During some recent years, after the 9/11, Al-Qaeda, the dreaded terrorist organization, has experienced huge flak, but of course has virtually spearheaded an expansionist movement in the name of “jihadist movement” across the world to continue the terrorist activities of Osama Bin Laden. In this article some of the few examples relating to Al-Qaeda’s ideological, strategic plus structural adaptations are being discussed. The article also gives a fact sheet of the contemporary weakness and strength of Al-Qaeda. In its unabated jihadi movement, Al-Qaeda’s continuous fanning many violent activities of others by orienting that violence to the United States in particular, and in addition to its allies in general in a well planned game of hate and warfare with the foster dichotomous warfare in the context of “us versus them” between the international community and Muslim world.
In spite of many hurdles Al-Qaeda is adopting different tactics that they had adopted a decade ago. The aggregate ideological, strategic and structural frameworks are although changed in a massive way but the type of jihadi threat to the rest of the world, especially against the west, is remaining as the same.
This newly adopted type of threat is not only still catastrophic it is seemingly posing to be more dangerous. The counterterrorism efforts are bent upon countering and disrupting the terrorist capabilities as were experienced earlier prior to 9/11. The latest multifaceted jihad around the globe will continue to execute greater number of terrorist activities in different locations through the more different cadre of dreaded terrorists spanning different ideological spectrum.
Strategic changes in responding to explosive incidents after 9/11.
Al-Qaeda's Strategic, Ideological and Structural Adaptations since 9/11
Introduction
A growing sense was rampant among the counterterrorist analysts with the approach of 10th year of the September, 2011 attack. All most all the academia and analysts from policy community viewed that terrorist organization, Al-Qaeda has become substantially weak during the last ten years and destined to remain subdued in the battle towards its foes. This was due to the assassination of terrorist CEO Bin Laden and other important leaders of the movement; near defeat or defeat of many franchisees of Al-Qaeda franchisees beyond the territory of Pakistan; huge volleys of ideological wars were let lose against the Al-Qaeda by some former allies; a number of protests shaking the Northern parts of African States and Middle Eastern countries at the beginning of 2011. Although, the social protests in Yemen, Tunisia, Syria, Bahrain, Egypt and in the different parts of the world were non violent, but they were the striking counter example of Al-Qaeda’s emphasis on power change in those areas constituting Middle East.
In spite of the above facts of organizational setbacks, yet Al-Qaeda’s success in the expansionist types of global jihadist upheaval can not be undermined. Even after 10 years of counter terrorism, Al-Qaeda is still mobilizing its followers from different countries. Nevertheless, the inter-woven activities among Core organization of Al-Qaeda (AQC), its affiliated groups, inspired adherents and associated groups are growing their violent activities in an unabated manner.
There are many incidents, both unsuccessful and successful, have come in to light during the last ten years, specially in the last few years, serving as the unforgettable reminder of the jihadi movements are still devoted to attacking its foes that also mostly with ingenuity.
There are many examples, mentioned below, where the plots of different organizations’ geographic, tactical and organizational operatives of the violence are emanating through their global jihadi activities.
Al-Qaeda
Affiliated Organisations
August 27, 2009, is the evidence of another assassination attempt by an operative of Qaeda in the peninsula of Arab country, Abdullah Hassan Talea Asiri, on Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, Interior Minister (Assistant) of Saudi Arabia, by the attack with a devastating item (PETN) Pentaerythritol tetranitrate - explosive device hiding inside underwear. On the Christmas Day of the same year, i.e. post 9/11, Umar Farouk Abdulab, Nigerian and AQAP trained, tried to detonate explosive in the same fashion as adopted by Abdullah Hassan Talea Asiri, in the flight 253 of Northwest Airlines. In the late 2010, a third variation by placing PETN within the printer cartridge, by the mastermind of AQAP, which was shipped in cargo plane, was the plan to detonate over the US continent.
Ideological, Strategic and Structural Evolution by Al-Qaeda after 9/11
As United States and its allies were determined to crash the terrorist groups following the September 2011, Qaeda group adapted, as the necessity or new design, new strategy, ideology and structural evolution.
Changes in the Al-Qaeda emphasis on strategic Evolution
It is a proven truth that Al-Qaeda adapts different strategies which is their frequent matters of degree instead of their type. This is their organizational change and organizational continuity.
Their renewed strategies are enumerated as below;
1) As they lost their training camp infrastructures, corresponding centrality within their jihadi groups after the fallout of 9/11, Qaeda group increased their media productions. The media production increase was their reflection of graduating as a solid terrorist organization in the quest of seeking to capitalize their newly formed brand recognition. AQC took up the agenda of setting power to their Internet arm, being influenced by Younis Tsouli, commonly known as (aka Irhabi007) and Abu Musab al-Suri. The assertion of Ayman al-Zawahiri revealed that at least 50% of their war against Crusader-Zionist enemies could make coverage in the media. If we go through the official releases of their media productions, it increased from 6 in the year 2002 to the strength of 11 in the next year, 13 in the year 2004, it increased up to16 in the following year, the figure increased up to 58 during the year 2006 while in the year 1997 it reached up to 97 releases. But it came down to 49 in the next year but again reached to 79 in the year 2009, but dropped again in the year 2010.
2) The next strategic step of Al-Qaeda’s evolution as was seen after September 2011 was its adherence to exploit the weakness of the countries in the west. Qaeda had intensely identified, monitored and exploited the gaps in the defenses of the west by studying the western literatures and by downloading the western websites’ materials. A new outfit of publications in the name of “jihadi strategic tactics” writings were the example of the new jehadi tactics were drawn on the line of western country based secular rationalist forces which identified and analyzed the weaknesses of Muslims and Western countries and considered economic, political and cultural factors pertaining to the conflicts and recommended statistics in a realistic way.
