore, President Bush stands as the main person who has lacked administrative responsibility in ensuring that the conduct of military operations against Al-Qaeda would not involve violations of basic internationally recognized conventions on human rights (Stillman, 2009).
Securing Public Interest
Public interest serves as the root of administrative responsibility, one that public administrators should fulfill in their official capacities. To secure public interest, it is important for public administrators to recognize the boundaries set by the legitimate political authority imparted unto them, while maintaining their sense of openness and responsiveness to anything the public states as major concerns for resolution. Therefore, it makes sense to assert that public administration should always cover the public interest. Engaging the public in participatory discourses is one way in which public administrators could ensure administrative responsibility. Since public administrators are, or representatives of elected officials whose mandate directly lie on the people through elections, they must always listen to the concerns listed by the public as among their interests. Transparency is perhaps the main virtue imbued within the need to encourage participatory governance that could generate factors that define public interest. At the same time, transparency is also present when public interest finds translation to policies. The public, especially concerned stakeholders should have information on the composition of policies so that they could introduce modifications or express their full consent or dissent. Accountability comes next after policy implementation, in which public administrators could hold themselves responsible over policy matters. Therefore, securing public interest comes through observing administrative responsibility and the cardinal administrative virtues of transparency and accountability. The foregoing prevents a repeat of the Abu Ghraib torture case and ensures the integrity of public administration (Stillman, 2009).
References
Stillman, R. (2009). Public administration: Concepts and cases. Independence, KY: Cengage Learning.
