Iran’s Nuclear Threat
REGIONAL STABILITY, GLOBAL SECURITY
Regional Stability, Global Security: Finding a Workable Answer to Iran’s Nuclear Threat
In the modern world, “rogue” states have become adept at wielding the threat of nuclear weaponry in the global political arena and wringing concessions from developed nations that have, at best, an imprecise knowledge of whether, and at what stage of development, nations like North Korea and Iran possess nuclear capability. It is a matter of intense interest among America’s intelligence and diplomatic communities to determine whether the persistently belligerent regime in Iran seeks political leverage against Israel and the United States, or whether it is using diplomatic subterfuge to mask a concerted and aggressive build-up aimed at some pointed political objective. Which leads to the fundamental question: Does a nuclear Iran pose a threat to the Middle East and, by extension, the world? The success with which the Ahmadinejad regime has kept the rest of the world guessing speaks to the true nature of nuclear power in the 21st century. Once a means of mutual deterrence between the United States and Soviet Union, today it is a potential instrument of terror that Iran can use to deceive and intimidate its enemies. The two-fold challenge of the situation is to determine how serious a threat the Iranians pose, and what objectives they seek to achieve through the threat of nuclear power. Such an investigation will reveal that the Iranians seek make political gains in the Middle East through the threat of a nuclear program, a scenario that poses a threat to regional stability.
Background of deception:
For many years, the United States was alone in its concerns over the presence of nuclear materials in Iran. By the mid-1990s, the opinion of the international community was changing significantly as it became clear that Tehran had carried on a campaign of deception about the
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“intents and extent ” of what was clearly a nascent nuclear weaponry program (Shaffer 2003). Writing in Arms Control Today, Brenda Shaffer argues that Iran’s nuclear program is part of an aggressive foreign policy stance. It enables Iran to pursue one of several options in terms of what facilities and what kind of raw material they may use in producing nuclear weaponry (Shaffer 2003). When then-President Mohammed Khatami confirmed that Iran would refuse to return spent reactor fuel to Russia, the country’s deception was laid bare. Russia and America’s allies, many of whom had been reluctant to upset trade relations with Iran, denounced the regime’s nuclear policy.
How viable a threat?
Richard Garwin wrote that in 2005, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq concluded that there was very little chance that Iran could produce sufficient amounts of uranium to produce a nuclear weapon “before early to mid-next decade” (Garwin 2008, 41). Garwin adds that one of the foremost experts on the subject, former director of U.S. national intelligence John Negroponte said in 2006 that “We don’t have clear-cut knowledge. But the estimate that we have made is that sometime between the beginning of the next decade and the middle of the next decade, Iran might be in a position to have a nuclear weapon” (Garwin 2008, 41). Negroponte’s use of the qualifier “might” does little to dilute the potential threat posed by a nuclear-capable Iran. Based on the NIE assessment, and the experience of experts in the field, it is reasonable to assume that in 2013 Iran is close to having achieved nuclear capacity.
In a 2007 Tikkun article, Stephen Zunes essentially concurred with the NIE findings. Zunes argued that Iran’s disregard of international restrictions against the enrichment of uranium
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indicated a high level of intent to develop nuclear missile weaponry. However, Zunes’ estimated timetable mirrored the NIE projections. “More than likely, Iran has not yet mastered the technique for turning uranium in uranium gas, which is necessary to reproduce highly enriched uraniumthere is no evidence that Iran has developed a design of a missile re-entry vehicle that could carry a nuclear warhead (a significant distance). Indeed, Iran is unlikely to have a single deployable nuclear warhead until at least the year 2015” (Zunes 2007, 29-32). It should be remembered that Iran has had a nuclear program of some sort since 1957. In that era, the United States was fully committed to supporting the Shah’s reign in Iran and to providing military support. The U.S. sought to convince the Iranians to cease nuclear development, which was met with resistance. In 1975, the Ford administration approved the sale of eight nuclear reactors, followed by laser technology in 1976, which could be used to process uranium (Zunes 2007, 29-32).
But even if Iran has by now obtained the ability to process uranium, how likely is it that it could produce a missile with appreciate range? The country’s only known ballistic missiles with a range of 1,000 kilometers are its Shahab-3 missiles, of which Iran is estimated to have anywhere from 25 to 100 (Garwin 2008, 40). Iran could, by trading payload for range, increase its nuclear reach to about 1,000 miles, plenty long enough to threaten the Middle East and the Gulf region. The NIE report indicated that Iran is “determined” to produce nuclear weapons. As such, it is logical to assume that Iran is just as determined to bring as many enemies and potential enemies within the reach of a nuclear arsenal.