The jihadi magazine, Inspire in English was published by Qaeda’s publication wing (AQAP) in the Peninsula of Arabian countries had illustrated about this trend. The inaugural edition by Anwar al-Awlaki, published a message, I quote here, “Message to the American People and Muslims in the West”, an article featuring to the point of intolerance in the matter of religious fervors for the Muslims living in the US. Anwar al-Awlaki, a dual Yemeni and US citizen contextualized his prediction by the examples of racisms retrieved from American historical references, like proposed Quran burnings as well the aggressions over the establishments like mosques to vociferously stating Anwar al-Awlaki’s arguments and reiterate Al-Qaeda narrative of war against Islamic sentiments.
3) Post 2011, September attack, Al-Qaeda has turned to be more politically motivated in terms of communiqués and the targeting and timing of their attacks. Qaeda had strived to make a wall between the US and its patronisers while attacking against British, German, Spanish and other likeminded forces to sabotage the combined efforts towards the war preparations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries. In 2004 Bin Laden’s truce offer to the European world had aimed to achieve the similar goal by withholding the offer to America. That was not the end, the group started exploiting the political calendar of the Western world, as was clear in the attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004, when Spanish presidential election was offing. Another plot, as was assessed by Brynjar Lia and Peter Nesser, could not happen in Oslo in Norway in the month of July 2010, indicating the interest of Al-Qaeda for attacking the peripheries of the Western countries’ allies with the Israel and United States.
4) The next adaptation of Al-Qaeda was economic jihad by mainly targeting the oil producers in the Gulf States and in the Middle East Countries. Before 9/11 Laden, in his 1996 declaration of war had clearly indicated the massive importance of the oil reserves, when he motivated the mujahideen by his pulsating words. Al-Qaeda’s emphasis towards these targets were over by the close of 2004, the Month of December, 2004 Laden’s call was to bleed-until-end. He termed the western countries’ oil purchase at that time of market price was nothing but the “biggest theft in any history”. He furthered to inflame the Muslim sentiments by his fiery speech. Before a year could pass a Qaeda group tried to attack a major oil field in Dammam in Saudi Arabia followed by breaching the security of the biggest oil processing plant of the world at Abqaiq in February 2006, of course, the attack failed to sabotage the entire production but it proved the group’s escalating focus on the economic strengths of its foes.
In the special circulation of ‘Inspire’, a recent example was reported about the celebration of rationale of the group’s attrition strategy. The magazine’s cover page superimposed the “$4200” on the top of the blurred print of the UPS jet, to signify the reduced price tags while targeting the air-cargo industries.
Ideological Dilution of the terrorist group:
(From their image of Elitist Organization and shifting to Catch-All image Movement)
After the 9/11, Al-Qaeda had endeavored to spread the focus area of its propaganda and recruitment campaigns. But before September 2011, had exclusively appealed to the Muslims, but changed its tone by adopting more rhetoric through popular means after 9/11 to catch the wider audience even targeting the non-Muslims. Among some of the favored propaganda by the Al-Qaeda was intended to provoke anti-Americanism towards the ‘infidel’ camp and disturbing the American social fabric along the racial lines.
How Air traveling was changed after 9/11?
When terrorists attacked American homeland territory on 9/11 by using American domestic passenger airliner as a guided weapon, which was on scheduled flight, made a new era of aviation as the suicide warrior changing everything. It was also feared that smuggled explosives might have caused the Pan AM UTA flight. It was a well coordinated aircraft hijackings, carried out successfully from four directions without the use of firearms.
The lessons learned
The lessons of onboard security were learned, and so new provisions were made for onboard security. New drills came into place for the crew members in the event of hijacking, passenger responses due to the suspicious behavior of the fellow passengers. Cabin and onboard cockpit security was revolutionized and the airport security was completely revamped.
SUICIDE FACTOR
Suicide factors were foreseen but authorities did not want to discuss or publicize it because of ramification of accepting the fact as the real risk.
The 9/11 episode completely invalidated many of the existing security procedures, which if properly could have been exercised could have prevented the Pan Am and UTA types of episodes in 9/11.
Today, as the fallout of the 9/11 cockpit doors are needed to be armoured as well locked through out the flight, video cameras are needed to be installed for the pilots to watch on the risky activities inside the flight.
Conclusion
Even after much talk about the most powerful countries and the lobbies in the world in the context of post 9/11, the Strategic changes in responding to explosive incidents after 9/11 are very much poignant in the different happenings around the world. All though about the imminent demise of Al-Qaeda, but the factual matter is, it has capitalized on many numbers of its core strengths that ensures its existence and relevance at least in the near future.
This is evident that it has regrouped in the Pakistan-Afghan border. It has also reestablished a safe-heaven, maybe in a limited way, in the active conflict zones, enabling the group to get in touch with the other like minded groups for fundraising, training, networking and waiting for the most opportunistic moments to make another 9/11, if not more catastrophic than that.
References:
Bill Braniff and Assaf Moghadam
P. Bergen and B. Hoffman, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat,” op. cit., p. 21.
Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “The Almanac of Al-Qaeda,” Foreign Policy, May/June 2010
“Online News Hour” website, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html
GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm
Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, Report No.2007/02729, 28-29;
Yassin Musharbash, Die Neue Al Qaida: Innenansichten eines lernenden Terrornetzwerkes (Cologne, Germany: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2006).
The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008)
Rafael Pantucci, “Operation Praline: The Realization of Al-Suri’s Nizam, la Tanzim,
Hanna Rogan, “Al-Qaeda’s Online Media Strategies: From Abu Reuter to Irhabi 007