Ali Rahigh-Aghsan and Peter Jakobsen argue that Iran’s aggressive move toward nuclear
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capability constitutes a direct response to the Ahmadinejad regime’s perceptions of the country’s military weaknesses. This perspective posits a kind of national inferiority complex, against which the Iranians have reacted violently and defiantly. Consequently, Iran has reached out to sympathetic governments in the international community to enhance its indigenous missile technology. Iran “has purchased North Korean Scud-B, Scud-C, and No-dong ballistic missiles, and has used this technology to develop the Shahab-1, -2 and -3 missiles” (Rahigh-Aghsan and
Jakobsen 2010, 562). Furthermore, Iran initiated a satellite program in 2009 and had a
successful test of its new Sajil-2 missile, an upgraded delivery system that can carry its payload considerably farther than Iran’s previous generations of missiles.
The debate over whether Iran is capable of processing uranium and producing nuclear missiles continue to rage in the international community. Official accounts of the situation, such as the NIE report and various “think tank” assessments, indicate that Iran’s success at putting off international scrutiny has given the country ample time to develop its nuclear program. As such, Iran is thought to be closing in on nuclear capability. On the other hand, news organizations like Reuters report that such claims are exaggerated and that Iran is much farther away from mounting a nuclear threat than many have claimed. Ultimately, the question must be narrowed to whether or not Iran is working toward the development of a nuclear arsenal. At this point, there seems very little doubt that this is the case. If so, Israel, the U.S. and other directly concerned parties must adopt a watchful, defensive posture in the assumption that eventually there will be a new member of the global nuclear community.
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Does a nuclear Iran pose a threat to the world?
Subsequent attempts by the international community to discern the level of threat presented by a nuclear Iran, and to pressure the Iranians to desist, speak not so much to the regime’s ability to launch a nuclear device but to the dire threat the situation poses to stability in the world’s most volatile region. Not only does a nuclear-capable Iran constitute a danger to Israel, it has motivated members of the Islamic community, like Saudi Arabia, to expand their own military power and even to seek nuclear capability. Thus, Iran has not fired a nuclear weapon but the potential of such a threat has already had a destabilizing effect (Jafarzadeh 2008).
In this sense, Iran certainly does pose a threat to the Middle East and the world.
Gawdat Bahgat observes that it is up to Iran’s Middle Eastern neighbors to decide how serious a threat Iran presents, and that their response will be crucial. In a 2011 article entitled “A Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East: Myth or Reality?,” Bahgat argues that the region may well find a way to come to terms with an Iran with nuclear capability. Bahgat notes that the Middle East has grown used to living alongside a nuclear country in Israel, and that Turkey’s nuclear capacity is also well-known. “A nuclear Iran, if it materializes, would not pose a serious enough threat to Arab countries for them to pursue a nuclear weapons option. Furthermore, given the heavy political and financial price for pursuing a nuclear weapons program, Arab countries are not likely to engage in a nuclear arms race with Tehran” (Bahgat 2011, 28). And yet, as has been discussed, the mere idea of a looming Iranian nuclear threat has been enough to send other Middle Eastern states scrambling. This is destabilization.
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Presumably, as a threat to peace, a nuclear Iran would cause many other nations in the Middle East to establish or step up their own nuclear weapons programs. This is the generally accepted modus operandi of the principle of nuclear deterrence, a simple matter of mutually assured destruction in which contending sides pointedly avoid using nuclear weapons as a matter of survival. In the modern world, and in light of the power of nuclear weaponry, deterrence is, at best, a complex and tenuous proposition. It was “a staple of the Cold War and post-Cold War world and it works very simply: in an unforgiving world ‘weak’ (non-nuclear) countries do what they can to survive. One way is to ally with a nuclear power that promises to retaliate on their behalf if they are attacked – thus functions the system of extended deterrence” (Patrikarakos 2012, 66). It is true that this principle worked, albeit narrowly. Yet it created a network of alliances, many of which yielded bitter fruit.
Perspective:
In the Middle East, Israel’s nuclear capacity is generally considered a matter of self-preservation in a political ocean of antagonists, Iran chief among them. Iran’s perspective on nuclear weaponry, to judge by the words used by Ahmadinejad himself, is of a far more aggressive stripe. Iran has, since the Khomeini era, been one of Islam’s most aggressively expansionist members. Jihad has proven a dangerously destabilizing force, leading either directly or indirectly to repeated warfare and international intervention in the Gulf, Iraq and
Afghanistan. In other words, Iranian nuclear capability is about the spread of Islam and, on
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another level, about holding the West political hostage on key issues. In this sense, a nuclear Iran poses a threat as a proponent of jihad, and as a rogue state willing to threaten nuclear warfare to get what it wants in the region.
But even as a vehicle for Islamic aggression, how serious a threat could a nuclear Iran truly pose? In a 2012 article in Washington Monthly entitled “We Can Live With a Nuclear Iran,” Paul Pillar contends that the issue has been “overhyped” in the media (2012). The international media (particularly in the U.S.) often does not offer a balanced view of the situation, overlooking key elements. “If Iran acquired the bomb, Israel would retain overwhelming military superiority, with its own nuclear weapons – which international think tanks estimate to number at least 100 and possibly 200 – conventional forces, and delivery systems that would continue to outclass by far anything Iran will have” (Pillar 2012). Pillar argues that the political considerations that are particular to the Middle East necessarily elevate consideration of nuclear war in the Middle East to a dangerous, crisis-level status. Pillar argues that “an Iranian nuclear weapon would not be an existential threat to Israel and would not give Iran a license to become more of a regional troublemaker” (Pillar 2012). There are too many military and economic obstacles for Iran to overcome, obstacles that mitigate the threat that even a nuclear Iran could pose. Israel, Saudi Arabia and their American ally have too many options at their disposal to permit Iran to accrue too much military or political influence in the region.
If one takes this position at face value, then Iran’s nuclear belligerence proceeds from a far more Machiavellian motivation, and an understanding that the use of nuclear weapons could
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only produce very limited results, if any. In 2010, the Middle East Journal published a
article that considered multiple scenarios, none of which are workable for a nuclear Iran. Rahigh-Aghsan and Jakobsen argue that fears of an Iran capable of legitimately threatening regional and global security are unfounded for several reasons:
- Iran’s power is too limited to dominate the Middle East
- The country’s particular version of Shi’ism does not translate well outside of Iran
- The economic and political instability that would result from nuclear aggression would drastically hamper Iran’s attempts at exerting itself militarily or ideologically
- The Iranian regime’s ability to hoodwink Western nations and international observers has created a tendency to underestimate the ability of the U.S. and its regional/global allies to counter Iranian aggression, even in the face of nuclear aggression (Rahigh-Aghsan and Jakobsen 2010, 559-573).
Many observers have argued that the United States should prepare for military intervention, possibly in the form of a massive air and missile attack. Many scenarios illustrate that the failure to remove the problem, while there is still time, would only make the situation more volatile. Author Matthew Kroenig argues in favor of a military strike and criticizes those who oppose direct action as unappreciative of the situation. Kroenig writes that they “fail to appreciate the true danger that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose to U.S. interests in the Middle East and beyond” (2012). There is simply too much danger involved in failing to act. Those countries who would be most threatened by a nuclear Iran would simply be acting in the interest of national security.
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Kroenig contends that “a military strike intended to destroy Iran’s nuclear program, if managed carefully, could spare the region and the world a very real threat and dramatically improve the long-term national security of the United States” (Kroenig 2012). Israel and the U.S., working together, are clearly well-positioned to take precise, strategic action in the Middle East. However, one must consider the ongoing implications of such action, which can be attributed to the vengeful and defensive perspective that Ahmadinejad has expressed so forcefully.
Conclusion:
Journalist Seymour Hersh, assessing the Iranian nuclear situation in 2006, disagrees with the military option, citing regional complications that have only been exacerbated by American military action in the region. Hersh argues that bombing Iranian nuclear facilities, or to be seen as attacking Iranian forces, would leave Ahmadinejad with a heightened moral profile in the Middle East, and would virtually preclude the possibility of a regime change. Hersh quotes an American diplomat who insists that a political solution is the only supportable route open to the U.S. “If you attack, Ahmadinejad will be the new Saddam Hussein of the Arab world, but with more credibility and more power. You must bite the bullet and sit down with the Iranians” (Hersh 2006). If the Iranians seek regional domination and a more influential position on the world stage, then it must be concluded that the Iranians do pose a threat. Thus, a diplomatic solution should first be tried, one that encourages the Iranians to comply with international law and emphasizes the desirability of cooperating with countries, like the United States, that have the power and economic influence to aid, or hamper, Iran’s development. In this way, a
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pervasive and lasting solution may best be found that respects and maintains Iran’s national sovereignty and security.
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References
Bahgat, G. “Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of Saudi Arabia.” Middle East Journal, 60(3),
Summer 2006.
Garwin, R.L. “Evaluating Iran’s Missile Threat.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 64(2),
May/June 2008, 40-43.
Hersh, S.M. “The Iran Plans.” New Yorker, 8 April 2006.
Jafarzadeh, A. (2008). The Iran Threat: President Ahmedinejad and the Coming Nuclear Crisis,
New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Kroenig, M. “Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike is the Least Bad Option.” Foreign Affairs,
2012.
Patrikarakos, D. Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State. London: I.B. Tauris, 2012.
Pillar, P.R. “We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran.” Washington Monthly, March/April 2012.
Rahigh-Aghsan, A. and Jakobsen, P.V. “The Rise of Iran: How Durable, How Dangerous?” The
Middle East Journal, 64(4), Autumn 2010, pp. 559-573.
Shaffer, B. “Iran at the Nuclear Threshold.” Arms Control Today, November 2003.
Zunes, S. “The Iranian Nuclear Threat.” Tikkun, 22(1), 29-32.
